SOVIET SOCIETY IN THE ERA OF LATE SOCIALISM, 1964–1985

Edited by NERINGA KLUMBYTĖ
and GULNAZ SHARAFUTDINOVA

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Introduction
What Was Late Socialism?
Neringa Klumbytė and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova

When the Soviet Union—the world's first and largest socialist experiment—collapsed in 1991, socialism appeared dead. Other milestone events in the socialist world had taken place only a few years earlier: the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Polish and Hungarian Round Tables, and popular protests at Tiananmen Square and in Tbilisi, as well as the breakdown of old regimes in Brazil and Chile. These various events, eclipsed by the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall, prompted some scholars to triumphantly declare the victory of liberalism and democracy and even announce the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1989). The Soviet collapse validated a pre-existing narrative about the immorality and inadequacy of the Soviet regime, long expressed through such idioms as "evil empire." As wittily asserted by Sheila Fitzpatrick about the end of the Soviet Union, while people speak only well of the dead, "When a regime dies, observers take this as a proof of its inadequacy ('not fit to survive'), so the convention for speaking of 'recently deceased' regimes is *nothing but bad*" (Fitzpatrick 2007, 51). The moral ranking of states, in which "the West" is superior to "the East," has been validated as well. As Deanna Davidson notes regarding Germany, the Western economic victory over socialism became capitalist democracy's moral victory. This moral ranking is still part of the fundamental cultural knowledge that underlies mainstream academic and official discursive norms (Davidson 2007, 215).

Alas, "dizzy with success" over the seeming victory of liberalism and democracy, the West was quickly disappointed with what came next—the rise of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in Russia and many other former Soviet republics. Declaring the break-up of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the twentieth century, Russian President Vladimir Putin challenged the Western triumphalist accounts of the "end of history."[1] The August 2008 war with Georgia and other signs of Russia's geopolitical reassertion have intensified discussions among scholars about a new Cold War (Lukas 2008; Sakwa 2008), consigning any remaining notions of any victory of liberalism to the margins of contemporary political history.

Throughout the two decades following the collapse of the USSR, socialism increasingly gained symbolic power, as millions of people living in the post-Soviet countries turned their gaze to the past, caught up with feelings of nostalgia and longing for stability, order, and predictability—qualities sorely lacking in the new post-Soviet milieu. In an October 2011 interview with Dozhd television, Dmitry Peskov, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's press secretary, said, "Brezhnev wasn't a minus for the history of our country, he was a huge plus. He laid the foundation of the economy, agriculture, etc."[2] Although Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev is usually associated with economic and political stagnation and tension with the West that ultimately led to the Soviet Union's collapse, nostalgia and new reinterpretations of late Soviet history invite us to ask again, what was "late socialism"?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most scholars avoided research topics related to

late socialism, focusing instead on earlier periods in Soviet history. In part, these choices could be explained by the opening of Soviet archives and corresponding new opportunities to revisit the Soviet past. But the near absence of research on late socialism is indicative of something more than restricted access to data on the recent past. Scholars who included late socialism in their works usually associated this period with "stagnation"—a time when there was relatively no change in the economy, society, or politics. The most extraordinary and dramatic eras of Soviet history—the revolutionary and Stalinist periods—seemingly have been more captivating to scholars than the era of relative stability. Yet the many people who actually lived, experienced, and even shaped late socialism could have provided researchers with rich ethnographic data.[3]

This book explores social, political, and cultural life in the European part of the USSR from Brezhnev's accession to power in 1964 to Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* reforms that began in 1985. Our biggest challenge is not reevaluating the views and questions that dominated the scholarly discourse about this period. That task seems to have been superseded by the realities of the Soviet collapse and the inability of those working within the old paradigms to "imagine" it from a different angle.[4] Developing a new approach to studying late socialism involves asking new questions and providing new perspectives. In this volume we argue against the understanding of late Soviet socialism in largely orientalist idioms; namely, as backward, oppressive, irrational, and immoral. The authors included here have opted to provincialize the West in scholarship and to recognize and acknowledge the ordinary Soviet experience.[5]

An interdisciplinary endeavor, the volume combines work by historians, sociologists, literary critics, and anthropologists. Our account of the long-neglected social history of late socialism emphasizes that this period was not only characterized by economic stagnation and confrontations among the state authorities, dissidents, and other citizens, but also by genuine beliefs in socialist values, voluntary involvement in creating Soviet socialism, the liberalization of social, economic, and political life, and a dialogue among different socialist publics as well as state authorities. The authors discuss a variety of topics, including the Soviet middle class, consumption, personal property and individualism; citizenship and morality; sexuality, the body, and health; political and civic participation; and late-socialist ethics and aesthetics. The contributors approach these topics by investigating case studies of ordinary life—yoga studios, nightclub culture, everyday life, popular culture, Soviet soccer, humor, and women's prose.

We treat late socialism as a period *sui generis* within the larger Soviet experience, different from the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. In contrast with earlier Soviet periods, this era distinguishes itself as relatively stable, prosperous, and non-violent, with governing methods involving negotiation, dialogue, and moral upbringing as well as control and discipline. This period is also different because of gradual societal changes, such as a liberalization of the social order and moves away from the revolutionary values of asceticism, collectivism, and proletarianism, that prepared people for the coming state-initiated shift toward regime liberalization in the mid- and late-1980s. Curiously, following almost a decade of economic growth and relative stability in the 2000s, contemporary Russian society may actually resemble the late socialist era. Such comparison of late Soviet social and demographic trends

with current developments in Russia allowed Russian sociologist Mikhail Dmitriev to foresee the demand for change and the political protests sweeping Russia in late 2011 (Dmitriev 2011). As famously noted by Mark Twain, "History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme." Having a greater appreciation for—and more accurate understanding of—late Soviet society might help us better grasp the foundations of Russia today.

Twins of the Cold War: the USSR and the West

In his work *The Parallax View,* Slavoj Žižek, following Hegel, reminds us that "subject and object are inherently 'mediated,' so that an 'epistemological' shift in the subject's point of view always reflects an 'ontological' shift in the object itself" (Žižek 2006, 17). The portrayal of the late Soviet Union has been long dominated by a specific value positioning of the subject —the researcher—who viewed the object, the Soviet Union, from the position of West's normality and moral superiority. This volume is one additional attempt to open a space for alternative conceptualizations of late Soviet history by shifting the "subject's point of view" to yield a new vision of the "object itself." We do not claim that either of the alternative subject positions or visions of the object are more correct than the other. We do hope, however, that the presence, comparison, and engagement with different alternative visions help us to better understand the late Soviet period's social and political history.

We use two major strategies to achieve the "shift in the object itself." First, we question the assumptions that underlie the analytical frameworks frequently used to interpret USSR history, which presume the superiority and normality of the West. Second, we propose different analytics to conceptualize everyday life in the late Soviet period by transcending the binaries of domination/resistance and socialism/liberalism and attending to multiple circulations of power. Rather than establishing Western liberal traditions as a blueprint against which the Soviet model is measured, we focus on similarities and interconnections. We look into manifestations of different liberal principles and their coexistence with Soviet socialism. Dominic Boyer and the other authors of this volume also entertain the possibility of using the new analytic lens of late socialism "to expose paradoxes and tensions in the political and cultural forms of contemporary lib-eral societies." It appears late socialism has its lessons not only for present-day Russia, but also for the late liberal societies such as that of the United States.

Imagine a Cold War-era town of prosperous workers, technicians, and scientists who are well paid, live in subsidized housing, and avail themselves of free healthcare at the local clinic. Their children attend excellent, tuition-free schools. The town suffers no unemployment and little crime. The town's population is remarkably homogenous—no foreigners and very few ethnic minorities or elderly people live here. Where should we look to find this town? Kate Brown describes the nuclear town of Cheliabinsk-40 in the Urals. Yet this town's description also applies to Richland, a plutonium plant town in Eastern Washington state. Everyone knows at least something of Chernobyl, the nuclear power plant in then-Soviet Ukraine that exploded in 1986 and emitted enough radiation to contaminate parts of Europe for hundreds of years to come. Yet how many Americans have heard of the Hanford plutonium production plant in Eastern Washington? How many know that over time Hanford dumped more

than twice the level of radioactive isotopes into the land, air, and water than Chernobyl did in 1986? What do radiation leaks from both sites tell us about the USSR and about the United States? What do nuclear cities tell us about citizenship and everyday life under both Soviet communism and U.S. democracy? Brown concludes that U.S. journalists, politicians, and scholars in the 1950s worried that Richland was "abnormal"; that is, socialist or communist. Soviet officials feared that Cheliabinsk-40's excellent material conditions would serve as an incubator for budding capitalists. But in reality, Cheliabinsk-40 was the ideal socialist town promised by the Party-state. And although Brown's study is focused on the 1950s, there are studies that indicate that other cities of the USSR had similar conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s. For example, Soviet industrial towns producing automobiles were touted as modern technological marvels, grand achievements of their political system and their particular way of life, as did similar towns in the United States (Siegelbaum 2008).

There are many socialist realities that bring late Soviet society close to its capitalist counterparts. One of them is the middle class.[6] Many social observers conceive of the middle class as the precondition, agent, and/or product of capitalism, democracy, and civil society (Lipset 1959; Moore 1993; Tocqueville 2003). The conventional view is socialist countries did not have a middle class and that a middle class would emerge in post-Soviet countries only as a result of neoliberal restructuring in the region.[7] Similarly, the existing literature on socialism, with a few exceptions, views consumption in the Soviet bloc—if broached at all—through the limited prism of shortages and *blat* (connections).[8] There are no real consumers, only desires to become consumers and to consume Western goods. A profound example of this perception of a chronically deprived Soviet citizenry can be seen in Paul Mazursky's film *Moscow on the Hudson* (1984), when Russian visitors to the United States storm Bloomingdale's department store in New York City. The protagonist Vladimir Ivanoff, swept away by the array of consumption opportunities, defects in the middle of the department store. Hugging a pair of jeans as if his life depends on it, Ivanoff staunchly refuses to return to the Soviet Union (Robinson 2007). While chaos sweeps through the store, a policeman arrives and proudly announces, "This is New York City. The man can do whatever he wants." The West's freedom, prosper-ity, modernity, and humanity are normalized in the film. Presented through the idiom of consumption, the Soviet Union is oppressive, impoverished, and dehumanizing. Juxtaposing late socialist materialism with the glamour of Manhattan gives us a picture of stagnation and backwardness represented by the figure of an exotic Soviet "other" clothed in a smelly, homemade sweater and desperately clutching a pair of designer jeans.

This volume's exploration of consumption patterns and middle-class lifestyles in late socialism challenges the hegemonic representations of Soviet consumers—the deprived, shabby Soviet citizens that are cinematically epitomized in *Moscow on the Hudson*. In late socialism, the Soviet government conceptualized consumption as a social right of its citizens. At a Communist Party Congress in 1971, Brezhnev declared that "even a small sacrifice of people's mate-rial comfort was no longer acceptable and that those comrades who failed to recognize this, did not understand Party's current agenda (Paretskaya, this volume). Under Brezhnev, the discourse around consumption elevated the value of individuality, self-reliance, and privacy—attitudes more commonly associated with the West. Writing in Chapter 2 Anna Paretskaya concludes that individualism and self-reliance, rather than dependence on the

community (whether one's work collective or the party-state), were modern Soviet values as much as they were Western, capitalist ones.

Paretskaya also notes that by the early 1980s, per capita consumption had nearly doubled since Joseph Stalin's death in 1953. Supplies of clothing, fruits, and vegetables as well as ownership of durable goods for the home, such as televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines, had also increased (Millar 1981, 97, 101; Patico 2008, 35–71; Siegelbaum 2008, 224).[9] The emphasis on communal eating was replaced with restaurants and cafés where people could have pleasant, private moments. The growth of cities, continuing industrialization, and the rise of mass production and consumption saw the emergence of a new class that, according to Siegelbaum (2008, 4), was to travel to socialism in their very own automobile. By the 1970s, it was no longer considered morally corrupt to own a car, as had been the case under Khrushchev, and state production of automobiles increased to satisfy the ever-growing demand. All of these developments significantly narrowed the gap between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries (e.g., Siegelbaum 2008, 224–25). Brezhnev, no doubt, experienced the power of materialism himself, as he raced through the streets of Moscow in his privately owned Rolls Royce, Cadillac, Porsche, Jaguar, and Maserati or as he strolled through the Kremlin corridors wearing expensive Western clothing.[10]

Consumption is a varied cultural practice that reflects different identity projects in societies. According to Friedman, in the modern West, consumption is about identity, the creation of a life world, and an imagined existence. It expresses a romantic longing to become an *other* (Friedman 1991, 158). But unlike modern Westerners the Hawaiians and, especially, the Ainu people of Japan, define themselves for others to see, objectifying themselves through things and invoking the gaze of the other in the creation of the self (Friedman 1991, 159–60). Consumption in the West, according to Jean Baudrillard (1970), is not a manifestation of consumer freedom and democracy, the two notions often invoked when juxtaposing Western and Soviet consumer cultures; rather, consumption is "something enforced, a morality, and institution. It is a whole system of values" (1970, 81). Individuals consume signs and desires and become subsumed (and produced as consumers) by the theories of "rational choice," needs, and demands. Such Western hegemony is embedded in interpretations of the Soviet economy, and they presume Western consumer culture as the desirable norm and the only moral alternative. For example, Kornai's "economy of shortages" (1992), a concept widely used to describe Soviet-type economies, often implicates the regime's negligent and even "inhuman" treatment of its subjects, presupposes that consumer society does not exist or is somehow deficient. Krisztina Fehérváry (2009) insightfully argues that such perspective glosses over the dynamics of local material worlds and presupposes the Western gaze that not only implies Western consumer culture as the norm, but questions alternatives as illegitimate signs of deprivation.

The socialist state existed as a material entity profoundly present in people's everyday lives, whether through sausages, delicious chocolate, Indian films, and Moroccan oranges or through its modernist (or pseudo-Modernist, according to Fehérváry 2009) style of furniture and architecture. Fehérváry points out that we need to understand these material worlds without subsuming them under the analytics of a shortage economy. We could also compare Soviet consumption with non-Western cultures and might discover that it will look

categorically bourgeois, feminine, beautiful, and at times luxurious, as Jianhua Zhao (2011) concludes from juxtaposing women's fashions in Maoist China, which was much more proletarian and androgynous, with contemporary women's fashions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We could draw attention to the multiple interchanges among the USSR and other countries, without assuming the centrality of the West to the Soviet engagement with the outside world, as argued by Sudha Rajagopalan (2008) in her study of Indian films in Soviet cinemas. Moreover, throughout the former Soviet bloc, post-socialist memories highlight *socialist abundance,* not only of consumer goods no one wanted, but of sometimes lavish subsidies for food and drink; for cultural events, books, and vacations; for health and childcare services, and for basic utilities such as heat—making for warm and cozy apartments (Fehérváry 2009, 434). Post-socialist cultures of poverty (see Kideckel 2008; Vitebsky 2002), with populations in poor health, increased suicide rates, daily life without heat and electricity, suppression of desires for *post-socialist abundance,* and lack of food and clothing, constitute another context from which socialist consumption and its material worlds could be approached. Thinking of a post-Soviet neoliberal milieu and the underclass that it produced and comparing it to late socialism, with its new consumer and middle-class orientation, provides us with an understanding of why some post-Soviet citizens may have experienced late socialism as a period of progress, prosperity, and well-being. It is not simply economic security and stability that explain contemporary nostalgia for socialism, but also the rich Soviet middle-class lifestyle and Soviet material worlds that have for so long been glossed over or entirely ignored in much of Western scholarship.

The West, indeed, cast a broad shadow across the Soviet space. Its presence, however, is often interpreted as a sign of Soviet citizens' opposition to socialism and admiration of the Western lifestyle. But the popularity of Lee jeans among Soviet citizens did not mean the Westernization of the USSR and the subversion of socialist ideals. As Alexei Yurchak (2006) notes, Soviet people constructed an "imaginary West"; Soviet citizens localized and domesticated various Western cultural forms, creatively adapting them to the socialist context and deploying them, as Sergei Zhuk indicates in Chapter 3, as constituent elements of their socialist and nationalist selves. Zhuk concludes that local authorities in Ukraine promoted Western forms of entertainment, such as the discotheque, which popularized Ukrainian music and history and disseminated Communist propaganda. Chapter 8, by Olga Livshin, cites V.A. Kozlov to emphasize that much of the resistance to authoritative ideas and practices in the late Soviet Union came from the very ideas and lexicon widely available to the dissenters, such as Marxism-Leninism, not extra-Soviet ideas, such as Western notions of democracy picked up by listening to Radio Liberty or the BBC.

Finally, in the afterword, Dominic Boyer engages with the ontological foundations of socialism and liberalism, which he describes as "philosophical vanishing twins," pointing out their symbiotic ideological entanglement and the need to recognize that the two cannot exist without each other because both reflect and emphasize the two different sides of human existence—individual autonomy and societal relatedness. Writing on the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Boyer argues against treating 1989 as an "extinction event" that represents an end of an alternative political and social modernity—socialism—and the "great triumph of neo-liberalism" (Boyer, this volume). Instead of burying "Socialism the Dreamer,"

he advocates resuscitating neosocialist studies.

The Soviet Subject and the State

The dominant theoretical paradigm long used to study politics in the Soviet Union emphasizes state domination over society and confrontations between different groups of people. The totalitarian model, mainly used by political scientists (see Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956; Arendt 1951), approached the Soviet state as an institution exercising near total power over society through secret police, propaganda, and economic planning. In this view, society existed as a collection of atomized individuals either brainwashed or repressed by the mighty state apparatus. Although totalitarian theory was developed to describe the Stalinist regime, the conceptual binaries that it produced, such as the state versus the people or oppression versus resistance, have been continuously used in later interpretations of Soviet history.

Revisionist and post-revisionist historians approach power as a more diffuse phenomenon, something secured by the state through social control, discipline, and mass support.[11] Post-revisionists promote new research agendas, focusing on what it meant to be Soviet, how Soviet values were internalized, how individuals learned to "speak Bolshevik" (Kotkin 1995), how they self-represented themselves (Hellbeck 2006), and how they became Soviet citizens through performance of "Sovietness" (O'Keeffe 2010). Many of these more recent studies still presume the state versus people dichotomy and repeatedly adopt the liberal view of human nature (Krylova 2000).

Some recent anthropological and literary studies have questioned earlier approaches to power in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. In *Everything Was For-ever until It Was No More* (2006), Alexei Yurchak shows that subjects were displaced in the state at the same time they were embedded within it. They were a kind of "de-territorialized public." This public neither supported nor opposed the state, but lived *vnye*, "outside"; that is, in a de-territorialized milieu that they perceived as "normal."[12] Soviet parades for May Day and the October Revolution, thus, provided opportunities for appealing celebrations. They were part of a powerful machinery for cultural production of the de-territorialized publics, who marched together through the streets, carried the same portraits and slogans, but cared little about the events being commemorated. It was a space to have fun and meet friends. Yurchak concludes that the late Soviet system was internally mutating toward unpredictable, creative, multiple forms of "normal life."

However, Yurchak does not address the particular power relations that created the normality of the Soviet milieu. The "normal life" is a political process, and "normal people" are political subjects even if they refrain from active political participation (Klumbytė 2011). If we agree with Yurchak that the constant displacement and de-territorialization of the authoritative discourse profoundly changed the Soviet system itself and made the post-Soviet era imaginable and possible, then Soviet normality indeed was a significant political development brought about by the interaction, exchange, and creative adaptations of different "normal Soviet people." In fact, dissidents, whom many of Yurchak's informants claimed not to know, might have been silenced, invisible, and discrete and thus less subversive than the

"normal" people themselves (Klumbytė 2011).

This volume traces the circulation of power in the spaces of ordinary life and maps its political trajectories during late socialism. Importantly, this period was marked by a transformation of power relations in which people were expected to control themselves (Kharkhordin 1999). Both Khrushchev's era and Brezhnev's era were characterized by a system more meticulous and thorough in giving attention to each individual than the more openly repressive Stalinist system (see Kharkhordin 1999, 298; Bittner 2008). These eras were characterized by numerous conflicts and arguments over state policy and Party ideology (see Humphrey 2008) as well as uncertainties, opportunities, gaps, and ambiguities in the everyday experience of politics. These gaps and ambiguities were not exceptions or evidence of the failure of socialism. They were intrinsic to the power regime and constitutive of power relations. Rather than being random and inconsequential, irrational or obscure, they manifested transitions in Party's ideological stance, citizen negotiation and dialogue with the state and its authorities, and various struggles for power and authority that elevated or degraded Party ideology.

The authors of this volume show that ordinary power regimes were intertwined with state agendas, socialist and nationalist values, as well as individual loyalties and personalities. Zhuk writes that some of the experimental poets in Ukraine expressed ideas of national history in traditionally accepted Marxist forms, but their ideas were interpreted by the police as the "nationalist propaganda." The cases of so-called anti-Soviet behavior reported in KGB files were the idealistic attempts of young people to cleanse socialist reality from "distortions" and "deviations" of communist ideals and to make life under socialism better and closer to the Leninist ideal of mature socialism.

Yuz Aleshkovsky, the Russian writer in Livshin's case study, portrayed Soviet men as caught between ideas of service to the state and the attractive images of science and progress led by men. The author's voice, full of "anti-regime" pathos, resonates with the Soviet intelligentsia, who saw themselves as autonomous and authentic in certain social contexts. Livshin shows that while seeking agency and fulfillment in terms of masculine and national ideals promoted by the state, Aleshkovsky's protagonists become disempowered and deeply humiliated; instead of sexual supermen, they became prostitutes and small people. Giving a more general existential tone, Aleshkovsky explores the limits of agency and the boundaries of the absurd "system" that seems to be equally produced by the believers and dissenters. At least for Nikolai, the major protagonist in the short novel *Nikolai Nikolaevich,* whose work consisted of donating sperm once a day for scientific projects of the Soviet state, resignation to *byt,* his dream job to repair shoes, one in which nothing radically new or utopian is produced, marks a new beginning.

Neringa Klumbytė shows in Chapter 4 that citizens used official venues designed to reinforce socialist moral values to express their frustrations, sending complaint letters to the editors of *Broom,* a humor and satire journal. Real people and events were depicted and ridiculed in the journal's articles, cartoons, and satires. These complaints had real repercussions—citizens who violated the tenets of Soviet moral citizenship were often punished. Hardly any reader of the journal could suspect, if he or she laughed at social vices, that in doing that he was also taking a class on communist ethical citizenship. But even if he

did, asks Klumbytė, did it matter? Citizens laughed at something that affected them personally. State authorities sought to perfect socialist society along certain communist ideals; individuals would benefit as well, because living in a moral and just society could yield comfort, respect, and a rewarding social and private life.

Did the late Soviet milieu provide the space for the existence of a liberal individual and freedom? In classic political science works on the Soviet era the iconic liberal subject capable of knowing its self and its society through the faculty of reason is absent. There is a "believing" subject and the "indoctrinated" subject unaware of its totalitarian essence and fragmented by it, contrasted with a non-believing and cynical subject complicit with immoral society. Anna Krylova (2000, 120) argues that the "emergence of the totalitarian school from the Cold War discourse of the 1940s and the 1950s resulted in a particular interpretive narrative that presented the Stalinist subject as the opposite of the liberal self, or as the death of liberal man in Stalinist Russia." The 1960s and 1970s evidenced the rebirth of the liberal subject, who rediscovered his personal dignity and self-consciously aligned himself with the liberal agenda. His liberal self, however, was primarily realized in resistance against the Soviet state rather than in prosaic *byt* or the ordinary moments of daily life.[13] Studying the "ideal" Soviet man, Anna Krylova (2000, 2) argues, "The search for remnants of liberal subjectivity and signs of resistance against anti-liberal communist Russia constituted a central, long-term agenda for American scholars" that persisted in different forms until the 2000s.

This volume suggests that in late socialism Soviet citizens were liberal individuals, not because they resisted the state or consciously aligned themselves with an anti-Soviet agenda, but because they lived self-fulfilling, free, and happy lives during the late Soviet era. In Chapter 5, Larisa Honey shows that a Soviet citizen was an autonomous individual capable of being responsible for and knowing about her own self and society. She was not a dissident and neither accepted nor resisted the Soviet state. She found a space largely created by the state itself in which she could pursue creativity, innovation, and self-fulfillment. Honey challenges the dichotomy between the state and its citizens by showing that alternative health practitioners were informed by values about health, self-perfection, and education as well as the values of individualism and collectivism promoted by the state. In their yoga practices, for example, health practitioners incorporated these ideas and became a Soviet spiritual avant-garde. At the same time, while extending the state's ideals through their own yoga practice, they were in dialogue with the state, making it respond to their needs and desires, as well as circumventing official understanding of health, science, and Soviet citizenship. Through yoga classes in culture houses and unofficial clubs, these practitioners were able to change the state formulations to accommodate these free-thinking Soviet subjects.

Analyzing the women's world as depicted by Grekova in Chapter 7, Benjamin M. Sutcliffe discovers that while a liberal self might be realized in public life, life at home often remained a suffocating experience. Grekova's protagonist, Vera, found liberation and happiness in the public space through work and social(ist) advancement. At the same time, her marriage to a committed Stalinist made private life an oppressive experience. Sutcliffe shows how emerging women's literature in the 1970s exposed problems of female characters and the seemingly innocuous realm of everyday life (*byt*) to address problems such as male alcoholism, broken families, and the difficult balance between home and career. This critique coexisted with the

acknowledgement of pleasures of a constantly improving material reality, personal advancement, and public success. Sutcliffe argues that Grekova's narrative attempts to convince the reader that the late Soviet experience is ultimately a positive one.[14] Grekova's *The Hotel Manager* was written as a production novel (a genre of socialist realism) and attracted many readers who often pilfered it from library. The popularity of this novel signified readers' voluntary consumption of and identification with some of the socialist and liberal values that defined the everyday of many women.

Autonomy and freedom were experienced in many other private and public spaces. In Chapter 6 Robert Edelman focuses on Spartak, one of the most popular Soviet football teams and argues that the state could never dictate fan loyalty, so the public space of football became also a space where private sentiments and loyalties were expressed. Contextualizing the evolution of Soviet football in worldwide developments, Edelman claims that, as in other countries, Soviet football developed in tandem with commerce and industry. In the Soviet Union, this process was especially pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s, when new cities sprang up around the country, accompanied by the parallel expansion and creation of new football teams. With new stadiums built, and numerous matches broadcast on newly available television sets, football entered millions of households, allowing the public to watch football in the privacy of their apartments. Edelman argues that the state did create space for happiness and entertainment, a view often glossed over in scholarship on the USSR.[15]

The picture of the Soviet state, society, and citizen that emerges from this volume is very different from the one based on long-accepted notions of pervasive stagnation and decay in the late Soviet Union. The state took important steps toward liberalizing the social order and abandoning the revolutionary values of asceticism, collectivism, and proletarianism; replacing revolutionary ideology with daily life-focused pragmatism. Responding to societal preferences, it embraced post-collectivist values by promoting private life, professionalism of the working class, and material consumption. It encouraged creativity, individuality, and self-development through education and various self-development techniques promoted in literary and sports clubs and various state-sponsored circles. The late-Soviet citizens enjoyed material improvements and more comfortable lifestyles, benefitted from new spaces created for individual spiritual growth and self-perfection, and savored new forms of entertainment. The late-Soviet period was a captivating and dynamic era where different objects, values, and practices coexisted: communist patriotic songs and the Beatles, nationalist poetry and communist propaganda, atheism and search for hidden human powers, an obsession with the imaginary West and satisfying public careers in Soviet state institutions. They all existed in the same time and space, not as opposites. And citizens embraced them in their various ways to live a late Soviet life and various ways to be Soviet.

Notes

1.Vladimir Putin, "Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, April 25, 2005," http://archive.kremlin.ru. Last accessed April 3, 2012.

2. Evgeniya Chaykovskaya, "Peskov: Comparing Putin to Brezhnev Is a Good Thing,"

Moscow News (May 10, 2011). See http://themoscownews.com/. Last accessed November 2, 2011.

3. Some important exceptions include Yurchak (2006), Rajagopalan (2008), Raleigh (2006), and Utekhin (2003).

4. Sovietology's failure to predict collapse became a subject of wide discussions in the 1990s. For some examples see Rutland 1993, King 1994.

5. See Chakrabarty (2007) on the mythical Europe in post-colonial settings and on provincializing Europe.

6. On the discussion of the concept of "middle class" in the Soviet Union see Patico (2008, 12–16).

7. For a different approach see Patico (2008).

8. For a critique of the shortage paradigm see Fehérváry (2009).

9. The proportion of Soviet households reported as owning televisions and refrigerators rose from 24 percent and 11 percent in 1965, to 74 percent and 65 percent in 1975, and 92 percent and 89 percent in 1982, respectively. See Table 2.6 in David Lane, *Soviet Economy and Society* (New York: Blackwell, 1985). For discussion, see Siegelbaum (2008, 224).

10. See *The St. Petersburg Times* (October 4, 2005) for information about Brezhnev's cars. http://www.sptimes.ru. Last accessed April 2, 2012.

11. See, for example, the works of J. Arch Getty, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Moshe Lewin, Robert Thurston, Oleg Kharkhordin, and Stephen Kotkin.

12. On de-territorialization, see Yurchak (2006, chapter 4).

13. In Vera S. Dunham's (1990 [1976]), *In Stalin's Time* a semi-liberal subject replaced the image of a Soviet subject subsumed by society, cleansed of individuality, and alienated from others by fear. The new subject pursued concessions in return for cooperation with the regime. In the 1970s Jerry Hough also argued for applicability of Western frameworks of analysis to the Soviet Union. See Krylova (2000) for discussion of a So-viet subject in Dunham's work and on the evolution of perception on Soviet subject in scholarship on the Soviet Union.

14. Irina Nikolaevna Grekova (pseudonym of Elena Sergeevna Venttsel', 1907–2002).

15. But see Yurchak (2006).

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Chapter 1
Plutonium Enriched: Making Bombs and Middle-Classes
Kate Brown

In 1986, when reactor number four in Chernobyl exploded, the blast took the lid off 40 years of silence about the production of nuclear weapons, a closely guarded secret throughout the Cold War. Soon after Chernobyl, Soviet and American citizens demanded *glasnost* in the nuclear industries. The results of the subsequent truth commissions were astonishing. The documents declassified in 1986 showed that the Hanford plutonium production plant in eastern Washington state had dumped more than twice as many radioactive isotopes into the land, air, and water as Chernobyl (Gerber 2002; Gephart 2003). Soviet citizens learned in 1989 of a series of shocking revelations about Chernobyl-style accidents in the eastern Urals, that had been kept secret for decades (Clines 1989; Medvedev 1990). Scientists soon proclaimed the Maiak plutonium plant the most radioactive spot on the planet.[1] Nuclear reactors and processing plants are massive; they are very difficult to hide, as is the radiation seeping from them. How did the Soviet Union and United States keep these plants and their environmental contamination away from the public gaze for decades?[2]

What became clear in the subsequent inquiries is that there had been a spatial component to Cold War nuclear secrets. In the Soviet Union, the public learned of scores of secret, closed atomic cities surrounded by buffer zones that grew larger as radiation spread (Mel'nikova 2006; Novoselov 1999; Novoselov and Tolstikov 1995). In the United States closed nuclear installations amounted to 36,000 square miles, a territory containing a whole exo-societal landscape, some of it very radiated (Hales 1997). Despite the fact that mobility and the mass media were not restricted in the United States, officials at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) managed to render invisible nuclear installations that were larger than the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maryland, and the District of Columbia put together (Masco 2006, 19). In short, containing territory and secrets went hand-in-hand.

This chapter focuses on the social, cultural, and spatial inventions that accompanied the creation and development of nuclear weapons. For we are, in part, what we make. What humans produce, whether it be corn, oil, or atomic bombs, determines how they organize their daily life and social institutions. The production of nuclear weapons produced a whole new kind of territory in the USSR and United States, accompanied by a new way of thinking about and organizing the economy, social networks, and citizenship. This new institution is called, in shorthand, the "nuclear security state." The nuclear security state existed in isolated territories within sovereign states and included communities that supported the production of nuclear weapons. These secluded communities were hardly known to the public at large. Yet they received lavish fiscal and political attention from Soviet and U.S. political and industrial elites.

Existing at ground zero of the Cold War, political elites focused on the nuclear communities because they were considered vital for the national interest. They worried over them, poured money into them, sent experts to look after them, and in so doing shaped them into pioneering communities operating ahead of larger cultural trends. As a result, leaders and residents of

these new atomic communities prioritized values and modes of living that much of the rest of society would aspire to in subsequent years and decades. These values did not promote—as one would expect—war and destruction, but instead fostered production, economic growth, and consumption. As a consequence, there emerged in the atomic communities new conceptions of loyalty, class, citizenship, and consumption, all of which were bound up together. The nuclear communities are important because they serve as sensitive seismographs, registering certain cultural trends before they hit the larger society.

A Tale of Two (Secret) Cities

To illustrate my argument, I will place in conversation the histories of the first two communities to produce plutonium in the United States and USSR. In 1943, the Army Corps of Engineers selected Richland, on the high desert plateau of eastern Washington, because it was remote and sparsely populated. Soviet security officials chose Cheliabinsk-40 on the thickly forested western slope of the Ural Mountains for the same reasons. With construction of the massive reactors and chemical processing plants, the populations swelled from thousands to tens of thousands on each site. Alongside the plants, American and Soviet factory directors built small towns that grew within months into cities for the plant operators. As the reactors came on line, these towns were seen as essential to the nation's survival: the employees were making the volatile ingredients of nuclear weapons, which strategists on both sides determined was the only reason the Cold War enemy desisted from attack.[3] These towns, integral to national secu-rity, were at the same time strangely disconnected from their societies. People who lived in the plutonium towns expressed a sense of separation and difference. Remembering in 1993 her life in early Richland, Margaret Collins claimed, "We weren't sure if we were part of Washington State" (Hevly and Findlay 1998, 22). Or as a resident of a closed Soviet city put it at a party conference in the 1950s: "We live here as if on another planet. The laws and decrees of the larger Soviet Union do not concern us." (Mel'nikova 2006, 78).

Cheliabinsk

Residents of atomic cities felt their separation because they were cut off, physically and politically, from the rest of the country. The Soviet plant, Maiak, sat at the bull's-eye of a series of concentric security zones, each one less accessible and more tightly controlled than the outer rings. The outermost zone encircled two entire provinces, (Sverdlovsk and Cheliabinsk), which were designated off-limits to foreigners. In 1947, security officials drew a 25-kilometer circle around Cheliabinsk-40 and gave it a "special regime zone" designation.[4] Security agents then cleansed from this new zone 3,000 social "undesirables," mostly deportees and ex-cons. In the following year, security officials also closed down institutions of higher learning, cultural associations, orphanages, homes for pensioners; any place that might draw in "extra" people whose presence could threaten secrecy and security.[5] Prisoners and army construction brigades were brought in to work on the construction projects, but did not

live in Cheliabinsk-40. Instead, they were stationed outside town in separate zoned-off camps.

Inside the special regime zone was the closed city of Cheliabinsk-40. Guards admitted to the city only those with a special pass. To get a pass, a person had to have a security clearance and a job working at the plant or in the closed city. Once inside the city, it was hard to leave. Residents were virtual hostages for the first decade.[6] Even knowledge of Cheliabinsk-40 was closely guarded: the town was on no published map; public buses, leaving from secret, unmarked bus stations ran to "the city" with no destination indicated.[7] For the 50,000 people who lived in Cheliabinsk-40, their address was officially—and informally when talking to friends and relatives—a postal code (#40) in Cheliabinsk some 35 miles away. Until 1954, there was no Soviet government in Cheliabinsk-40; no city or party councils, no organ of power other than embodied by one man, I.M. Tkachenko, a KBG Lieutenant-General in charge of the regime zone. He was subordinate directly to Stalin's close confidante, Lavrenti Beria, who ran the nuclear bomb project. Tkachenko had final say on all decisions (Novoselov and Tolstikov 1995, 107).

Richland

Richland was part of the 2,000-square-mile Hanford Nuclear Reservation, a huge rectangle broken into ever-smaller zones of ever-greater security. Much of this land was emptied of its residents in 1943 as a buffer zone. Inside the main reservation was an interior reserve of 700 square miles, which included the town of Richland (Hales 1997, 44–45). The plutonium plant was located inside a smaller zone, consisting of 200 square miles. The Army Corp of Engineers originally planned to encircle Richland with a fence and guards as they had in Oak Ridge, TN, and Los Alamos, NM, but in Richland officials from DuPont, the chief contractor, resisted the fence, and it was never built (Lt.-Col. Franklin T. Matthias . . . 170). Instead of guards and fences, more quotidian forms of control—zoning and property rights—determined access to Richland.

For security reasons, residence in Richland was restricted to plant operators and supervisors employed by the contractor (DuPont until 1946 and then General Electric) or the Atomic Energy Commission. Transient construction workers brought in to build the plants, prisoners shipped in to tend the fields, and soldiers stationed to guard the territory were not given housing in Richland. They all lived in temporary barracks, camps, and trailer parks outside Richland. As Hanford site commander Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Matthias understood it, Richland's founding principle was based on security and surveillance: "The village is to provide family housing only to those who must be kept under control for security reasons."[8] In order to live in Richland, a person had to have a job in the plant. To get a job, the applicant had to pass an FBI background security check. So, too, did the merchants, selected by DuPont and later GE, who were granted commercial monopolies in Richland. There was no private property or local government in Richland. Lieutenant-Colonel Frank T. Matthias of the Army Corps of Engineers was in charge during the war years. He passed control of the city and plant on to civilian commanders of the AEC in 1946. The federal government owned all the territory and buildings in the city. The corporate contractor managed housing, commerce, municipal

affairs, medical services, churches, streets, parking, policing, and the public school system—pretty much everything.[9]

What was it like to live in one of these towns? Imagine it in the early 1950s. The Cold War is simmering. The plants are working round-the-clock to produce as much plutonium as possible. Construction crews worked fast to build new reactors and processing plants, each of them massive industrial factories. Soldiers train in nearby forts. Fighter pilots patrol overhead. Missiles line the roads, pointing up to mercifully empty skies. The assumption is not if but *when* the next war will start. Everyone knows the plutonium plant is on the primary list of enemy targets. Local officials draw up emergency plans and organize volunteers for civil defense training. The growing power of atomic bombs, however, determines that "Civil Defense" is a fiction. In the United States, for instance, classified plans do not foresee the survival of the Richland community; rather, strategists plan to save a few vital workers to keep the plants running to produce more plutonium in the wake of nuclear Armageddon.[10]

Life in a Closed City

Alongside plutonium, the plants produced rumors. In the late 1940s, Soviet women in a neighboring closed city staged a demonstration complaining that their husbands were impotent. "Send us home," they demanded. "We don't want our husbands to become impotent. We don't want to live and work here" (Mel'nikova 2006, 98–99). Workers, mostly women, at the Maiak chemical processing plant, fell sick in alarming numbers. Some died from a new illness local doctors secretly labeled "Chronic Radiation Syndrome." The living were quietly reassigned to non-production jobs without ever learning of their classified illness.[11] In Richland, a guard was posted to a special hospital room dedicated for Hanford workers. Doctors ran children through full-body scans and GE officials bypassed local dairies and had milk shipped in from Minnesota.[12] Workers who fell ill from exposure to radiation were denied access to their medical records and to any knowledge of the reason for their illness (Hales 1997, 290–91). Public health officials in both cities insisted that the rumors of cancer and impotence were "dreamed up" to cause "undue alarm"; that the "rumors" were meant for "provocation."[13] The doctors insisted there were "safe" levels of radiation, levels they said they carefully monitored. No one, they said publicly, had exceeded them.[14] In classified correspondence, however, they admitted to having serious concerns.[15]

Richland

In 1946 Paul Nissen, a local journalist, wrote that Richland was a "nervous, wondering community" (Deutschmann 1952, 20). Members of the community were nervous not because they had recently discovered that they had been living alongside a plant producing the world's most dangerous and volatile material. Rather, their worries were of a more ordinary variety. They were anxious about the survival of their local economy. With the war over, Nissen continued, "[Richland's] purpose for being [was] suddenly shot out from under it and [people] worried about what, when, how, and if the blow would fall that would make it another ghost

town." Nissen had reason to worry. Since the opening of the dry inland West to homesteading and mining, many Western towns, built in boom-time haste, had gone belly up. For that reason, in the U.S. national imagination ghost towns are associated with the West. Nissen emphasized the green lawns and whispering sprinklers, the pretty little homes in the midst of the desert as a sign of how far progress had come. But without the massive government subsidies keeping the water pumping and paychecks flowing, there was no local, "organic" economy to sustain Richland.[16]

Richland's problems were more acute than those of a normal Western boom town. The nature of plutonium production made for a very special economic relationship. The government monopolized production, as well as consumption of plutonium, which was produced in communities created and dedicated solely for that purpose. Government agencies in Washington, DC, made decisions on a planned basis—without reference to market forces—behind closed doors, and for reasons kept from the public. As political scientist Rodney Carlisle phrased it, the whole process was similar to the command economy in the Soviet Union (Carlisle and Zenzen 1996, 162).

Oddly enough, it was a successful formula for eastern Washington, a terri-tory that until plutonium arrived had been economically undeveloped. In 1950, Congressman Hal Holmes boasted that Washington State's Fourth Congress-ional District received more federal grants than all other districts around the country.[17] The money came in not just to manufacture plutonium, but to sustain an entire infrastructure designed to shore up the community that made plutonium. The items on the regional wish list, items that eastern Washington boosters had long lobbied for unsuccessfully, were suddenly granted when justified by the threat from communism. The federal government built a series of dams (to make sure the plant had constant supply of electricity); national defense highways and bridges (for evacuation in case of war); regional army and naval bases (to defend the plant in case of attack); and large-scale irrigation of agricultural land and agricultural subsidies (for national self-sufficiency in case of war).[18] Even in the flush years, however, residents of Richland never ceased to worry that the federal largesse would evaporate. Without the many sources of federal funds, their whole community would literally dry up and blow away in one of the frequent dust storms.

Richland residents had other reasons to worry, as well. All employees had to sign a secrecy oath, pledging to keep state secrets entrusted to them or face termination, steep fines, and 10 years' imprisonment. In order to make sure secrets were contained, security agents listened to phone calls, paid informers to report conversations, and visited residents to ask questions about neighbors.[19] Several people I talked to in Richland told me that if a man's wife asked invasive questions, such as "what does you husband do for a living?" the family of the inquisitive wife would be gone overnight, their rented house standing empty the next morning. So far, I haven't located the AEC security files, but the story is important as it registers the level of anxiety the secrecy oath inspired.[20] On a more quotidian level, a man who lost his plant job for mundane reasons had a week to move out of Richland.[21]

Cheliabinsk

In Cheliabinsk-40, residents also worried they would lose the right to reside in their special community. Cheliabinsk-40 was unique among towns in provincial Russia during the 1950s. Built from scratch, deep in an uncharted forest, the city blossomed in less than a decade. In the hungry post-war years in the Soviet Union, Cheliabinsk-40 had, remarkably, no hunger, no lines for goods, no long-lasting housing crisis, and no shortage of medical care.[22] While people in neighboring communities lived in sod dugouts and barracks, ate hunger rations, and kept their children home from school for lack of clothing and shoes, residents of Cheliabinsk-40 lived in comfortable apartments and dormitories. They ate at well-stocked cafeterias and restaurants.[23] They shopped in stores stocked with caviar, chocolate, sausage, Finnish boots, Yugoslav coats, and German shoes. Residents owned more cars, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and radios per capita than the national averages.[24] Once they were allowed to leave the closed city in the mid-1950s, they vacationed at special resorts on the Baltic and Black Seas. Cheliabinsk-40 stood out in provincial Russia for its excellent schools, theaters, sports programs, and cultural events. By the late 1950s, few expenses were spared to enlighten the children. As the local director of the club for young scientists put it, “We don’t want our club to look like a regular club. That is why we have mirrors, marble, parquet, and flowers. Here we celebrate childhood joy.”[25] Most residents I spoke to remember their hometown as “paradise,” real socialism.[26] L.V. Zhondetskaia, living in the neighboring closed city of Cheliabinsk-70, remembered in 1988: “We had the feeling that we already lived under communism. There was everything in the stores, from crabs to black caviar” (Emel'ianov 1997, 27).

The greatest fear, in fact, that former Cheliabinsk-40 residents possessed was not nuclear annihilation, but being released from their golden cage—losing their pass to the closed city and with it access to their socialist paradise. It was not hard to lose one’s place. If a man drank too much, caroused, beat his wife, misbehaved in public, missed work, or showed up late too often, then officials got involved, censuring, judging, and issuing warnings.[27] If the person didn’t correct his ways, he could be sent off, pass withdrawn, never again allowed to enter Cheliabinsk-40 to see family and friends. If a child earned a D in school for behavior, or if a teenager started dressing like Elvis and quoting the *Voice of America*, that son or daughter could be sent to reform school elsewhere.[28] Banishment was complete. Once a pass was revoked, it was nearly impossible to win back.[29] The magnetic allure of Cheliabinsk-40 was such that when parents had their children taken from them, when husbands were banished to the ter-ritory beyond the gates, many residents, stayed behind without their exiled loved ones, alone in Eden.

In short, Cheliabinsk-40 was so pleasant, so hospitable and responsive to its residents, so comfortable and prosperous that it created its own reason for se-crecy. Soviet citizens living “in the big world,” as the territory outside the town was called, had to be protected from the knowledge that Soviet socialism really existed, if only in one city; that socialism wasn’t just an illusion created by the Moscow film studios and imaginative *Pravda* journalists. The fences and guard towers, the secret bus stations, and fictitious postal code existed in part to keep regular, threadbare, poorly shod, and protein-starved Soviet citizens out—and thus safe from the knowledge that their lives could be much better, would, in fact, have been a great deal

better, had so many scarce resources not been expended on weapons of mass destruction.

In 1956, a young woman, Taishina, in Cheliabinsk-40 was troubled by the discrepancy between her closed city and the miserable life outside it. She stood up at a party cell meeting and said, “We were chased out to hear a lecture on Marx. But I was out in the big world and there people don’t live so well. There is poverty. Why don’t you give us a lecture on that?”[30] The answer Taishina received was one I also heard when interviewing former residents of Cheliabinsk-40: residents of the closed city believed they deserved the state’s largesse The residents worked and sacrificed to defend the nation; therefore, the nation needed to support them, unconditionally.

Twin Cities

What interests me about these communities is how foreign they were in the frame of their domestic landscapes. Richland, built to defend American-style democratic capitalism from the global ambitions of Soviet communism, had no democratic institutions, no free trade, no free press, and no private property. Cheliabinsk-40, built to defend Soviet socialism against bourgeois materialism and capitalist imperialism, had no Communist Party, no soviet governance, and an abnormally comfortable, bourgeois community in the midst of a famished landscape where former residents bragged to me that they had never worn So-viet-made footwear.[31]

What I find fascinating as I have placed these two towns together in my field of vision is how much more in structure and composition they resembled each other than they did their neighboring communities. These were towns of prosperous workers, well-paid technicians and scientists living in subsidized housing; their children sent to excellent schools and health clinics. These two towns had no unemployment, no foreigners, and very little crime, ethnic minorities, and elderly residents. These towns thrived, in fact, at the expense of their neighboring communities, which were poor, agricultural, and remote, making the contrast between inside and outside even more pronounced.[32] I am not the first to notice this strange resemblance. U.S. journalists, politicians, and scholars in the 1950s worried that Richland was “abnormal,” socialist, or communist.[33] Soviet officials were troubled that Cheliabinsk-40’s excellent material conditions served as an incubator for budding capitalists.[34] They complained that the high standards of living fostered opportunism, materialism, and bourgeois ideology.

Perhaps the likenesses, and the anxieties about them, are not surprising. After all, the two towns existed in each other’s shadow. If not for Richland, Cheliabinsk-40 would not have been created. If not for Chelaibinsk-40, Richland would not have grown from a cow-town to become one of Washington State’s largest metropolitan areas.[35] The future of the two towns depended on the other. If the Soviet Union agreed to arms control, the plutonium orders in Richland would come to a halt, and the whole regional economy would collapse. The two towns existed in a strange co-dependence, an unlikely mail-order marriage, each inadvertently reliant on the other, while each threatening to destroy the other. In other words, Richland and Cheliabinsk-40 needed the Cold War and, therefore, each other, like fishermen need the sea

and farmers the land. The dependence led to a certain fixation on the other. Soviet engineers modeled Maiak from plans cribbed from Hanford. (the first Hanford reactor was called “B”; the first Cheliabinsk-40 reactor was dubbed “A”). The American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down in the Urals immediately after flying over Cheliabinsk-40.[36]

Life in the Other Town

In the larger national cultures, the fixation with the other was endemic. Hollywood made movies aimed at discrediting the Soviet enemy. In the United States, news and editorials on Soviet Russia daily filled the paper. Political commentators followed Senator Joseph McCarthy in searching for communist infiltrators in peace groups, groups espousing liberal causes, and with ties to Southern or Eastern Europe and communism. Journalists Stewart and Joseph Alsop, for example, proud of their close, personal connections to the “Founding Fathers” of the CIA, wrote a popular syndicated column in which they exaggerated the Soviet nuclear arsenal and trumpeted the Soviet threat to humanity (Saunders 1999, 402–403). Using information planted by top government sources, probably in the CIA, the Alsops reported in October 1950 on the Soviet construction of “a great new atomic production plant in the Urals,” information that at the time was just reaching top-secret CIA reports. They predicted that once the Soviets caught up to the Americans, the “temptation will become almost irresistible” to “cripple the American war potential” and “conquer all Europe.” American bombs, the brothers asserted, are “all that stands between the Kremlin and world domination.[37]

While Americans exaggerated Soviet power, Soviet officials worried about an inflated Soviet faith in U.S. strength. Propagandists were especially worried about Soviet intellectuals who were thought to be bowing and scraping before Western science and culture. To counter this bad influence, Soviet propagandists drew up a plan to insert a quota of anti-Americanism into Soviet domestic news reports, films, novels, and commentaries.[38] As part of this campaign, propagandists created the image of the weak, effeminate cosmopolitan—the Soviet intellectual who loved to quote Western languages, read books by foreign authors, dress his wife in fashionable clothes, and keep exotic hothouse flowers. In 1947, to make sure Soviet scientists got the point, justice officials convicted Professor V.V. Panin of espionage for pandering to the enemy by handing over a manuscript on microbiology to U.S. academics.[39] In both plutonium cities, in short, as in their larger societies, there was an infatuated focus on the enemy, an infatuation born of an uncomfortable dependence.

We see this obsession with the other in one of the founding moments of Cheliabinsk-40, when Igor Kurchatov, the father of the Soviet atom, addressed a crowd in March 1948, envisioning the new city yet to be built:

> And to spite them [the enemies abroad] [a town] will be founded. In time your town and mine will have everything—kindergartens, fine shops, a theater and, if you like, a symphony orchestra! And then in thirty years’ time your children, born here, will take into their own hands everything that we have made, and our successes will pale before their successes. . . . And if in that time not one uranium bomb explodes over the heads of people, you and I can be happy! (Holloway 1994, 186)

Model Communities, Contented Citizens

Kurchatov points to an important element of the closed atomic city. Although foreign in their domestic landscape, Richland and Cheliabinsk-40 also served as exemplary communities in their respective countries.[40] Soviet and American planners wanted to attract talented labor to the remote cities and keep it there.[41] They also wanted to make sure state secrets were contained. So they prioritized citizen contentment and state security in designing the cities. Using technology, state-of-the-art planning techniques, and rational management, architects assembled exemplary communities of contented citizens who could be both trusted and easily monitored—in case they weren't trustworthy. Surprisingly, these goals—satisfaction and surveillance—coalesced happily.

General Electric had a Master Plan drawn up for Richland, and GE executives were able to carry it out as planned because they did not have interference from troublesome city councils and existing traditions that befuddled urban plans elsewhere.[42] Planners started with bulldozers, leveling much of the existing western outpost. The project architect then drew up a dozen housing designs and construction crews mass-produced houses in assembly-line fashion, a Levittown rising long before Levittown—while Bill Levitt was still working in Army military construction.[43] As the houses multiplied, GE management realized the town needed more commerce.[44] To avoid parking and congestion problems, planners plotted out new, decentralized "gateway" shopping centers away from downtown on the edges of Richland. The resulting strip malls were another post-war innovation pioneered in Richland. This is particularly fitting, since strip malls worked into civil defense plans. The Viennese socialist-turned-American developer, Viktor Gruen, who promoted strip malls across the United States, billed them as both new centers of community and community bomb shelters because gateway malls were safely located in the suburbs beyond the first ring of nuclear destruction and ensconced behind vast asphalt firewalls in the form of 3,000-car parking lots.[45]

GE planners also allocated federal funds generously for an impressive network of state-of-the-art schools and sports facilities.[46] Richland placed schools and children at the center of the community, a phenomenon that would also become typical of subsequent post-war suburbs across America. People too were just as carefully planned and cultivated in Richland. A local editorialist described Richland as "an amazing community whose 15,000 inhabitants were hand picked because of their intelligence and ability."[47] An AEC pamphlet repeated a similar sentiment: "The average employee is superior to the average industrial employee due to careful screening for security and job requirements."[48] The authors pointed to the fact that no one could live in Richland without durable political, financial, and health credentials, without a security clearance; unless authorized by GE management. Post-war suburban developers would have to rely on illegal racial covenants and redlining to secure the same highly select residential populations.

As a consequence, everyone in Richland had excellent wages, good benefits, and good housing at low rents.[49] Richland families were wholly "normal." All but two breadwinners in town were white and male. (Pressured by the Seattle Urban League, the AEC had hired two African-American employees by 1951.[50]) There was no head of household who had fallen through the cracks; no one who suffered from a mental illness, disability, or unemployment. As a 1949 booster pamphlet boasted, "There are no unemployed, no slums, no marginal

businesses," and "crime is tightly controlled."[51] Indeed, "The Patrol" (the GE police force) patrolled vigorously. Crime rates were low, and most crimes were solved. Richland won nation-wide policing and traffic safety awards year after year, and *Look* magazine named Richland an "All-American City" in 1961. Resident screening, discrimination, and vigilant community surveillance all contributed to resident satisfaction. In 1952, a sociologist polled Richland and found there a "dominant universe of content" (McCann 1952, 115).

Richland, by 1950, was what much of America desired: an orderly, safe community with excellent schools, no minorities, no riffraff, and a large consuming middle-class. Better yet, Richland did not orbit a big, congested city with its host of budgetary, policing, racial, labor, and class problems. Richland was what Americans were increasingly aspiring to: middle-class suburbia as an end in itself.

Soviet architects had dreamed of building a well-planned, thriving socialist city since the Revolution. They believed that to forge a new breed of socialist citizen, they needed to design an entirely new kind of city—a socialist city. In the 1930s, architects drew up plans for a "socialist city" (*sotsgorod*) with an optimal population of 50,000 residents.[52] The city was to be an urban garden oasis, safely isolated from the dangers of the old, congested, crime-ridden, bourgeois city (Ruble 1993, 248). *Sotsgorod* planners segregated industrial sections from residential sections. In the residential sections, multi-story buildings with apartments above, services and commerce below, made ideally for decentralized commerce, so that residents should walk no more than 50 meters for goods and services. The socialist city was to supply all the needs of private and civic life: shops, libraries, schools, childcare, sports facilities, theaters, cultural centers, and offices for municipal affairs. Despite many projected designs, however, a socialist city was never built in the Soviet Union before the Cold War. Scarcity and poverty in the Soviet 1930s and 1940s contained these dreams to paper.

Only in the early 1950s, with the development of closed nuclear cities and the increasingly boundless budgets of the arms race—thanks to nuclear Armageddon looming on the horizon—did Soviet planners get their first big chance to build their dreamed-of socialist city. In the early 1950s, a team of Leningrad architects plotted out Cheliabinsk-40 and four other secret nuclear cities in the Urals.[53] From the start, they proudly named Cheliabinsk-40 a *sotsgorod*.[54] Ironically, the mandates of nuclear secrecy and security aided the architects in building a socialist city. The city was built on an isthmus surrounded by four lakes that formed a natural barrier to neighboring towns beset with economic, health, and social problems. Buildings could not be too high; trees and plants were to cover the town from the air. For safety the plant, too, was segregated from the town. Schools and after-school arts and sports programs sprang up to occupy children whose parents had to work swing-shifts in the rush to produce plutonium. Well-stocked stores in street-level shops meant residents did not have to leave their neighborhood for necessities. Workers and future atomic workers needed to be well-trained and disciplined, so schools and adult education programs received 51 percent of the city budget (Mel'nikova 2006, 93). Since traveling theaters could not come to town, city leaders founded and generously subsidized local operetta, symphonies, and theaters for both children and adults.

As in Richland, funds delegated for the arms race in Cheliabinsk-40 bankrolled a utopia constructed in the shadow of nuclear dystopia. With the Cold War justifying unprecedented

expenditures, Cheliabinsk-40 became the city revolutionary architects had dreamed of for decades. To live in a safe, well-stocked, paved city with good housing, education, and health care for all was a dream most Soviet citizens aspired to in the 1950s. To dress well, to set a nice table, to own the latest time-saving appliances, to have volumes of the Russian classics on the shelf, to own a car (even if you have no place to drive), to go to first-run movies or stroll along the embankment in good shoes, all of the middle-class, philistine pastimes Vera Dunham (1976) denounced as "selling out the Revolution" were aspirations, graspable ones, in Cheliabinsk-40 by the late 1950s. It was a remarkable accomplishment. In Cheliabinsk-40, quietly, with no parades or banner headlines, Soviet leaders finally achieved what they had promised: socialism, not in one country, but in one city.[55]

An Elite Middle Class

Residents of Cheliabinsk-40 and Richland defined themselves as middle-class, as a cut above the working-class farmers and the factory and construction workers in the surrounding communities who were banned from living in their town. A certain hostility grew up between the "GE Crowd" and local farmers and ranchers of eastern Washington, and, likewise, between "the chocolate people" and neighboring communities outside the closed city. The sense of superiority, of being chosen, essential, more moral and disciplined than the working classes surrounding them, characterized residents of both atomic cities.[56]

A way of defining one's self as "middle-class" is to be ambivalent, even hostile, toward the working classes. This development is not surprising in Richland. In the 1950s, General Electric led U.S. corporations in devising innovative media and training programs to inculcate among its 250,000 employees a political reaction against liberalism in all its guises: labor unions, New Deal social welfare programs, taxes, regulation, and big government. GE mailed its employees weekly corporate newspapers and a monthly glossy magazine with "The Message." They sent mid-level managers to political training courses to teach colleagues and subordinates to organize locally for lower taxes, less government, and "better business" practices (a term GE officials coined) (Evans 2006, 69). GE also sent out the young Ronald Reagan, host of the popular TV program *GE Theater*, to give talks to plant workers on the essence of fighting communism with free markets, free business, and free people. GE employee-relations executives sought to counter the political and organizational efforts of the AFL and CIO. GE bulletins classified labor unions, supported by working classes, as promoting selfish, corrupt, and self-serving policies that would weaken America and make it soft for communists to attack.

In Richland, this antipathy for working classes came out in the usual places. The major newspaper, *The Tri-City Herald*, served up a strongly anti-union editorial page. The newspaper's editor, Glenn Scott was involved in an extended lawsuit against the local printer's union, and in his column he railed at every opportunity against corrupt union tactics, the manipulation of the working man, and labor's link to communism.[57] Historians John Findlay and Bruce Hevly point out that Richland as a community marginalized labor and unions. The Hanford Atomic Trade Metals Council, for example, was not invited to participate

in Congressional hearings held in 1954 about the incorporation of Richland (Findlay and Hevly 2011, 56). Animosity toward the working classes also cropped up in unexpected places. In 1958, GE published a manual for company policemen.[58] A good part of the manual reads like it was excerpted from an Em-ily Post etiquette column. The text instructs officers to bathe, shave, and watch for dandruff on the collar and halitosis in the mouth. It tells patrolmen not to slouch against walls, "chew the fat" or speak too loudly. The manual—ostensibly about policing and security—goes into surprising detail about per-sonal comportment: "The handkerchief should be clean and free from stains. . . . Never pull a handkerchief from your pocket and give it a vigorous flick preparatory to use."[59] The GE authors scarcely conceal their repulsion of the working classes at the Hanford Plant.

The strange thing is that in Cheliabinsk-40 one also notices a certain antipathy for the working classes, a mood paradoxical in a country nominally led by the Proletariat. This trend is noticeable from the town's founding party conference in 1956. Three-quarters of party members were engineers or white-collar workers.[60] Their disappointment with the behavior of many fellow working-class residents constituted an ongoing mantra. They complained of the dissolute and dirty ways of the working classes in the workers' dorms. They publicly chastised a man who had an affair and left his sick wife home alone with the baby. They set into Young Communist League-types who drank too much and got into a fight with waiters in a restaurant or the cleaning woman who invited men to her apartment at night.[61] They complained of young people who preferred trashy, pot-boiler music and dances to the opera and symphony.[62] "We have to teach them to value the theater and the classics of Russian literature," party members pronounced.[63]

The solution to better behavior was more goods and services. From the first city party conference in 1956, party officials upbraided the supply and distribution office for not supplying fast enough luxuries reclassified as necessities: skis, skates, volleyballs, soccer cleats, and sailing yachts. They demanded faster service, more polite clerks, and self-service department stores.[64] Consumer goods were needed, they said, to make good citizens; good loyal citizens were needed to make more plutonium.

Of course, material possessions could corrupt too. Local officials complained of spoiled youth who had not been baptized in the revolution and civil war: "[these young people] are growing up . . . when socialism had already won out, and has created exceptionally good conditions to raise youth." Vasilii Demeshev served as an example of Cheliabinsk-40's spoiled youth. In 1957, just out of the institute and earning a good salary at Cheliabinsk-40, he bought himself a new car and a television set, yet he had not paid his Young Communist Leagues dues for seven months. When asked for the dues, he claimed he had no money. "Why is he even in the League?" exasperated party members asked.[65]

An ambiguity over upwardly mobile working classes is a problem in Soviet culture of the 1950s. In films of the period the hero is a hard-working professional, a doctor, architect, scientist, or policeman. The antagonists, meanwhile, who help the foreign saboteur in *Unending Story* (1955) and *Case No. 306* (1956), are working-class thugs who take advantage of the hard-working, self-denying Soviet citizens. In the 1960s, the antagonist shifts to the "operator," the person newly arrived in the white-collar service classes; like the young

communist above, he is the false "*intelligent*" who only cares about material acquisition, conspicuous consumption, and a good party. This antagonist appears in films such as *Come Mukhtar* (1964) and *Beware of Automobiles* (1966). There is one film, however, where there is no antagonist, where everyone is a good citizen, educated, smart, and selfless. In the 1961 film *Nine Days of One Year*, the scientists in the closed nuclear city can do both: work hard for the nation and party away in their nice clothes, over elegant cuisine served in homes with sleek, modern interiors. The material rewards for the scientists in *Nine Days* are obvious and need no explanation. The scientists devoted their lives to the cause—peaceful atomic power—and deserved a comfortable life (which they can hardly enjoy since they work all the time). It is here, in the closed city, "not yet on the map," as the film narrator points out, that citizenship and consumption unite successfully in the Soviet cultural imagination.

The residents of Cheliabinsk and Richland identified themselves as edu-cated and middle-class. It is true that the cities consisted of an unusually high number of people with college degrees and PhDs for towns of their size.[66] But most people worked blue-collar jobs. Most employees at Hanford were titled "chemical workers" and in Cheliabinsk they were simply "workers"; they hauled, drove trucks, ran machines, and guarded, cleaned, and fixed them.[67] If one defines middle-class as working a white-collar job, then the majorities in the plutonium cities did not pass. If the middle-class is defined as economically independent, then no one in Richland and Cheliabinsk-40 qualified. If, however, the middle-class is defined by consumption, all residents of Richland and Cheliabinsk-40 made the grade.

In Cheliabinsk-40, the residents' unusual purchasing power, not their job descriptions, gave them an understanding of being middle-class, defined as part of an elite group of consumers. And consumption is what they came for. Over 80 percent of the residents of closed Soviet cities responded that they went to the city in search of this purchasing power: for better housing, goods, and higher wages. A minority replied that they came "for interesting work" (Mel'nikova 2006, 38). As Alexander Novoselov, a former resident, put it, "When I went out in the big world, I felt different from the rest, autonomous."[68] Novoselov said he could identify another closed city resident from 50 paces because of the same air of self-confidence and good wardrobe. A higher standard of living translated into a sense of consumer-driven independence and authority, values that by 1970 would become officially promoted across the Soviet Union.[69]

Richland residents were the vanguard of a larger trend in which America no longer had a proletariat, but, as Peter Bacon Hales puts it, just an "aspiring bourgeoisie" (Hales 1997, 82). Increasingly as the working class was associated with unions, union corruption, labor disputes, and communism, working-class Americans, spurred on by GE-style corporate media campaigns, began to express their anti-communism and pro-Americanism by repositioning themselves in the middle-class. New, mass-produced housing with subsidized loans for white workers in increasingly segregated suburbs, which before World War II were reserved for upper-middle-classes and their servants, gave this re-definition material legitimacy.[70] In his "suburban memoir," D.J. Waldie records his perception of his hometown compared with McDonnell Douglas factories, in Lakewood, California, a development of 17,000 houses that managed to preserve its white demographics into the 1990s: "He thought of them [the houses]

as middle-class, even though 1,100-square-foot tract houses on streets meeting at right angles are not middle-class at all. Middle-class houses are the homes of people who would not live here."[71]

Conclusion

In both the USSR and the United States, consumption increasingly charted out identity, class, and personal self-worth. If you could consume like someone in the middle-class, then you became a better person and belonged there. Episodes of *GE Theater* in 1957 closed with a commercial that featured Nancy and Ronald Reagan in the kitchen of their "Total Electric Home." "When you live better electrically," Reagan told viewers, "you lead a richer, fuller, more satisfying life" (Bird 2007). Or, as a *Pravda* journalist noted in 1971: "Material well-being is to serve as a basis for personal improvement" (Paretskaya 2007, 20).

As the atomic cities led the country in creating new kinds of planned communities, so too they led their respective societies toward a new calibration of a person's place in those communities and society in general. Plant directors and party leaders in Cheliabinsk-40—and corporate and government officials in Richland—were already making the argument in the 1950s that high-quality citizens (i.e., loyal, patriotic, and dutiful) were a product of high-quality goods and services. And the formula worked. The combination of satisfaction and surveillance, of consumer contentment and control, made for good citizens in both Richland and Cheliabinsk-40. Because of their affluence, the residents of the plutonium cities viewed themselves as middle-class. As a community, their allegiances and political beliefs were attuned not to the working and service classes to which the majority belonged, but to the beliefs of their party bosses and corporate executives. Both atomic cities were known for their political conservatism, hawkishness, and patriotism. Despite the fact that the plutonium they produced poisoned their communities and environment, the residents of the atomic cities were militantly pro-nuclear in all its forms. They dismissed the "dissidents" and "hippies" who in the 1970s questioned the nuclear establishment.[72] Safely ensconced in their elite communities, the politics of both closed cities stood by a notion of unequal distribution of public goods and services controlled by the creation of zones of privilege and zones of poverty.[73]

Even young people crossed this conceptual bridge. There were no rebellious *stiliagi* among the elite adolescents of Cheliabinsk-40. No equivalent of the Metropol group in Moscow, where the offspring of the elite were the first to emerge as part of a new counter-culture. Nor in Richland did young people rebel against the "military-industrial complex" that drove their hometown. The first peace movement in the region started up only in 1982, and it was quickly countered by the "Hanford Family," created to defend the plant (Stoffels 2007). Civil rights, hippies, free love, Vietnam protests, and anti-nuclear movements passed Richland right on by.

Joan Didion, commenting on the demise of California's Department-of-Defense-created suburbs, wrote: "When times were good and there was money to spread around, these were the towns that proved Marx wrong, that managed to increase the proletariat and simultaneously, by calling it middle-class, to co-opt it" (Didion 2003, 115). *As long as times were good*. That

was the problem. Despite their identification with the middle-class, the workers of Richland and Cheliabinsk-40 carried on as proletariat; they were wage-laborers, dependent on the plant for their jobs and homes, for their children's schools and the economic health of their communities. In the mid-1950s, Richland voted twice against incorporation and "disposal" of government property. In 1959, Congress forced Richland to accept democracy and private property. But even as Richlanders voted in their first city council and bought their previously rented homes, they did not gain independence. The community did not find alternative industries to support it, despite a great deal of rhetoric about "diversification." The federal government, via contractors, continued to underwrite the vast majority of paychecks in town even after the Cold War, spending over $100 billion to clean up the site. Members of the community were painfully aware that if the plant closed (as it started to just a few years after incorporation) the city's economy would collapse, and they would be left holding their primary investment, their houses, drained of value on a wind-swept, high desert plateau. In Cheliabinsk-40 (later renamed Cheliabinsk-65) residents continued to support their fences long after the wall dividing Berlin came down. In 1989, 97 percent of the residents of the closed city polled voted to keep their gates and guards; mostly for fear of the riffraff lurking outside the gates.[74] Strangely, at the end of the Cold War, as fear of nuclear Armageddon subsided, in Richland and Cheliabinsk-65, the long-standing anxieties of losing one's pass to the atomic city —anxieties born of creating synthetic middle-classes in the middle of nowhere—only intensified.

The cooptation of wage laborers precariously perched in the middle-class in places with no other sustaining economy helped push the atomic communities to the political right, into the embrace of a bipolar world, national defense, and nationalism, embroidered by a gated-community elitism won from decades of consumer superiority. As the Cold War wore on, communities like Cheliabinsk-40 stretched from the Urals to Kazakhstan, Siberia, and parts of European Russia. Department of Defense communities like Richland multiplied across California, Texas, Georgia, Idaho, and New Mexico. In these places the re-calibration of class, the belief in an endlessly upward social mobility linked to the naturalization of consumption took root. And while the goals of keeping a strong economy running and propping up a consuming middle-class converged in the nuclear security state, they were not contained there. As the definition of middle-class changed to embrace not production or economic independence, but consumption, the need to consume got confused with the *right* to consume and became bound up with politics, ideology, and loyalty. In so doing, consuming—frivolously, ostentatiously, outside of necessity—became national obsessions and international benchmarks for achievement of one's society.[75] The image of Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev scowling over kitchen appliances in 1959 reflects how critical this contest became.

Notes

1. According to Thomas B. Cochran, a physicist and senior staff scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Matthew L. Wald, "High Radiation Doses Seen for Soviet Arms Workers." *New York Times* (August 16, 1990). See also Ul'iana Skoibeda, "Rasplata: rebenok-

mutant pokvitalsia s iadernym zavodom." *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, (October 18, 1997).

2. Joseph Masco (2006) comments on the "invisibility" of U.S. nuclear installations during the Cold War, despite their size and substantial economic impact.

3. The plutonium plants produced tritium alongside plutonium. Tritium was necessary for the bombs' triggering mechanism. See Carlisle and Zenzen (1996, 76). In the mid-1960s, Hanford scientists also sought to use tritium in human radiation experiments at the Walla Walla State Prison. See Pacific Northwest Labs 9086, April 6, 1966, Department of Energy public reading room, #13659 (6 pp.).

4. Beria ordered the new security regime after an on-site inspection in July 1947, where he was horrified to find German POWs and prisoners working on the top-secret reactor site (Novoselov and Tolstikov 1995, 141). In the Soviet Union, "regime zones" designated places where people had to possess a domestic passport and permission (*propiska*) to live in the zone. Highly desirable and well-stocked cities such as Moscow and Leningrad had regime-zone designations, as did border zones, considered too vulnerable for potentially suspect classes of persons. For literature on the larger Soviet spatial regime, see Shearer (2004); Popov (1995); Kessler (2001); Moine (1997).

5. For the order to shut down institutions that might draw outsiders into the zone, see "Protokol no. 9: zakrytogo bioro Kyshteymksii gorkom, 5 May 1948," Oblastnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Cheliabinskoi Oblasti (OGAChO) 288/42/34. For a history of the 3,000 people deported as "undesirables" (usually those with criminal records or deported persons) from the zone, see Khakimov 2006). For descriptions of the closed cities and the passport regime that supported it, see B. Emel'ianov (1997); Kolotinskii, Sokhina, and Khalturin (2003). For problems that emerged operating the regime zone on a daily level, see "Protokol no. 9: zakrytogo bioro Kyshtymksii gorkom." 5 May 48, and "From Tkachenko to MGB, Smorodinskii, V.T." May 1948, OGAChO, 288/42/34: 5–9.

6. After Stalin's death and Beria's execution, the closed regime lightened considerably. By 1956, residents were allowed to leave the city with permission for medical treatment, cures at sanatoria, and visits to relatives. See Sokina (2003, 35).

7. Author interview with Elena Igor'evna Viatkina, June 20, 2007, Kyshtym.

8. Matthias Notes and Diary, March 2, 1943.

9. For the organizations structure established by Du Pont, see Du Pont Operations History, Department of Energy (DOE) Public Reading Room, Richland (PRR), Washington, HAN-73214.

10. Initially in 1952, Richland, alone among the federal atomic cities in the United States, was budgeted shelters for the community. Because of its location, north and west, Richland/Hanford had shortest warning time for an impending attack and was considered especially vulnerable to attack because of its importance. As the costs of building shelters were tallied up as "inordinate" however, AEC officials downgraded the civil defense plan to evacuation for the public and shelters for the most vital workers. See "Assumptions and Standards for AEC Disaster Plans" no date. 1955, NARA RG 326/650, box 49, folder 4 and AEC, "Passive Defense Survey of Certain Atomic Energy Installations." 7 May 1953, note by the Acting Secretary Harold D. Anamosa (AEC 393/4). NARA RG 326/650, box 154, folder 9. In the Soviet Union, leaders initially planned in the 1950s to build blast shelters for all

citizens. In the 1950s, construction brigades started building shelters for essential industrial and service workers, but did not build for the larger community. In the second half of the 1960s, planners decided it was too expensive to build blast shelters for all urban residents, so they concentrated on new public construction and industrial sites. In 1974, they decided again to build shelters for all of Richland's citizens, and started using dual purpose shelters, but these plans were also never carried out, despite American conjecture that the Soviet Union was fully prepared to sit out a nuclear war. For this view, see Gouré (1976).

11. Nine workers at the plant died of Chronic Radiation Syndrome, a new illness first diagnosed in Cheliabinsk-40. Another 400 plant workers were diagnosed with CRS. Another estimated 1,500 residents downstream from the plant suffered from the syndrome as well (Kolotinskii, Sokhina, and Khalturin, *Plutonii v devich'ikh rukakh* 2003, 135).

12. Those outside Richland continued to drink local milk. The results of a 1990 health study showed that in a ten-county area around Hanford from 1944 to 1947 people may have received radiation doses of 33 or more rads to their thyroids. Some infants who drank milk from domestic cows may have received doses as high as 2,900 rads. These are the highest known doses to any population group in the United States (Gerber 2002, 213).

13. Findlay and Hevly (2011, 5, 60). For security reports (*svodki)* with political interpretation of rumors about health problems in closed cities, see Mel'nikova (2006, 98).

14. Herbert Parker, public health director in Richland, issued statements such as: "Not one abnormal finding has been uncovered which could in any way be attributed to the hazards of radiation or to chemical toxicity of any of the materials used on the Plant" (Cantril and Parker 1945), as quoted in Gephart (2003, 2, note 7).

15. See, for examples, H.M. Parker, Control of Ground Contamination (memo to D.F. Shaw) August 19, 1954. HW 32808; Kolotinskii, Sokhina, and Khalturin, *Plutonii v devich'ikh rukakh* (2003); Kossenko and Degteva (1994, 73–89), and Gus'kova (2004).

16. The cost, alone, of irrigating and mowing an acre of Richland's green lawns was $625–$700 annually in 1948. Turnbull (1948, 56).

17. *Tri-City Herald*, (October 25, 1950): 1.

18. President Truman declared in 1951 that the nation needed 4.5 million more kilowatts of electricity for national defense production. The Inland Waterways Empire Association responded with proposals for three new dams on the Snake and Columbia Rivers. The local *Columbia Basin News* and *Tri-City Herald* argued in editorials and editorializing news reports that the inland West needed to be developed for national defense. As editorialist for the *CBN* put it: the government must "begin to develop every national resource at its command. The West is the last economic frontier. Its industrial and agricultural settlement is imperative." Quoted in Findlay and Hevly (2011, 18). For examples of justifications for hydroelectric dams, irrigation projects and highway development in Southeastern Washington led by Glenn Lee, editor of the *Tri-City Herald,* see Glenn Lee Papers, Washington State University Libraries, series 10, 11, and 14. For the role of the booster press in general in advocating for government subsidies, see Arakaki (2006).

19. Author interview with Pat Merrill, August 15, 2007; Prosser and Sanger (1995, 135).

20. Archivists at the Department of Energy Reading Room in Richland, WA, and in the Seattle, Atlanta, and College Park branches of the National Archives have no idea where these

files are presently located.

21. See Fred Claggett, “History of Richland.” 2006.001 Box 1, folder 3.1, The Columbia River Exhibition of History, Science, and Technology (CREHST) Collection. Richland Advisory Community Council members (a body set up and overseen by GE) raised the issue of securing the right of residence for people who no longer worked at GE and for working mothers at the first meeting of the council. GE and AEC officials re-jected the proposal. See “City of Richland Minute Books” 1, no. 1–3, May 9, 1949, Richland Public Library Collection.

22. For relative consumption of food, dairy, and medical personnel in Cheliabinsk-40 versus Cheliabinsk, see Novoselov and Tolstikov (1995, 154, 250, 258).

23. For conditions in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the Soviet Union, see Kosheleva, Zubkova, and Kuznetsova (2003).

24. By the mid-1960s, the economic weight of distribution, the residents of only three closed cities (amounting to no more than 300,000 people) bought up from 1960–1965, 1–2 percent of the consumer appliances produced in the USSR and 0.5–0.7 percent of the TVs, refrigerators, and washing machines. To compare, in Cheliabinsk-40, residents had 15 phones per 1,000 residents, while in neighboring Cheliabinsk, residents had all of 1.8 phones per 1,000. See Emel'ianov (1997, 85) for a table of consumer goods for Cheliabinsk-40.

25. Cheliabinsk-40 recruited teachers from the best institutes in the Soviet Union. Forty percent of the city’s students went on to higher education. See Novoselov and Tolstikov (1995, 238–42).

26. Author interviews with Alexander Novoselov (June 26, 2007); V.S. Tolstikov (June 20, 2007); Nadezhda Petrovich Petrushkina (June 25, 2007); and Nadezhda Petrovich Petrushkina (June 25, 2007), all in Cheliabinsk, Russia.

27. For one of many examples, see “Protokoly gorkoma.”19 April 1957, OGAChO, 2469/1/122: 20.

28. For examples of grave concerns over suspicions of young scientists listening to foreign broadcasts, see “Stenogramma Zasedaniia biuro Gorkoma KPSS s uchastiem chlenov biuro pervichoi partorganizastii TsZL.” 7 December 1956, OGAChO 2469/1/5: 18–37. For anxieties over youth and fashion, see author interview with Novoselov (June 26, 2007).

29. The people who asked to be transferred due to fear of radiation poisoning after the 1957 accident at the plant found this out. They left and learned they did not want to live outside the comfort of Cheliabinsk-40, but when they asked to come back, they were denied permission (Mel'nikova 2006, 100).

30. “Stenogramma zasedaniia biuro gorkoma KPSS s uchastiem chlenov biuro pervichoi partorganizastii TsZL.” 7 December 1956, OGAChO 2469/1/5: 18–37.

31. The famine of 1946–1947 hit rural and provincial areas like those of the western Urals particularly hard. For reports of famine and the general poverty of the period, see Kosheleva, Zubkova, and Kuznetsova (2003): 154–58. On Soviet-made footwear, see transcript of author interview with Kotchenko, June 21, 2007.

32. The relative poverty of neighboring communities is stark, especially in the 1950s. Thanks to federal subsidies, Richland had $3,075,000 more revenue to spend on municipal services than neighboring Walla Walla, of comparable size (Owin, Fullerton, and Goff 1955).

The lowest-paying workers at the plant, construction and service providers, were not granted permission to live in Richland. The surrounding communities of Kennewick and Pasco, already over-crowded, had to house these lowest-paid workers. The neighboring regions of Cheliabinsk-40 lost their institutions of higher education, their orphanages, and cultural events because of security requirements related to Cheliabinsk-40. The agricultural region was poor, and public services were limited. Schools, for example, ran on two shifts, the last one ending at 8 p.m. yet did not provide bus service for village kids. The fire brigade was chronically short on equipment. Lacking pumps, firemen put out one fire with milk. On the economic and cultural poverty of the neighboring Kasli and Kyshtym regions surrounding Cheliabinsk-40, agricultural areas with no agricultural goods in the stores, see, for examples, "Protokol shestoi Kaslinskoi raionnoi partiinoi konferensti." 27–28 January 1951, OGAChO, 107/17/658: 11; "Informatsiia o pozhare." 30 November 54, OGAChO, 107/22/13: 136. On the miserable state of the local schools, which reflects also on the poor state of transportation and the supply of goods outside the closed city, see "Sel raikoma partii Shcherbakovu, G. V." 10 November 1954, OGAChO, 102/22/13: 124.

33. See, for examples, "The Atom." *Time* (December 12, 1948): 21; Owin, Fullerton, and Goff (1955, 271); and Paul Nissen's series on GE censorship in Richland, *Tri-City Herald*, **(**October 24, 1950): 1.

34. See "Protokol sobrannia aktiva gorodskoi partiinoi organizastii." 3 November 1957, OGAChO 2469/1/119: 159–70 and Mel'nikova (2006, 102).

35. The reaction at Hanford to the explosion of "Little Joe" in Soviet Kazakhstan in August 1949 was immediate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff set new minimum requirements for the atomic stockpile with a demand for increased production. Funds for new construction at Hanford that had been held back were released (Carlisle with Zenzen 1996, 67–68).

36. U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1962.

37. *Tri-City Herald* (October 15, 1950): 4. Lawmakers from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and officials in the Atomic Energy Commission were greatly troubled by the "strange familiarity seemingly acquired by the Alsops in this atomic field." Congressman Bourke Hickenlooper noted, "These stories have been too frequent to explain either as coincidence of shrewd guessing or journalistic 'dope' stories. Somebody is violating the Atomic Energy Act." See "Hickenlooper to Gordon Dean." 18 June 1952, NARA, RG 326/1A (1951–1958), Box 223, folder 9. Despite Hickenlooper's concerns, the file records no action taken against the Alsop brothers. Many other journalists, however, had their stories redacted or killed because of information deemed sensitive to the bomb project. See NARA, RG 326/1A (1951–1958), Box 223, folder 9.

38. In 1947, the chief Soviet propaganda agency sent out the word to all newspapers, the union of writers and cinematographers, and the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences to take measures to instill more Soviet patriotism in Soviet citizens. The gist of the planned message was that the last Soviet citizen, free from the clutches of capitalism stood above any foreign, high-placed official, who stood on the shoulders of the capitalist slaves. The real danger, the message went, was the tendency to bow and scrape, to adore with servility (*rabolepiia*) bourgeois science and culture" (Fateev 1996, 63).

39. Ibid., 66–67.

40. Peter Hales, for example, calls the Manhattan District's control of atomic sites like Richland "a model for new government and a new social compact within the surrounding countryside" (1997, 125).

41. As Deutschmann notes in his 1952 study of Richland: [there was a feeling that] "in Richland proper a superior school system should be developed, particularly because of the interest of scientific and technical personnel in the education of their children. GE General Manager Shuggs explained: "After a scientist has found out that he will work on an interesting project, and that he will have the proper tools, he wants to know, 'where do I live?' Next, he wants to know about the schools, then the medical service, and then the store" (1952, 136).

42. The architects of the plan illuminated this fact in their introduction, but were also troubled by the lack of public participation in the creation of all the public and private facilities in the city. In compensation, planners recommended that the public be informed of the plan (Turnbull 1948, 1).

43. While Richland was going up, Bill Levitt was a Seabee, working on military construction projects across the United States. While working in military construction, Levitt learned how to build cheap, mass-produced housing with assembly line efficiency. See Hales, "Building Levittown: A Rudimentary Primer."

44. "Policies and Practices Covering Provision and Operation of Commercial Facilities at Richland, Washington, Hanford Operations Office." June 22, 1949, in James P. Thomas Papers, 5433–1, 24, 1949, Special Collections, University of Washington Libraries.

45. Richland's Uptown shopping center was completed in 1949. Gruen designed the first mall for Hudsons on the outskirts (a "gateway") of Detroit in 1950. Gruen was an advocate of decentralization as a form of civil defense in case of nuclear attack. See Hardwick and Gruen (2004, 120). For the "modern" features of Richland's planning and development, see Abbott (1998, 100–103).

46. In 1947, the Richland High School had two complete gyms, an auditorium for 750, a domestic science room, a general science lab, manual training shops, art rooms, and a cafeteria. The school campus took up a total of 35 acres, including a baseball field with wooden stands for 2,000 spectators, a football field and bleachers for 5,000, tennis softball and baseball field, basketball and volleyball courts (Turnbull 1948, 30).

47. *Richland Villager* (March 27, 1947): 9.

48. AEC, *Report of the Safety and Industrial Health Advisory Board*, 20 as quoted in Findlay and Hevly (2011, 53).

49. Richland wages, based on corporate, not government, pay scales, were about 10–15 percent higher than neighboring Benton County in 1950, 1960, and 1970 (Abbott 1998, 103).

50. The NAACP first organized in Richland in 1948, setting up a presence in a local school. *Richland Villager* October 14, 1948. On history of complaints of discrimination in Richland, see Hevly and Findlay (2006, 61).

51. *2nd Annual Atomic Frontier Days Program*, 9 as quoted in Hevly and Findlay (2011, 50).

52. The classic statement in this vein is N.A. Miliutin, *Sotsgorod the Problem of Building Socialist Cities*. See also, L.M. Kaganovich (1934); Pallot (1993, 211–32).

53. The Leningradskii Projectnie institute GSP-11 plotted out the plan for Cheliabinsk-40

(Novoselov and Tolstikov 1995, 175).

54. “Gorodskoi komitet KPSS Trekhgornogo.” OGAChO 1597/1/3: 17 and “Gorodskoi komitet KPSS Snezhinska.” 2845/2/3: 7.

55. There is evidence that the closed atomic cities became models for later Soviet planning. In the 1960s, residential and cultural buildings in Cheliabinsk-40 won prizes for their design (Novoselov and Tolstikov 1995, 182). The layout and plan of Cheliabinsk-40 matches closely the prospective plan for Soviet cities laid out in “All Union conference on the Prospects of Soviet City Planning” held in Moscow 1970. The 1970 plan called for building self-sufficient satellite cities with their own services and commerce, surrounded by green zones. See DiMaio (1974, 52).

56. As a party member stated in Cheliabinsk-40: “Our city isn’t on the map, but many can envy the conditions in which we live.” Gorkom (Ozersk), OGAChO 2469/7/2: 67. At another meeting, speakers enunciated that their town was better because of the party and state’s attention to it, which had created the excellent technical base of the factory, the good cultural distribution, qualified cadres, literate, educated and “chosen” people. “Pervichnye organizacii khimkombinata ‘Mayak’ Ozerskogo gorodskogo komiteta KPSS.” OGAChO 2983/1/1: 31. This attitude has continued in independent Russia (Riskin 2004).

57. This tactic, of undermining unions and thus New Deal legislation by linking it to union corruption was carried out on a national level by Pulitizer-prize winning columnist Westbrook Pegler (Witwer 2005). On Scott’s lawsuits, see Pugnetti (1975).

58. “Regulations and General instructions Governing Hanford Works Security Patrolmen.” GE, revised 2 February 1958, DOE Hanford PRR HAN 22970.

59. Ibid., 9.

60. Zasedanie IIIii gorodskoi partiinoi konferenstii (Ozersk), OGAChO 2469/2/1 (14–15 December 1958).

61. See “Protokoly gorkoma.” 19 April 1957, OGAChO 2469/1/122: 1–30 and “Rezul’taty raboty komissii po proverke gorodskogo khoziastva kombinata no. 817.” OGAChO 288/42/75: 31–37.

62. “Protokol sobrannia aktiva gorodskoi partiinoi organizastii.” 3 November 1957, OGAChO 2469/1/119: 159–70.

63. “Rezoliustiia cheliabinskoi oblastnoi konferenstii storonnikov mira.” 13 September 1951, OGAChO 288/15/220: 191.

64. “Protokol 1ii gorodskoi partiinoi konferentsii.” 16–17 August 1956, OGAChO 2469/1/1: 12–118.

65. “Doklad na 3m plenume” 1957.

66. In closed cities in the Soviet Union, on average 25 percent of the population had a higher education and 38 percent had a high school degree. Mel'nikova (2006, 42). In Richland in the 1960s, 40 percent of the adult male population had gone to college. The average for Washington state at the time was 20 percent (Findlay and Hevly 2011, 53).

67. In Richland, less than 30 percent of the population were classified as professional or technical workers or managers in the 1950 and 1960 U.S. Census. In Ozersk, by 1956–1960, only 20 percent of employees in the city had a higher or middle school education (Mel'nikova 2006, 42).

68. Author interview with Novoselov, June 26, 2007.

69. Anna Paretskaya argues that in the 1970s, Soviet propagandists promoted new values that determined boundaries for personal independence and authority based, often, on citizen's consumer opportunities and choices. See Chapter 2 of this volume.

70. There is a large body of scholarship on the postwar creation of the segregated American suburb: Jackson (1985); Haynes (2001); Self (2003); Harvey (2000); Orser (1994); Seligman (2005); Katznelson (2005); Pierce (2005); and Connerly (2005).

71. In 1960, the census registered the Lakewood population as 98.5 percent white. That year the Census counted seven people (out of 67,125 residents), who identified themselves as black (Waldie 1996 1, 162).

72. Author interview with Jim Stoeffels, co-founder of World Citizens for Peace and the Bomb, Richland, August 17, 2007. For a record of resistance to safety concerns about the Hanford Plant that coalesced with a burgeoning peace movement, see D'Antonio (1993).

73. In both countries there was a trend away from the 1930s promises of redistribution of public goods for the benefit of all citizens, toward a pattern of spatial exclusion of jobs, goods and services in privileged zones for some, while the rhetoric of rights and freedoms for all continued. See Brown (2007, 67–103).

74. The poll was used by the city and plant administration to justify the continuance of both the security regime, the fence and its guards. (The poll evidently was planned and taken for that reason: to fend off demands from Moscow to open the city.) A second poll taken in 1999 found that 85 percent of the population wanted the gates up. The lower figure was attributed to the new migrants who had moved into the city who were not as fearful of the "big world" (Riskin 2004, 2006).

75. For an examination of how U.S. promoters and officials worked to convince Europeans to use American-style "Standard of Living" assessments to judge their society over existing measurements that included issues such as quality of life and hours on the job, see de Grazia (2005).

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Chapter 2
A Middle Class without Capitalism? Socialist Ideology and Post-Collectivist Discourse in the Late-Soviet Era

Anna Paretskaya

In the years since the official end of the Soviet socialist project in 1991, both Russian elites and the Russian public have been wary of capitalism, democracy, and civil society, which were supposed to replace the Soviet party-state. However, it seems that everyone has embraced the idea of the middle class, a group that is usually seen as a precondition, an agent, or a product of capitalism, democracy, and civil society. Politicians from the "reformer" Boris Yeltsin to the "autocrat" Vladimir Putin have viewed the middle class as a cornerstone of the country's future.[1] Both scholars and market research organizations frequently conduct studies of the group's wealth, consumption preferences, and political attitudes, and the media publish the results and invite specialists to discuss them.[2] Over the years, the public has enthusiastically identified with this recently resurrected social group: already in the late Soviet period, over 40 percent of the respondents in one survey described themselves as middle class (*Sovetskii prostoi* 1993, 53), in 2003 the number was at 50 percent,[3] and five years later, according to another study, "Some 80% of the population consider themselves to be middle class."[4]

Interestingly, middle-class status is often measured not simply by occupation, income and wealth, or education, but by lifestyle choices and attitudes. For example, a 2006 study of the middle class in Moscow stipulated that to be even considered part of the group, prospective members must own at least five of the following items: a color TV, VCR, camcorder, two or more cars, camera, personal computer, electric drill, deep fryer, clock radio, and a second apartment or a summer house.[5] Researchers who designed the survey did not explain how and why these particular items ended up on the list, but one can assume that it is not so much their price—an electric drill and a second home are obviously in different price categories—that is significant, but rather a certain "middle-class lifestyle" that they create and that sets their owners apart from others. These consumer goods convey an image of the home-owning, technologically savvy, and easily mobile (for work or pleasure) middle-class households in the West. But at the same time, in the post-socialist context, they may signify their owners' aspirations for individuality, autonomy, and self-reliance when it comes to entertainment, travel, household repairs, and work.

Surveys testify to such connections between the middle class and individualism and independence as well. Two-thirds of the members of the middle class, according to one study, lived by the old Russian saying that "everyone is a blacksmith of his own happiness" and believed they could determine their life goals and achieve them on their own. More than 50 percent of the middle class (as opposed to less than 30 percent among the general population) thought they were capable of providing for themselves and their families without any help from the state.[6] And 60 percent declared they liked to "stick out" and were not afraid to find themselves in a minority by taking risks in their private or professional life.[7] As one

representative of this new class, now a stockbroker, summarized, "I was an employee, merely a hired worker. . . . Financially I've gained nothing so far. . . . What I've gained is independence and prospects. I wanted to be independent. . . . Now everything depends on me. . . . I'm starting life anew" (Semenova and Thompson 2004, 141). This view testifies to a sense of agency and, at least when there are no serious economic troubles, to a sense of optimism detected in many in-depth interviews with members of this class (Diligenskii 2002, 64–78). Surveys and interviews alike show that members of the Russian middle class tend to value personal freedom and prefer equality of opportunity over equality of income more than their lower-class compatriots (*Novye izvestiia* May 29, 2008; Diligenskii 2002, 91).

Why is there such comfort with the concept of the middle class and these values so soon after the end of a regime that purportedly championed the pri-macy of the proletariat, collectivism, equality, and asceticism? Was no one listening? Or did the propaganda simply backfire? There is no doubt that the reappearance of the term "middle class" post-dates the death of the Soviet Union and that the rise of the group—both on paper and in reality[8]—is a product of post-Soviet development. However, perhaps the term's meaning for today's Russians is rooted not so much in the political and economic reforms of the last 15–20 years, but originates in the pre-*perestroika* years, when the seeds of these values of individualism[9] and middle-class lifestyles were sown by the party-state. Can we say that if socialism, as it was presented (although not necessarily practiced) by the Communist Party to the Soviet people, did not create a "real" or "paper" middle class, then at least it introduced and embedded in its subjects values other than workerism and collectivism? Did it begin to exercise symbolic power, "the power to make groups and to consecrate or institute them" (Bourdieu 1987, 14), on behalf of a group whose name would not even be mentioned until after the political death of the Party?

My analysis of Soviet newspapers and official speeches during late socialism reveals that alongside predictable rhetoric about fulfillment and overfulfillment of the five-year plans, the leading role of the working class under the guidance of the Communist Party, and the creation of the "New Soviet Man" and the "Radiant Future," there was another discourse that promoted values of individuality, self-reliance, and privatism, which I call "post-collectivist values." To be sure, this alternative discourse never mentioned a middle class and was framed in the customary terms of socialist ideology, but its contradictions with the conventional ideological language of communism are nonetheless obvious.

Why do I associate these values with the middle class? Are they intrinsic to the middle class anywhere and at any time? Of course not; what constitutes "middle class" and the values and lifestyles this group exhibits vary across space and time. For example, many studies of the nineteenth century American middle class stress the centrality of tolerance and egalitarian and collectivist values (Williams 1961). On the other hand, Bell ([1976]1996), Bellah et al. (1985), and Gans (1988) have suggested that central to identities and values of the post–World War II middle class in America were "individualism and achievement, privacy, familism, consumerism, and conventionality" (Archer and Blau 1993, 34).[10] In the same manner, a "quasi-middle class" that existed during the earlier years of the USSR, particularly under Stalin, displayed and strived for values different from their post-Soviet counterparts: civilized personal conduct in public, proper hygiene, acquisitive but cultured consumerism, and general

unifor-mity of behavior, cultural tastes, and consumption patterns (Dunham 1976; see also Fitzpatrick 1988b). I link self-reliance, individualism, and privatism to middle class, because the post-Soviet discourse does, as is evident from the surveys mentioned above.

I base my argument on a close analysis of the official Soviet press and the minutes of three Party Congresses (1971, 1976, 1981). I examined every issue of three major newspapers —*Pravda*, *Trud*, and *Literaturnaia gazeta*—between 1970 and 1986, and looked at random issues of *Izvestiia*, another major publication, from 1970 to 1980.[11] I chose these papers because, on the one hand, they were nation-wide publications of the four main Soviet institutions—the Communist Party, the Council of Trade Unions, the Writers' Union, and the Soviet parliament, respectively—and everything printed there (including items from citizen-correspondents and letters from readers) was sanctioned, if not directly commissioned, by the authorities. Therefore, nothing that contradicted the official point of view could appear in these pages. On the other hand, they had somewhat diverse audiences: while *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* did not target any specific segments of the population and, hence, published materials presumed to be of interest to all, *Trud* had a more working-class readership and paid more attention to their specific milieu. *Literaturnaia gazeta* was a weekly newspaper mostly for educated audience with contributions—articles, as well as poetry and works of fiction—from literati. However, despite these differences, all four papers printed stories, editorials, letters to the editor, and other items that in one way or another reproduced the ideas of what I call "post-collectivist discourse," demonstrating its uncanny pervasiveness.

In this chapter I look at three areas of life where distinctions between social groups are formed and manifested: work, consumption, and leisure. In the area of work, this new discourse was promoting what can be called the professionalization of manual labor. In an era of accelerated technological revolution, the Soviet party-state began to encourage broad professional education for workers beyond the skills needed in their immediate jobs. Such education, in theory, would facilitate workers' autonomy in work-related decision making. The image of the worker-intellectual, often wearing a white coat on the shop floor and compared to a professor, doctor, or artist, replaced the image of a rugged proletarian in soiled overalls with permanent dirt under his nails but revolutionary ideas on his mind. Second, the austerity of life and personal sacrifice associated with the early Soviet years were sidelined by the promise of abundant consumer goods now—not in some distant future. More important, the consumer goods promoted in the Soviet press were admired for the features that allowed their owners to set themselves apart from fellow citizens and to rely less on state-provided services and thus facilitate a certain post-collectivist lifestyle. Lastly, the new discourse endorsed new cultural tastes for the Soviet people, especially, again, among the workers.[12] People were urged to create their own works of art in their free time but with near-professional commitment. These practices were promoted not only to broaden people's intellectual horizons, but also to encourage original and independent thinking, even a certain contempt for the establishment. In short, if we look closely, we can see a departure in pronouncements—if not actual policies—of the Soviet state from the collectivist and workerist ethos usually associated with socialism and the inauguration of values that today are represented by Russia's emerging and growing middle class.

Professor-Pipefitter: Making Trades into Professions

This new discourse most strikingly manifested itself through an attempt to remake manual labor into professional work[13] and praised blue-collar workers for broad academic knowledge rather than technical skills, physical strength, or political consciousness. As one newspaper correspondent noted, "Today's working class differs greatly from the working class of the 1920s–1930s. Now, we see an educated, philosophically thinking worker. At times, I don't even know where a worker ends and an *intelligent* begins."[14] *Rabochie-intelligenty,*[15] as they became known and whose numbers were reportedly in the millions, brought "creative spirit, scientific approach, daring exploration" to their day-to-day work and were a living testament to the eradication of distinctions between physical and intellectual jobs.[16]

Educational credentials and the type of knowledge each group used in their respective work were the most obvious distinctions between professionals and blue-collars. The Communist Party pressed workers to complete secondary education and pursue technical and college degrees, although without giving up their manual jobs. Younger workers faced special pressure to comply, and they were encouraged to continue their schooling by appeals to their political consciousness, but also by offers of tangible rewards such as passes to summer resorts, bonus pay, and extra vacation days.[17] This was in stark contrast to previous eras. For instance, Nikita Khrushchev's 1958 education reform aimed at steering more people into working-class trades: all 15-year-olds, instead of finishing high school, were to enter the labor force for a minimum of two years, preferably in manufacturing. This arrangement sought "to reduce the inbuilt advantages enjoyed by children from professional families, and to encourage more young people to take up skilled *manual trades,* which the economy desperately needed" (Hosking 1993, 354; emphasis added). In essence, intending to reduce inequalities, this reform was raising the prestige of the working class at the expense of everybody else, by forcing everyone to be a part of it—at least temporarily. Needless to say, this policy met considerable resistance and was never fully implemented. The need for an expanded labor pool in the manual professions, however, remained, as did the necessity to showcase the progress toward ever-growing equality. But General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's administration employed the opposite tactics: in its rhetoric, and frequently in its policies, it elevated the blue-collar workers to the level of white-collar professionals.[18] Newspapers and official speeches regularly mentioned the growing numbers of manual workers with secondary, and often more advanced, schooling. They meant to celebrate the USSR's achievements in education, but also to signal to workers that they, as a group, were gaining on the professionals in terms of the complexity, creativity, and importance of their work—even without necessarily moving up the occupational and social hierarchy. "Not all [of us] are engineers, but all study," wrote one foreman about his brigade.[19]

But even those blue-collar workers who did not want to pursue education formally could choose to participate in the "schools of communist labor"—often referred to as "workers' academies"—set up at many factories. There, as part of the effort to professionalize their positions, the most capable workers were prodded to defend "worker dissertations." By the late 1970s and early 1980s, hundreds of them had gone through the process from Leningrad to

Khabarovsk, from Berdiansk to Taganrog.[20] Since, as *Pravda* pointed out on April 21, 1972, "The word 'dissertation' is from an academic vocabulary," to merit the title, the workers' theses had to satisfy certain requirements of complexity and sophistication. And they did, as newspaper reports testified: For example, when a Leningrad steelworker was presenting his dissertation in front of the committee, "It seemed everyone forgot he was a worker . . . [He] freely used scientific terminology, referred to diagrams . . . convincingly demonstrated the viability of his technical ideas. In front of us," the observer concluded, "was a worker-intellectual, worker-scientist."[21]

This broad knowledge not only "expanded the intellectual horizon" of the worker, but it also allowed him to learn a second or third trade. Professional branching out was good not only for business, but for workers themselves: diverse skills allowed them to perform different tasks and to avoid "monotony, tedium, and the boredom of labor."[22] It also made workers more independent, putting them in charge of their own work routine and time-management. This was, according to newspapers, especially true—although somewhat paradoxical, perhaps—for conveyer-belt operators, whose work seemed to be entirely regulated by the production line. For instance, operations on an assembly line at the transistor radio factory in Riga, Latvia, were reorganized. While before the workers had performed only a handful of operations each, now each worked on the product from the beginning to end. As a result, a featured female worker, Svetlana, became "the mistress of the conveyer and hence her own mistress." She regained independence from the assembly line and gained control of her own time (which she could use to get a haircut at the factory salon "at a time convenient for her").[23] For a manual worker, this break was probably the equivalent of a professor's summer off from his teaching responsibilities.

Even if additional education did not yield formal degrees for workers or admission to scientific professional associations, official discourse nonetheless often likened at least some of them to scholars. Frequent were stories featuring "professors of fittery" and "professors of the assembly line" who possessed exemplary skills and knowledge albeit without any academic seal of approval.[24] A good example is a poem in which a young fitter with failed college aspirations gets comforted by a kind old-timer who opens the young man's eyes to the true value of their profession by equating it with rocket science:

Stand firm, my son!

To be a fitter is not that simple!

Here, knowledge

with skillfulness you must combine.

Technology advances!

It's tough to keep up with its progress.

But, no, it

can't do without fitters.

Look, in the sky

a rocket treads a virgin path

and spacecrafts glide in space.

But they, you know,

are also made from metal.

Which means

they were assembled

by the fitters.

And a fitter everywhere reaps respect

when he works from his heart, his soul.

You—are a Doctor here!

Professor of the metals—

in your hands

is the steel life of the machines.[25]

Besides drawing comparisons between manual and highly abstract, intellectual work, this poem, like many other newspaper publications, emphasized the individual's professional self-worth, as opposed to his political consciousness as a member of the proletariat. "Reaping respect" and recognition for his knowledge and skill was, according to the poem, as important for the worker as actually building communism (in the form of spaceships, in this case). Likewise, an article in *Trud* about two highly skilled turners saluted them for "finding their place [in life] and making a wonderful career. Because the mastery they possess has brought them recognition, respect, [and] a realization of their self-worth."[26] Moreover, in a number of articles that appeared in the 1980s, "The Stakhanovites of the 1930s [were] presented as having been motivated by concerns for self-actualization" rather than driven to overfulfill the Plan by ideology or economic necessity. In other words, "Official statements have recognized that workers may find satisfaction in the 'content of their work,' irrespective of its contribution to societal development" (Shlapentokh 1986, 52). This stress on individual professional satisfaction and advancement was yet another signal that manual labor and the people who performed it were catching up with white-collar professionals, in whose line of work individual contribution was more evident and pride in personal achievement was more legitimate.

In addition to informal academic honorifics and symbolic comparisons with artists,[27] Soviet manual workers made claims, with support from the press, for more tangible—although not necessarily material—rewards similar to those of the professionals they were being compared with. At the Party Congress in 1971, a grinder from Leningrad complained about a lack of "moral stimuli." In particular, he was upset that many workers were not permitted to put a personal stamp on goods they made.[28] Such a stamp, analogous to an artist's signature on a painting, would not only indicate the worker's mastery, but also mark his particular contribution to the overall product instead of it being lost in a collective effort. The grinder also proposed holding local and national competitions for workers, especially novices, in

various trades: “We have young musician laureates—vocalists, violinists, pianists. Why not establish a contest for a turner laureate?” he posed under the audience’s applause.[29] The Congress attendees were also enthusiastic about his other idea (which was, undoubtedly, dictated by the Party, just like his entire address): he suggested that, as “members of scientific and artistic intelligentsia, doctors and teachers” were bestowed official honorary titles and special prizes (the Honored Artist of the Soviet Union, Honored Scholar of Ukraine, etc.), it was now time to institute the same official honorifics for manual workers. “It would sound so great, ‘The Honored Worker of the Republic’!” he exclaimed.[30] And sure enough, by the next Party Congress blue-collar workers with extraordinary achievements in their fields received a special medal, “The Labor Glory.”[31] Moreover, the USSR State Prize, previously awarded only to professionals in arts and sciences, was also extended to workers who, in the words of a working-class Congress delegate, “considered it only appropriate.”[32] Newspapers annually reported the names of the workers receiving the high honor and often profiled winners of the “professional mastery contests.” And again, they underscored that these challenges tested not only workers’ manual skills, but also their broader competence. In short, workers were revered in a similar way and for similar skills and knowledge as were engineers, artists, and other professionals.

Newspapers also covered the presumed fading of probably the most acute and visible distinction between blue-collar workers and professionals, their working conditions. According to one report, workers at a Moscow electronics factory wore “sterile, spotlessly clean coats and snow-white caps,” a depiction that evoked in readers’ minds a laboratory or a hospital.[33] Many facilities in different industries were also reportedly working to reduce industrial noise, a particular blue-collar problem: the transistor radio factory in Riga mentioned above built a “recreation room” with soft music, dim lights, and plush armchairs for its workers; and a Leningrad timber-cutting shop placed potted greenery on its factory floor to moderate noise and dust pollution.[34] Even industrial machines were becoming more “cultured,” the press reported. The October 26, 1973, issue of *Trud* waxed poetic about the new lathes at one factory: “Their movements are now quicker, more precise, more intricate. . . . They are attractive in their modern beauty of smooth concise lines, hidden inside impetuous force, matte white or multihued panes of facing.” Such tools were obviously “smarter” than old ones and made work of their operators less strenuous. But, more importantly, they were designed with much attention to their appearance, and their descriptions evoked a doctor’s scalpel, an architect’s compass, and possibly the most sophisticated and sleekest of all devices—a space rocket. Although Soviet blue-collars were still mainly doing physical work, at least their workplace was changing to approximate, as much as possible, white-collar offices and labs, which were clean and pleasantly lit, sported comfortable office furniture and modern slick tools, and where the only sound audible was soothing music.

In a society of “developed socialism,” the party-state, for reasons of politics and economics, could not allow everyone to become a white-collar professional. But it had to demonstrate to its people that some tangible progress toward a classless, homogeneous social system was being made and that more and more of the barriers between social groups were being torn down. Still maintaining the notion of the working class as the “vanguard of society,”

the Soviet press—indubitably with the consent of the state and Party leadership—worked hard to prove that members of the Soviet working class did not need to actually move up into the ranks of the intelligentsia to perform equally intellectual, creative, and sophisticated labor in similarly comfortable working conditions, enjoy same symbolic rewards, and be honored and respected in comparable ways. Yet, by likening the blue-collar workers to Soviet professionals, the "scientific and artistic intelligentsia," public discourse under Brezhnev signaled to the Soviet workers that professions were more desirable than trades, that white-collars with their creative independence were superior to manual workers, and that the future of socialism lay in the professionalization, individual or collective, of all labor.

"To Make Consumers Happy" Marketing Post-Collectivist Lifestyles

The 1970s also saw a shift in priorities, as a consumer-oriented discourse supplanted revolutionary asceticism and sacrifice. At the Party Congress in 1971, General Secretary Brezhnev declared that Soviet citizens no longer would have to sacrifice their material comfort and that comrades who failed to recognize this shift did not understand the Party's current agenda (*Materialy,* 51–52). Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin described the Party's new course even more force-fully: "For the first time in history, socialism is turning the wealth of the society into the wealth of its every member,"[35] signaling an audacious turn in priorities away from austerity and the primacy of collective interests over personal desires; now the state would work for the benefit of men, rather than men working for the benefit of the state.

Indeed, the state's interests were sacrificed at least on one occasion during the following Five-Year Plan (*piatiletka*). In 1975, after several years of poor grain crops, the government imported 30 million tons of grain—wheat, corn, soybeans, and so on—from abroad, worth a total of nearly $5 billion. A November 1975 letter from Kosygin to the CPSU's Central Committee detailing the sources of hard currency to finance these purchases recommended that the Party (partially) forego buying Western industrial equipment, accelerate exports of natural resources (such as copper, aluminum, nickel, oil, gasoline, and diesel fuel) instead of stockpiling them in the national reserves, and borrow hard currency from foreign banks at a 10–12 percent annual interest rate. The letter predicted that the first two measures would slow down industrial output necessitating "austere economizing" in industrial production, while the last one would place the country "into a severe dependency on the capitalist financial market."[36] Nonetheless, Kosygin was willing to recommend them to the Central Committee; the time of "belt tightening" and food rationing had passed.

While this rhetoric somewhat dissipated at the 1976 Party Congress (Breslauer 1977; Grossman 1977), it did not mean that the leadership abandoned—or even lessened—its dedication to people's well-being. If indeed financial commitment to the production of consumer goods decreased, the party re-oriented its discourse to the quality of consumption, both in terms of the quality (rather than sheer quantity) of goods produced and of satisfying consumer demand, rather than producing to meet the Plan. In his report to the 1976 Congress, Brezhnev stressed the need to improve quality and expand the inventory of manufactured

merchandise: if consumer demand was not yet satisfied, "The problem was not with the amount, but rather the lack of high-quality, fashionable" products.[37] Even in their internal communications, where, presumably, there was no need to feign concern, the Party's Central Committee and its Secretariat upheld this position. Since, in its own view, people judged the Party's performance based on how it handled consumer issues,[38] the Secretariat's resolution of June 11, 1979, sent to the heads of republican and regional Party organizations, stipulated:

> The Central Committee once again underscores the topmost significance of an all-out increase of consumer goods output, unequivocal compliance with the set goals of their production and improvements of their quality . . . These issues at all times ought to be in the center of attention of all Party organizations because satisfying consumer demand is one of the most crucial economic and socio-political tasks [of the Party].[39]

Catering to consumers' ever-rising expectations regarding the quality and range of products had safely risen to the level of a political and economic prior-ity in the first socialist state.

Attention to consumption was not new in late socialism. In the 1930s, consumption was envisioned as a part of a "civilizing process" to convert Soviet workers, especially newcomers to the class, into cultured builders of communism who, at the same time, could—at least in theory—indulge in the consumption of luxury goods (such as champagne, chocolate, and caviar) previously available only to nobility and bourgeoisie (Hessler 2000; Volkov 2000; Gronow 2003). In the 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin's policies rewarded midlevel managers of the Soviet state with expanded consumption options that instilled middle-class, or rather petty-bourgeois, values in their clients (Dunham 1976). Khrushchev's administration used consumption "to renew and maintain its popular legitimacy [especially among women] without surrendering its exclusive hold on power" (Reid 2002, 221). But under Brezhnev, the discourse around consumption was elevating the values of individuality, self-reliance, and privacy—attitudes that are usually associated with consumption outside of state socialist societies. In short, it undercut the main tenet of socialism—its collectivist spirit.

It was not so much the goods themselves that mattered, but the lifestyles they represented and how they would change the lives of people and society and what lifestyles they encouraged. If household durables and means of individual transportation would supposedly save time and energy that people could instead apply to collective endeavors, it remained unclear how fashionable and often custom-made clothes, stylishly decorated apartments, and high-tech sound- and video-recoding and reproducing devices would necessarily contribute to the advancement of a collectivist spirit and socialist values. Instead, this rhetoric fostered "a new ethos [of] . . . the pleasure of purchasing goods, including new gadgets, the placing of personal interests at the center of one's private life and the acquisition of as much money as possible to satisfy the new wants" (Hirszowicz 1980, 116–17).

The early 1970s brought about a new type of a grocery store—the *universam. Universams*, which first opened in new residential neighborhoods in Moscow, were different from more traditional shops in two respects. First, they were to carry and sell a wide variety (*univer*, universal) of foodstuffs, as opposed to specialized stores selling just dairy, meat and fish, or produce. More importantly, in these stores, customers were to help themselves (*sam*, self-service) to pre-packaged products displayed in the open. Both innovations were to reduce the time consumers spent on acquiring food items: the former minimized the number of stops the

shopper had to make to buy all the ingredient she needed to prepare meals, and the latter reduced the time she had to spend in the store.[40] Newspapers unanimously hailed *universams* for this time-saving quality,[41] but also for the greater control customers gained over the process of shopping: "Ordinary shoppers have become active participants of the buying–selling process [because] most store counters that for centuries were an insurmountable barrier for consumers have now disappeared," as *Trud* summarized ten years later.[42] If there were any complaints about this new shopping experience (in addition to ordinary grievances regarding shortages and the poor quality of some goods), they usually were about the staff at *universams* who attempted to regain control over shoppers: customers—both newspaper journalists in their articles and readers in their letters—grumbled about having to check their bags when entering the store and being subjected to searches when leaving it. Even though shop clerks were not necessarily viewed as agents of the state, the introduction of the new type of store and its generally positive depiction in the press reinforced for readers the value of autonomy and self-reliance when making their consumer choices and, perhaps, a more general opposition to a supervised communal existence.

The new Soviet consumption discourse encouraged a retreat from collective life into private life more directly as well. Many of the products publicized by the media—especially home appliances and gadgets—not only helped to conserve time, but they reduced the need to rely on communal services by making "private space" more usable, comfortable, and desirable. In 1973, *Pravda* and *Trud* each ran news items that featured, respectively, a new model of a refrigerator with a built-in bar and an electric fireplace with a similar feature.[43] In the midst of an anti-alcoholism campaign, these products were praised for creating a cozy atmosphere at home, where residents could consume endless chilled drinks by the fireplace "with the flickering flame of simulated coal framed by imitation brick."[44] Similarly, the proliferation of television sets, transistor radios, reel-to-reel tape players and recorders—typically the most frequently and most proudly advertised gadgets—privatized leisure by allowing people to enjoy various kinds of entertainment in their own home, rather than in movie theaters, concert halls, or sports arenas. The Soviet press was especially enthusiastic about portable devices, such as small color televisions, battery-powered tape-recorders, and mini-fridges powered by a car battery.[45] Not only could Soviet citizens evade, with the help of this equipment, leisure activities regimented by the state and escape into the relative privacy of their own home, but they also could, if they wanted, create their own entertainment and carry it far away from, if not the authorities, then their nosy neighbors.[46]

Furthermore, the official rhetoric was mixed on how the time saved with the help of the new consumer products and services was to be spent. On one hand, once liberated from household chores, the Soviet people were expected to use their new-found free time on socially meaningful endeavors: civic and political engagement, improving their professional qualifications and labor productivity, and collective educational leisure.[47] On the other, Soviet newspapers often elevated, if not outright glorified, the most primordial and unproductive form of leisure: food consumption. "Points of communal eating" had long been sites to celebrate special occasions with family, friends, and co-workers, but, by the mid–1970s, people increasingly enjoyed coming to restaurants and cafés "'for no reason,' other than a good time,

for pleasant conversation," "to see and be seen."[48] Newspapers commended cafés and restaurants that had a distinctive ambiance created by unique décor, entertainment, and menu: old-fashioned samovar tea and blintzes in Leningrad's "Russian samovars," traditional Ukrainian fare from an 1812 cookbook and folk music at "Café May" in Zhdanov, Italian pizza at a bistro in Moscow.[49] Newspapers especially noted places that cre-ated cozy atmospheres conducive to intimate conversations: small but not cramped dining rooms, music that was not too loud, and with candles on the tables and other small touches.

The cornucopia of products and services supposedly available to consumers meant that everyone was going to find what suited their personal needs, tastes, and budget. According to the newspapers, the Soviet people were able to afford—and industry supplied them with—enough variety of brands and styles that one man's apartment would be decorated differently from his neighbor's and a woman would never find a coworker wearing the same outfit. To that effect, newspapers advertised tailor shops and more exclusive "houses of fashion" specializing in custom-made garments and criticized them for abandoning "their main task of serving the *individual* needs of their customers" if they chose to manufacture off-the-rack clothes to meet production targets.[50]

Likewise, the Soviet press (and a well-known 1975 Soviet comedy, *The Irony of Fate*) criticized the uniformity of architecture and home décor.

> Our homes and things we furnish them with are now being designed and built without taking into account the demands of individual consumers. . . . But every person wants to furnish his home in such a way that it would satisfy his own tastes . . . [and] each of us is trying to overcome the faceless standard in his own way.[51]

The media urged architects and interior designers to make sure that Soviet homes, their layouts, décor, and amenities were less standardized and more distinctive, even unique. For example, the dull brown color of most television sets could be changed to white, red, or any other color, "depending on how the rest of the room is decorated."[52] *Trud* hailed a new type of furniture store, which allowed its patrons to buy as many or as few kitchen cabinets as they needed in a variety of colors and patterns, as opposed to a traditional practice of selling pre-fabricated sets that came in one or two hues.[53]

The color, shape, and style of home appliances and furniture, electronic gadgets, and clothes became valued in the consumption discourse over the years at least as much as their functional qualities. Manufacturers, recognizing consumer's demands, strove to make goods more attractive in order to compete with foreign brands that were often more popular not only because of the prestige they gave their owners, but because of their unusual styles. For instance, designers and manufacturers invariably stressed the "more elegant design" and better comfort of Soviet family cars.[54] An article in *Pravda*, reporting on an experimental model of Moskvich, the second-most popular Soviet family car, began its description by noting the prototype's golden color, which its creators dubbed "Stradivari."[55] In a country where car models had numbers rather than names and most of them came in primary colors, a rare shade with a foreign name that evoked the sophistication of classical music must have seemed extremely desirable even to journalists at the Communist Party mouthpiece.

The media's ongoing promotion of fashionable clothes, smart-looking appliances, funky

furniture, and uniquely painted cars was supposed to demonstrate to audiences the extraordinary achievements of the Soviet way of life and, in particular, the much improved standard of living of the Soviet people who now could afford "quality goods" that would satisfy any customer's demands. In other words, the notion of "the average consumer" was no longer acceptable. Rather than breeding the New Soviet Man, this new discourse around consumption gave birth to a tenacious consumer[56] and once again reinforced post-collectivist values: independence and self-reliance as opposed to submission to societal supervision; withdrawal into the private sphere versus commitment and contribution to collective living and interests; individualism rather than blending in with the rest of society. Similar to some other historical contexts, mass marketing in the Soviet Union, however embryonic, did not lead to the "homogenization of . . . lifestyle . . . [but] encouraged experimentation with identity and an ideal of individualism" (Young 1999, 66).

The Soviet Renaissance Man: A Do-It-Yourself Cultural Snob

The Soviet party-state was nurturing its people to be not only educated producers and savvy consumers, but also active creators and avid admirers of artistic creations made by others. Just as broad professional knowledge—for both workers and the intelligentsia—was saluted and propagated, so was the notion that a more wide-ranging erudition was beneficial for personal growth and success outside of work. Soviet people were supposed to become well-versed in the social sciences, civics, and current affairs—which were to raise their political consciousness—but also in the natural sciences and arts. The general education and acculturation of the people had been the Party's pet project since the Revolution, but in post-Stalinist times, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, it took a different direction. In the early Soviet years, the two main goals were the eradication of illiteracy and the creation of a new, distinct proletarian culture.[57] Under Stalin, universal literacy was attained, but the project of the proletarian culture was abandoned. Instead, the focus shifted to across-the-board *kul'turnost'* and "the elimination of egoism and the championing of collectivism over individuality" (Hoffmann 2003, 16). Others goals of Stalin's cultural policies included promoting social—class and ethnic—unity and sustaining the regime's legiti-macy, which was done, in part, through the inauguration of Socialist Realism and the reintroduction of selected pre-revolutionary works of art instead of the avant-garde style dominant during the previous decade (Hoffmann 2003, 159–75). Some forty years later, official Party rhetoric pushed Soviet people, especially but not only of working-class backgrounds, to develop knowledge in the arts and sciences that would cultivate original and independent thinking and even a certain disdain for the authority of cultural and scientific elites.

In 1959, amid the USSR's achievements in space exploration and nuclear and hydrogen energy, Boris Slutskii, a well-known poet, published a short poem (a mere 20 lines) titled "Physicists and Lyricists" where he wistfully observed that the former were now held in high esteem whereas the latter—not so much. He blamed the poets themselves for uninspired writing and all but ceded the hegemony to "the logarithms" (*Biblioteka* 1965, 13–14). His

phrasing clearly struck a chord as it grew wildly popular and for years to come became an aphorism for Soviet society's dilemma: who were more indispensable, technocrats or humanists, and, more broadly, should the Soviet people be highly competent but "narrow" specialists or well-rounded individuals with wide-ranging knowledge? While often-heated discussions of the topic appeared in newspapers for decades, the official public discourse ultimately came down on the side of broad knowledge. Various state, party, industrial, and cultural bureaucrats, as well as journalists themselves, concluded that for all strata of society, but especially for the working class, having diverse interests when it came to cultural pursuits was preferable.

As with their professional training, workers (but others as well) were prodded to pursue a variety of interests for leisure. Usually, of course, the main reason for engagement in diverse leisure activities was that, as one factory manager (a "physicist") summarized, a learned worker "gives more to [his] factory, to our [entire] society than the one who is limited by narrow professional interests."[58] But there was a less ideological and dogmatic reason as well. As with consumption, individual cultural attainment had less to do with the benefits for society than with the advantages it created for individual success. Responding to a query from a welder who questioned whether it was necessary and realistic to be erudite in a time of narrow professional specialization, prominent writer and critic Viktor Shklovskii (a "lyricist") insisted that it was impossible and unadvisable not to be well-educated in the rapidly changing world where broad knowledge served as a roadmap. "If you don't know it inside out, aren't capable of exploration, you cannot choose [and] determine your destiny, your life. You are blind," the writer concluded.[59] Such a response, didactic as it was, encouraged individuals, specifically *Trud*'s working-class readers, to be in charge of their own fate, present and future, rather than rely on somebody else, including the powers-that-be. Individualism and self-reliance, rather than dependence on community and its organizations (whether one's work collective or the party-state), seemed to be the skills necessary in the modern Soviet, not just Western and capitalist, milieu.

Another eminent "lyricist," a playwright and a State Prize Laureate, made a similar statement, only he spoke of the impact of culture not as something hypothetical, but as already happening. According to him, the Soviet people had become individuals who could stand up for themselves and had original opinions and independent perceptions of the world around them, thanks to their diverse leisure pursuits.[60]

Newspapers liked to feature conversations between "lyricists"—writers, poets, filmmakers—and workers or print workers' profiles penned by representatives of the artistic intelligentsia. The undiscriminating interests and tastes of their subjects and striking similarity between workers' choices and those of the intellectuals were a common thread in all those publications. For example, replying to a writer's question about whether he and his colleagues limited themselves to shop talk in their free time, a welder from Leningrad said, "We are just like you. We have many bibliophiles, aficionados of music and arts, tourists, gardeners among us . . . Of course we talk about work, but we also have many other interests. For example, we'll get together with friends and mull over problems of space [exploration]."[61] One Soviet academician confessed that he had met many workers who talked about arts with the

sophistication of artists or art critics.[62] Newspapers were peppered with stories about such people: a foreman from Chita who was "a lyricist, sociologist, economist" and also painted, lectured about art, and had a diverse home library;[63] a Moscow pipefitter who wrote poetry, collected records, and took night classes at the Institute for Cinematography;[64] three steelworkers from Taganrog who painted, penned poetry, and played violin, respectively;[65] and a turner who was a regular theater-goer, lover of "serious" literature and music, and a news junkie.[66] In fact, as a leading sociology journal reported in 1974, a small but growing group of worker-intellectuals often surpassed even white-collar professionals in their consumption of "cultural treasures": almost one-third of the worker-intellectuals reported going to the theater at least once a month, as opposed to 16 percent of the white-collar professionals, and only 3.7 percent of them cited idleness as their main pastime, half the number of the white-collars.[67] Even if these data were doctored for ideological reasons (as might be expected of sociological research supervised by the Communist Party), it was done to stress that manual workers—less educated "physicists"—were expected to lead the way in embracing the "lyricist" realms of fine art, literature, music, and film.

Workers—and others—not only imitated the full-time artistic intelligentsia, but also criticized their work, often so convincingly that professional critics agreed with them. A Leningrad shipbuilder was invited to join a panel of judges (mostly professional musicians) to referee a competition of composers marking Lenin's centennial, where he actively critiqued the pieces he heard, on par with his professional co-panelists. A celebrated song-writer, the chair of the committee, "respectfully [spoke] about the worker-cum-music-aficionado: 'I like [his] independent opinions about the material we have heard during the competition. He energetically defends his unique position.'"[68] Likewise, a worker from Orel sent a letter to *Literaturnaia gazeta* that dissected a poem the newspaper had published several months prior. He not only sarcastically pointed out "unpolished" places with improper word usage and syntax, factual inaccuracies, and the overall jumble of the poem's imagery, but also tried to engage the paper in a discussion about who the poetry was written for and to what end. Not only did the newspaper deem the letter worthy of publication, it furnished the correspondent—and its readers—with a lengthy reply from one of its staff writers, who, while disagreeing with some of the points made by the worker-turned-literary critic, conceded that in general the worker's criticisms were accurate.[69] The details of the poem, the worker's criticism, and the rejoinder are, of course, much less interesting than the fact that a publication run and read by profes-sional writers felt obligated to publicize a layman's criticism of the work of one of their own and to admit that some, if not all, of his comments had merit. Maybe "lyricists" were under attack from "physicists," but such attacks more and more often occurred on their own terrain and with their own weapons.

As a blue-collar worker-cum-amateur actress pointed out, serious art was no longer the prerogative of the elites: "Rich cultural life is not a privilege of an actress, painter, writer," she said. "Vivid, full is the spiritual world of a worker [too]. If one is truly devoted to creative work, their contribution to arts will surely win public's recognition."[70] Not only were the social boundaries between the working class and the intelligentsia being eliminated in the Soviet Union (Iovchuk and Kogan 1975), the distinction between "physicists" and

"lyricists"—technicians and artists—of all social backgrounds was all but eradicated, and the Soviet Man, prodded by the Communist Party, turned into a Renaissance Man with accomplishments in and curiosity about a wide range of pursuits. Certainly, one of the goals of such rhetoric was to edify the Soviet people, to bring enlightenment to the masses, a goal not inconsistent with the Soviet project of eradicating class differences. However, what is more important is that this discourse about culture stressed not only new erudition and encyclopedic knowledge, but also the control over their professional and personal lives that this knowledge gave people, as well as their independent thinking, their ability and willingness—pictured as quite desirable—to render opinions that might go against those of the establishment.

Conclusion

What can explain the shift in the Communist Party's discourse toward post-collectivism? While my interests are not so much in the origins, as in the consequences of this transformation, I can suggest a few possible explanations. First, the Iron Curtain was not rock-solid, and information about the lives of people in the West and in other socialist countries invariably made its way into the Soviet Union (Bushnell 1980; Lapidus 1987). Secondly, as Bunce (1980) explains, Communist leaders paid more attention to rising standards of living—professional growth and social mobility, as well as expanded choices for mate-rial consumption and leisure—in the aftermaths of political succession crises that often created uncertainty and potential for mass unrest. Therefore, it is no surprise that the rhetoric of the primacy of individual needs over the economic and ideological exigency of the state emerged soon after Khrushchev's overthrow. Teague (1988) also suggests that during the Brezhnev era the Soviet Communist Party grew less certain about its legitimacy—even in the absence of widespread organized discontent—especially after the rise of the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland. Lastly, perhaps the shift was a consequence of the Party's cynical attempt to co-opt the working class by convincing them that they led a middle-class life or by emphasizing socialism's continued superiority over the West (Brown 2007; Kotkin 2001). On the other hand, perhaps this discourse of post-collectivism was a logical, if not necessarily inevitable, result of Enlightenment-rooted modernity, of which the Soviet Union was a part (Kotkin 1995; Yurchak 2006), and that is why it partially resembles the discourse of post-Fordism and post-materialism in the West (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

As for the empirical outcomes and theoretical implications of this post-collectivist discourse, I discuss many of them elsewhere (Paretskaya 2010, 394–98). Here I want to stress that my analysis challenges those, such as Eyal et al. (1998) most recently, who argue that state socialism was not and could not be a class society. They conceptualize Soviet-style socialism as a society based on rank order where social capital—institutionalized as political capital—was the major source of distinction, power, and privilege. Such representation divides the society into party and state elites—those who have access to social capital—and the rest, who don't (or patrons and clients, as they put it). Class-based stratification emerges, according to them, only with the transition to post-socialism, which is "a historically unique system of stratification in which cultural capital is dominant."[71] (Capitalism, in their view, is a class system where economic capital is dominant.) I believe that my story demonstrates that the

ascendance of cultural capital as a source of distinction began years before the fall of socialism. The three areas that I have described—work, consumption, and leisure—correspond though imperfectly to three "subspecies of cultural capital: an embodied disposition that expressed itself in tastes and practices [consumption]), formal certification by educational institutions of skills and knowledge (an institutional form, [work]), and possession of esteemed cultural goods (an objectified form [leisure])" (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007, 23–24).

This chapter has also tried to show that the attitudes of today's middle class in Russia originated in the old regime and at the instigation of the Party itself, which through its rhetoric gave this nascent group identity and, possibly, mobilization (Swartz 1997, 45). How well this discourse "took," whether and how this middle class in discourse became a class on paper and in reality, is an empirical question for a different study (Paretskaya, n.d.), but there is some evidence already (as some of the other essays in this volume demonstrate) that people did respond to the Party's encouragements to work toward self-cultivation, independent thinking, and autonomous action. Desire for better and more satisfying jobs; for bespoke clothing and attractive consumer goods that facilitated individuality and a certain freedom from society; for more and more varied knowledge, if not necessarily brought down the Soviet Union in a ferocious popular uprising, then at least slowly eroded the legitimacy of a regime that would not allow—or was unable to deliver—what was portrayed and promised as a good, almost middle-class, existence, one quite different from the more orthodox "Soviet way of life."

Notes

1.In 1998, then-President Boris Yeltsin asserted that Russian middle class "is the most reliable foundation for the country's stability, its best guarantee against revolutionary turmoil." See *Kommersant-Daily* (February 28, 1998). This view was echoed by economist Evgenii Iasin who said, commenting on the results of a 2006 study of the Moscow middle class, "The more Russians can be called middle-class, the more stable our country will be." See *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (June 27, 2006). Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, and "the leaders of [his] United Russia Party consistently speak of the middle class as a force for stability in society and as their natural constituency" (Remington 2010, 19).

2. Soon after Yeltsin's 1998 speech, the weekly magazine *Itogi* devoted an entire issue to the discussion of the Russian middle class. See *Itogi* (April 21, 1998).

3. *Izvestiia* (November 12, 2003).

4. Remington 2010, 2. The actual size of the group, according to social scientists, is a lot smaller. For an informative overview of different ways to measure the middle class see Remington 2010. Almost all major survey centers in Russia have conducted studies of the middle class in the past decade or so. Many of them can be found in an online database EAESD/JESDA. I am well aware of the problematic nature of many opinion polls conducted in Russia (flawed sampling, unaccountable interviewers, reliance of some polling organizations on state funding). However, I use these studies not for hard data, but to demonstrate patterns and trends in discourse, among both the public and professional researchers.

5. *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (June 27, 2006).

6. *Izvestiia* (November 12, 2003).

7. *Komsomol'skaia pravda* (June 27, 2006); *Izvestiia* (January 13, 2006).

8. Pierre Bourdieu claims, "Classes do not exist. . . . What exists is a social space, a space of differences, in which classes exist in some sense in a state of virtuality, not as something given but as *something to be done*" (1998, 12; emphasis in the original). As a result, he distinguishes between "classes on paper" and "real classes," the former—"fictitious regroupings" drawn up by social scientists, often arbitrarily, while the latter are "real groups that are constituted as such in reality" (1998, 10). "Classes on paper" can become "real classes" "only if there is symbolic and political work to give them actual identity and mobilization" (Swartz 1997, 45) "as a result of the *struggle of classifications* which is a properly symbolic . . . struggle" (Bourdieu 1998, 11; emphasis in the original).

9. "The broad distinction between individualism and collectivism continues to be a central theme in . . . research on cross-cultural differences. [Individualism is often] defined as a focus on rights above duties, a concern for oneself and one's immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and basing identity on one's personal accomplishments" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 135).

10. The post-war West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard described the middle class in very similar terms: "people whose qualitative characteristics are a feeling of self-worth, independence of view, self-reliance, social resilience, daring to make their existence dependent on the results of their own labor, and with the desire to assert themselves in a free society and free world" (quoted in Remington 2010, 17).

11. My methodology is hermeneutics more than content analysis. My purpose was not so much to examine how frequently certain concepts appeared in Soviet press, but to uncover their embedded meanings. Because of the constraints of space, I reference only a small selection of data here.

12. If this post-collectivist discourse seems to have mostly targeted manual workers, it is probably because they were the biggest social group in the country. According to official numbers, in the 1970s the working class was estimated to be 57–64 percent of the urban population, while white-collar professionals comprised 32–39 percent (Shkaratan and Rukavishnikov 1974, 41); or 60 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of the entire population (Pikhoia and Sokolov 2008, 55).

13. An ideal-type model of professionalism consists of five elements: "(1) specialized work . . . grounded in a body of theoretically based, discretionary knowledge and skill and . . . given a special status in the labor force; (2) exclusive jurisdiction . . . controlled by occupational negotiation; (3) a sheltered position . . . based on qualifying credentials created by the occupation; (4) a formal training program . . . which is . . . associated with higher education; and (5) an ideology that asserts greater commitment to doing good work than to economic gain" (Freidson 2001, 127).

14. *Trud* (February 21, 1970): 2; see also *Trud* (February 10, 1970): 3; *Trud* (June 4, 1976): 2; Iovchuk and Kogan (1975); Shkaratan and Rukavishnikov (1974).

15. I translate *rabochii-intelligent* as worker-intellectual even though "intellectual" in Russian does not have quite the same connotation as *intelligent*.

16. *Pravda* (August 25, 1973): 1.

17. *Trud* (October 24, 1970): 2; (August 11, 1972): 2.

18. Even during the Brezhnev years, professionals were often called on to perform manual jobs—harvesting, spring cleaning of their work places, fixing and cleaning playgrounds and public parks, and so on—but those were "voluntary," short-term, and sporadic.

19. *Pravda* (November 30, 1982): 3.

20. See, for example, *Pravda* (May 25, 1978): 2; *Pravda* (October 10, 1978): 1; *Pravda* (December 28, 1980): 1; *Trud* (May 25, 1980): 3.

21. *Pravda* (May 25, 1978): 2.

22. *Pravda* (June 3, 1970): 3.

23. *Literaturnaia gazeta* (October 23, 1985): 10.

24. *Pravda* (March 18, 1970): 3; *Pravda* (November 16, 1970): 1; *Pravda* (November 5, 1974): 3; *Trud* (October 26, 1973): 2.

25. *Trud* (May 15, 1970): 4.

26. *Trud* (February 14, 1973): 3.

27. See, for example, *Pravda* (November 21, 1970): 1; *Pravda* (June 19, 1978): 3; *Pravda* (January 3, 1983): 2; *Trud* (April 1, 1971): 4; *Trud* (October 20, 1972): 2.

28. Archives, film #2.537, f. 582, op. 1, d. 12, l. 14.

29. Archives, film #2.537, f. 582, op. 1, d. 12, l. 15.

30. Archives, film #2.537, f. 582, op. 1, d. 12, l. 15.

31. This medal, established in the year of the 30th anniversary of the victory in World War II was analogous to "The War Glory," a decoration given to many participants of the war.

32. Archives, film #2.573, f. 604, op. 1, d. 5, l. 12.

33. *Pravda* (June 19, 1978): 3; see also *Pravda* (July 29, 1970): 2.

34. *Pravda* (July 29, 1970): 2; *Literaturnaia gazeta* (October 23, 1985): 10; *Trud* (February 6, 1980): 3.

35. Archives, film #2.537, f. 582, op. 1, d. 11, l. 71.

36. Volkogonov Collection, reel #18, box 27, folder 10.

37. Archives, film #2.573, f. 604, op. 1, d. 1, l. 92.

38. Archives, film #2.577, f. 620, op. 1, d. 2, l. 66.

39. Fond 89, film #1.1000, op. 32, d. 4, l. 4.

40. In older shops she usually had to queue at least three times: to have her purchase weighed at the counter, to pay for it to a cashier, and finally to exchange her payment receipt for her purchase back at the counter. Often the cycle would repeat if the products she needed were sold at different counters in the same store.

41. *Trud* (May 22, 1977): 1; *Trud* (October 20, 1979): 4. This is contrary to Verdery's (1992) analysis of the "etatization of time," which suggests that state-socialist regimes were seizing time from their subjects—often by purposefully creating consumer queues, among other things—in order to minimize the amount of free time citizens could spend, outside of direct control of the state, socializing with friends and family or making money in the "second economy."

42. *Trud* (September 24, 1980): 2; see also *Trud* (July 1, 1973): 3.

43. *Pravda* (January 31, 1973): 6; *Trud* (May 24, 1973): 2.

44. *Trud* (October 10, 1973): 2.

45. On small color TVs, see *Pravda* (November 23, 1977): 6; tape-recorders *Trud* (May 24, 1973): 2, and mini-fridges *Trud* (June 2, 1971): 1; *Pravda* (January 31, 1973): 6.

46. Siegelbaum (2006b) convincingly demonstrates how mass production of family cars inadvertently promoted proliferation of private networks and generally embedded the notion of privacy and private endeavors in Soviet people's consciousness and practices. More generally on privacy in post-Stalinist Soviet Union, see Siegelbaum (2006a).

47. As Volkov argues, privacy cultivated in 1930s "was connected with political self-education and the cultivation of Bolshevik consciousness. . . . [But] whatever the initial purposes of regime-approved privacy, its further development was more and more likely to escape direct control" (2000, 228).

48. *Pravda* (September 1, 1974): 3; *Trud* (September 24, 1972): 4.

49. *Pravda* (September 15, 1976): 3; *Trud* (November 17, 1979): 4; *Trud* (February 6, 1980): 3.

50. *Pravda* (November 15, 1977): 3; emphasis added.

51. *Pravda* (August 16, 1974): 3.

52. *Pravda* (August 10, 1976): 3.

53. *Trud* (September 16, 1976): 2.

54. *Trud* (November 18, 1978): 4; *Trud* (April 26, 1979): 3; *Trud* (August 22, 1980): 4; *Pravda* (August 28, 1982): 2.

55. *Pravda* (September 11, 1985): 6.

56. Zukin and Maguire observe, "Media advertisements . . . are extremely important in socializing people to be consumers even before the goods are widely available" (2004, 190). Even though the Soviet press's promotion of goods was not exactly advertising, in the absence of a marketing industry it played a similar role.

57. On the Bolsheviks' early attempts to craft a proletarian culture—and the proletariat as a class—their ambiguities, and outcomes, see Fitzpatrick (1988a).

58. *Pravda* (July 29, 1970): 2.

59. *Trud* (February 25, 1975): 4.

60. *Trud* (September 30, 1970): 3.

61. *Literaturnaia gazeta* (June 1, 1970): 3.

62. *Pravda* (January 16, 1974): 3.

63. *Trud* (August 25, 1971): 2.

64. *Pravda* (August 15, 1971): 3.

65. *Pravda* (July 29, 1970): 2.

66. *Trud* (October 26, 1973): 2.

67. Shkaratan and Rukavishnikov (1974, 42).

68. *Pravda* (July 27, 1970): 3.

69. *Literaturnaia gazeta* (February 23, 1972): 6.

70. *Pravda* (July 24, 1977): 3.

71. Eyal et al. (1998, 7). In this view, cultural capital and differences in cultural dispositions did matter in socialism, but only among socialist elites distinguishing bureaucrats from technocrats and humanistic reform intelligentsia (Konrád and Szelényi 1979). Different coalitions of socialist elites, which were a result of intraclass struggles, explain the divergent

paths of post-socialist countries in Europe and Eurasia. See, for example, Eyal et al. (1998); Eyal (2000, 2003); King (2002); King and Szelényi (2004, chapters 4–6).

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Chapter 3
"Cultural Wars" in the Closed City of Soviet Ukraine, 1959–1982

Sergei I. Zhuk

In January 1969, A. Vatchenko, the first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Dniepropetrovsk, explained to Komsomol activists that the main essence of socialist cultural consumption was the ability of young Soviet consumers to give a "correct class evaluation of the pieces of bourgeois arts and music and avoid non-critical attitudes toward a eulogy of the capitalist way of life." He emphasized that a Marxist ideological approach would help residents of Dniepropetrovsk to make good choices in their cultural consumption. In contrast to the Western degenerate culture, Vatchenko noted, Komsomol members had to promote the best forms of their own socialist national culture. They should use the most progressive patterns of their Ukrainian culture in the struggle against Western influences.[1] In April 1970, Z. Soumina, a representative of the city administration in Dniepropetrovsk, elaborated this theme further:

> We are not against consumption. But this should be a cultured consumption. Take a look at our city offices of music recording and what our youth is consuming there as "music." They are recording the tapes with songs of Vysotsky, music by the Beatles (*bitlov*). Where is the real cultural consumption here? You can't see that our young people are recording classical music by Tchaikovsky or Glinka. They still prefer the dances with their boogie-woogie to the concerts of classical music. In their search for the recordings of their Western idols, young people forget their national roots, their own national culture.[2]

The Soviet *apparatchiks,* party workers who experienced first-hand the real problems of consumerism in the post-Stalinist society, tried to draw a line between cultural (good) and non-cultural (bad) forms of consumption. The most serious problem for the Soviet ideologists was to sort out such forms of consumption and protect socialist national culture from "ideological pollution of cosmopolitan bourgeois influences." Soviet ideologists clearly understood the links between cultural consumption and identity formation. To some extent, they tried to protect the ideal of Soviet cultural identity from the polluting influences of new forms of consumption. Protection from ideological pollution was especially important in the Ukrainian city of Dniepropetrovsk. This big industrial city had a growing population of young, multinational, predominantly Russian-language speakers, which grew from 917,074 inhabitants in 1970 to 1,191,971 people in 1989.[3]

New forms of cultural consumption among the youth of this city created problems for Soviet ideologists and the KGB because Dnipropetrovsk had a special strategic importance for the entire Soviet regime. The KGB officially closed the city to foreign visitors in 1959 when Dniepropetrovsk became a host for *Yuzhmash,* one of the biggest missile factories in the Soviet Union. The most powerful rocket engines made for the Soviet military-industrial complex were manufactured in Dniepropetrovsk, which inhabitants called "the closed rocket city."[4] At the same time, this city became a launch pad for Soviet politicians who followed Leonid Brezhnev to Moscow. This city also played an important role in the political life of Ukraine. Before *perestroika* more than 53 percent of all political leaders in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, came

from Dniepropetrovsk. By 1996 80 percent of the post-Soviet Ukrainian politicians had begun their career in the rocket city.[5]

This chapter is an attempt to explore connections among cultural consumption, ideology, and identity formation in one particular city in Soviet Ukraine during the late-socialist period and before the Gorbachev reforms. Given its closed, sheltered existence, Dniepropetrovsk became a unique Soviet social and cultural laboratory in which various patterns of late socialism collided with the new Western cultural influences.

Using archival documents, periodicals, and personal interviews as historical sources, I focus on how different moments of cultural consumption among the youth of the Soviet "closed rocket city" contributed to various forms of cultural identification, which eventually became elements of post-Soviet Ukrainian national identity. Drawing on British cultural studies about cultural consumption (Storey 1998, 135–36),[6] the chapter will explore how Soviet consumption of Western popular culture, ideology, and practices of late socialism contributed to the unmaking of Soviet civilization before *perestroika*. Recent studies about late (post-Stalin) socialism in the Soviet Union explore various forms of cultural production and consumption and their interaction with ideology. Yet an overwhelming majority of these studies are based on material from the most Westernized cities of the USSR (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, or L'viv).[7] As a result, the story of typical provincial cities or villages is missing from their analysis. It is difficult to generalize about the social and cultural history of the Soviet Union when the focus is on Moscow and Leningrad, two very non-typical Soviet cities. By including forgotten cities such as Dniepropetrovsk into the historical analysis of late socialism, this chapter adds new material and gives new dimensions for the study of Soviet cultural consumption during late socialism. The closed city of Dniepropetrovsk could be used as a microcosm for an analysis of the entire closed Soviet society. In this sense, it was a more typical Soviet city than were the Westernized capital cities of the Soviet Union.

The KGB officers in Dniepropetrovsk were especially concerned with new forms of cultural consumption that could breach the shroud of secrecy around *Yuzhmash*. Each month a KGB representative reported to the regional Communist party committee about the ideological situation in the closed city. The main ideological crimes they recorded were related to new levels of cultural consumption among the regional population, whose standards of living had been improved since the beginning of Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization and liberalization.

From the earliest days of the Soviet regime, Communist Party propaganda had emphasized technical progress and technical-scientific education. All Soviet leaders, from Lenin and Stalin to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, mentioned this priority in their reports, and all Congresses of the CPSU referenced this theme. But this interest in new technology brought unwelcome side effects among Soviet youth. In Dniepropetrovsk during the late 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of students from high schools and the local colleges became enthusiastic designers of amateur radio sets and other radio devices. Some of them even tried to broadcast their own improvised—and unauthorized—radio shows. The KGB tried to prevent such "radio hooliganism." According to the Dniepropetrovsk police, the local radio hooligans persistently recorded and regularly broadcast foreign music for a local audience during the 1970s and 1980s. The number of such radio hooligans increased from 475 to 685 from 1970 to 1971 and

continued to grow. The KGB recorded annually 3,000 instances of illegal radio broadcasts from almost 700 local amateur radio stations. More than 90 percent of these "radio music criminals" were young people under the age of 25.[8]

Radios and Rock Music

In January 1968, KGB officials analyzed data about how inhabitants of Dniepropetrovsk region consumed information from foreign radio stations. Police intercepted at least 1,000 letters sent to radio stations throughout the world by listeners from the region during 1967. According to their analysis, 36 percent of all letters were sent to radio stations of Canada, 31 percent to stations in the United States, and 29 percent to England. The overwhelming majority of correspondents were young people: 38.8 percent of these listeners were younger than 18 years old, 28 percent were between 18 and 28 years old, and 32.2 percent were older than 28.[9] As KGB analysts noted, in 1968 37 percent of listeners asked in their letters for foreign radio stations to send them music records, albums, instructions for popular dances, and radio guides with broadcast schedules for different Western radio stations. Some 25.5 percent of listeners asked stations to fulfill their musical request to play their favorite song; 13.7 percent asked for help in establish "friendship with citizens of other countries," while 23.5 percent of these letters contained "answers to various contests and quizzes organized by the radio stations."[10]

This analysis represents the main content of cultural consumption among the listeners of the Western radio in Dniepropetrovsk region. An overwhelming majority of people who listened to the Western radio stations were mainly interested in new music and popular culture—fashion, not politics. Notably, the KGB censors could not find any critical anti-Soviet comments or ironical/skeptical attitudes toward Soviet values in these letters. In the majority of cases, Soviet listeners were concerned only with Western music.[11]

The spreading popularity of Western pop music became a major problem for both the local police and communist ideologists. Annual reports by KGB officials to the regional committee of the CPSU drew a clear connection between anti-Soviet behavior and an unhealthy enthusiasm for Western mass culture.[12] For six months in 1972 Komsomol activists and the police organized more than 100 raids against "hippies" and people who traded foreign music records in downtown Dniepropetrovsk. More than 200 music *fartsovshchiks* (black marketers) were arrested during those raids. The police confiscated hundreds of records and thousands of audiotapes with Western popular music, as well as "264 copies of illegal printed material, called *samizdat*." But even after this crackdown, leaders in Dniepropetrovsk still complained about the rapid increase in rock music consumption. By the beginning of 1980, KGB reports admitted that all ideological efforts to stop the spread of Western pop music in the region and city of Dniepropetrovsk had failed.[13]

On July 4, 1968, N. Mazhara, head of the KGB's Dniepropetrovsk branch, sent the first secretary of Dniepropetrovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU secret information about the ideological situation in their region.[14] In this information, a KGB officer noted that in six months of 1968 police had discovered 183 printed documents with "anti-Soviet content," widely circulated among regional population: 95 of those documents derived from Ukrainian

nationalist organizations, 14 from Russian anti-communist organizations, 61 from various religious organizations, and 14 from "socialist revisionist international organizations" (mainly from Albania). The KGB noted an increase of anti-Soviet and "politically harmful" activity in the region of Dniepropetrovsk: there were 60 cases of such activities for all of 1967, but there were 194 such cases in just the first five months of 1968.[15] This report quantifies the growth of a new kind of cultural consumption among regional population during 1967–1968. The most popular type of forbidden literature was pamphlets by Ukrainian nationalists (95 cases) and religious publications (61 cases). Of the 194 detected cases of anti-Soviet activity during five months of 1968, the most typical were "dissemination of foreign anti-Soviet literature" (183 cases), "spread of ideologically and politically harmful notions, slander about Soviet reality" (62), "manifestations of nationalist character" (47), "anti-societal acts of religious tendency" (20), and "circulation and keeping at home hand written and printed material of anti-Soviet and politically harmful content" (12).[16] Some 56 percent, a majority of "anti-Soviet criminals" (109 from 194) were intellectuals (31 students, 27 college teachers, 30 representatives of "creative intelligentsia" and 21 of "technical intelligentsia"). Those who were the most active in processes of cultural production and consumption in the region also became the main violators of Soviet rules of cultural consumption in Dniepropetrovsk. Other KGB reports during the 1970s emphasized and repeated similar trends in ideological crimes connected to cultural consumption among Dniepropetrovsk youth, specifically "overzealous" rock music consumption and consumption of Ukrainian nationalist literature. Given the strategic importance of Dniepropetrovsk for the Soviet military-industrial complex, any increase in anti-Soviet cultural production and consumption required special attention from all branches of local administration—not only the political police, but also the ideological and educational organs of power.

DGU and Shevchenko's Great Cellar

A dangerous problem, related to "Khrushchev thaw," was a rising interest in Ukrainian national history and national traditions among loyal Soviet intellectuals, as well as members of the Communist party and Komsomol. KGB operatives interpreted this curiosity as Ukrainian nationalism. For them the main center of Ukrainian nationalism in Dniepropetrovsk was Dniepropetrovsk State University (hereafter, DGU), especially its historical-philological department.[17] The first KGB case directly related to cultural consumption concerned A. Ovcharenko, a student from the historical-philological department. In 1960 he prepared an MA thesis (*diplomnaia rabota*) about a controversial poem written in 1845 by Taras Shevchenko, the 19th century Ukrainian poet and the founding father of the Ukrainian literary tradition. Shevchenko referred to the poem, "A Great Cellar (*Velykyi Liokh*)," as "A Poem-Fantasy" (*Mysteria*). This poem is about Ukraine's tragic history portrayed through the laments of "three souls, three crows, and three kobza-players." According to Shevchenko, these images symbolized all of the Ukrainians who died after the annexation of Ukraine by the Russian Empire.

The main idea of the poem is that Bohdan Khmel'nytsky, a Ukrainian Cossacks leader

(*hetman*), made a dangerous mistake when he signed an agreement with the Russian delegation to approve the unification of Ukraine with Russia in Pereyaslav in 1654. After this alliance Ukrainians became slaves of the Russian tsars. Russian rulers Peter I and Catherine II, "the worst enemies of Ukraine," annihilated freedoms and privileges of Ukrainian Cossacks and destroyed Zaporiz'ka Sich, Baturin, and other centers of Cossack power in Ukraine. After this, Russian rulers ("*moskali*" and "*katsapy*" in the poem) exploited and humiliated Ukrainians. Thousands of Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks died while building the city of St. Petersburg, railroads, and other projects for the Russian crown. Due to these tragic events, the souls of dead Ukrainians still gather at the Subbotov farmstead (Khmel'nytsky's residence near Chigirin) to lament and denounce Khmel'nytsky's decision to betray the independence of Ukraine and join Russia. Shevchenko used the metaphors of "the Great Cellar" or "the Great Coffin" to portray Ukraine during his lifetime, proclaiming that Ukraine had been enslaved by the Russian rulers and transformed into a big coffin for Ukrainian patriots. After the *Pereyaslav Rada* of 1654, the Russians dug a "huge cellar (*liokh*) of slavery" for Ukrainians. The entire Russian empire was portrayed as a "cold and oppressive underground prison for people." Khmel'nitsky's church in Subbotov, in the poetic imagination of Shevchenko, was transformed into a symbol of slavery and death ("a burial place") for all Ukraine, oppressed by the Russian tsars. According to Shevchenko, Khmel'nytsky, a friend of the Russian Tsar Alexis, betrayed and humiliated Ukraine: "All nations of the world now are laughing at Ukraine and making fun of Ukrainians who, by their own will, have traded their freedoms for slavery in Russia." But the ending of Shevchenko's poem is very optimistic and prophetic: "Do not laugh, strangers, at poor orphan Ukraine, because this Church-Coffin will fall apart and from its ruins the free Ukraine will arise! And Ukraine will remove the darkness of slavery, and then turn the light of Truth on, and Ukraine's oppressed children will pray in freedom at last!" (Shevchenko 1989, 221–33, 494–97).

This poem offered a historical concept that differed from traditional interpretations of Soviet historiography. Instead of positively portraying *Pereyaslav Rada* as a symbol of friendship between two brotherly Slavic nations, Shev chenko described it as a tragic act of betrayal and humiliation for Ukraine. He branded Peter the Great and Catherine the Great not as imperial reformers, but as the worst, most brutal executioners and torturers of the Ukrainian people. The Russian rulers destroyed Cossack freedoms and hopes for an independent Ukraine. Of course, the very fact that Ovcharenko chose this poem for his research work raised some suspicions among his classmates, who denounced him to KGB officers. As a result, the KGB considered Ovcharenko's entire thesis to be "a nationalistic deviation," and KGB officers complained about this to Ovcharenko's professors. But despite KGB pressure, his professors not only tried to avoid any ideological criticism of Ovcharenko's work, but supported his thesis by all means available to them. Moreover, Ovcharenko's mentor Dmukhovsky, an associate professor at the philological department, suggested that he just remove some sentences "that looked too nationalistic" in the thesis, and eventually insisted on a grade of "B" ("good" [*dobre*]) for his student's research.

KGB officials, outraged by the professors' indifference toward such nationalistic transgressions, organized a special investigation of Ovcharenko. They discovered that in 1960, Ovcharenko, along with his classmates Zavgorodnii and Trush from the philological

department and Leliukh, a student from the Dnipropetrovsk Medical Institute, were part of the student group "Dnipro" at the university. Members of this group read books on Ukrainian history and culture, recited Ukrainian poetry, and studied Shevchenko's works. Leliukh, not Ovcharenko, had organized this group and composed its program and rules. According to KGB records, Leliukh was notorious among his classmates for his anti-Soviet remarks and nationalistic ideas. In 1959, during a seminar on political economy at his institute, Leliukh used his own interpretation of Marxist theory to prove the necessity of economic autonomy for Ukraine in the USSR. In 1960 he used the same ideas in the "Dnipro" platform. According to the KGB report, Leliukh "included an idea of a separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union." It was fortunate for other participants of this group that they had no time to discuss Leliukh's manifesto. In 1962 after graduation from the University, they left Dniepropetrovsk for their new job assignments, sparing them from arrest. But as the main organizer of the group, Leliukh was eventually arrested and sent to jail in November 1962 for "nationalistic propaganda."[18]

It is noteworthy that Leliukh's group attracted loyal Komsomol members, whose interest in Ukrainian history and traditions was stimulated by two moments of cultural production and consumption in Soviet Ukraine during 1959 and 1961, which were connected to the official discourse of post-Stalin socialism. First, the new educational requirements for the students' assigned readings at the philological department included more books in Ukrainian, written by celebrated Ukrainian writers such as Shevchenko. Second, the Communist party's cultural program under Khrushchev stressed the creation of a new Soviet humanistic culture, "socialist in essence" and "national in form." This led to official support and sponsorship of state ideological campaigns to celebrate national poets, such as Shevchenko, who were "opponents of the oppressive tsarist regime" (Shevchenko 1989, 492–97). Shevchenko's anniversaries (in 1954 and 1961) were marked with the publication of multi-volume collections of his works in Ukrainian. Millions of students consumed Shevchenko's controversial poetry (both anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian) in school, fueling interest in the Ukrainian historical past, which took forms that differed from the tenets of Soviet internationalism. Some of these forms were qualified as nationalistic deviations by the KGB.

The '60s Generation

At the beginning of 1960 another group of young, patriotically inclined poets attracted the attention of the KGB. Most of these poets were students of the local university who joined the literary studio at the Palace of Students in Dniepropetrovsk. According to KGB reports, these young talented poets denied "traditions of socialist realism," insisted on the new "revolutionary approaches to a changing reality" and called themselves "a generation of the 60s" (*shestediasiatniki*). KGB officers discovered that these young poets also experimented with national ideas, reading and disseminating texts written by famous figures in Ukrainian national movements of the 19th and 20th centuries.[19] Their ideas of national history expressed in the traditionally accepted Marxist forms (none of "these experimental poets" denied the theory of "class struggle" or the progressive character of socialism), were interpreted by the police as "nationalist propa-ganda." In 1965 the poet group attracted new members, including

A. Vodolazhchenko, who said publicly:

> We must fight not only for the preservation of the Ukrainian language because this is not a very important question for this given period, but we must struggle for the preservation of the nation, national cadres. It is necessary that Ukrainians stay to work in Ukraine, that we have fewer ethnically mixed marriages. We must work hard in this direction.[20]

According to KGB reports, similar ideas were shared by many people not only at the philological department, but also at the physical-technical department of DGU, at the Engineering and Construction Institute of Dniepropetrovsk (DISI), and among young artists and men of letters.

As 1966 neared, DGU students such as Vodolazhchenko and Sokul'sky organized a group of 16 young people to meet in classrooms at the agricultural institute (DSKHI) and DGU for performances of national Ukrainian Christmas and New Year songs (called *koliadky* and *shchedrivky* in Ukrainian). They had permission from the DGU Party committee and regional committee of Komsomol for those meetings and recitals of *koliadky*.[21] These students borrowed Ukrainian national costumes from the Dniepropetrovsk Palace of Students. Late in the evening of December 31, 1965, they donned these Ukrainian national costumes and visited apartments of their professors from DGU, DISI, and DSKHI, where they performed traditional New Year celebrations and sang *koliadky*. Both professors and students enjoyed these rituals. But when the revelers tried to visit a special residence building in downtown Dniepropetrovsk for officials of the regional party committee, they were stopped by the police.[22]

Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism

After this event, an administrator at DGU, under pressure from the KGB, tried to accuse one of the main organizers of this group, Ivan Sokul'sky, a junior (fourth-year) student at the philological department, of what they called "Ukrainian nationalism." It is noteworthy that the cases of so-called anti-Soviet behavior in the KGB files were about the idealistic attempts of young people to cleanse socialist reality from "distortions" and "deviations" of communist ideals and to make life under socialism better and closer to the Leninist ideal of mature socialism. This kind of discourse existed in Soviet society, but Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and his romantic reformism, based on the new CPSU program of building communism in the near future, energized and justified this discourse, especially between 1961 and 1968. All DGU students who were interrogated by the KGB for the anti-Soviet propaganda wanted to "make Soviet reality fit classical Leninist model of socialism." They tried to defend "the Leninist theory of equality for all nations and national languages under socialism." Therefore, they accused Dniepropetrovsk's Communist leadership of "ignoring Leninism, organizing an anti-Marxist campaign of Russification and persecution of the socialist Ukrainian national culture."[23]

All cases of so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism related to the same discourse of improving the "Soviet socialist model" and implementing the Com-munist Party program's objective: "to create Soviet culture, socialist in its content and national in its forms." Some students who were arrested by the KGB for "nationalism" told investigators that they believed their activities were important for awakening national feelings among local Ukrainians and

improving socialist society. In Dniepropetrovsk, they noted, local department stores did not carry Ukrainian national costumes and literature. According to many local Ukrainians, they argued, this lack of national goods was a distortion of Leninist national policy and had created "a Russified version" of socialist cultural consumption that contradicted the main principles of mature socialism declared by Brezhnev himself.[24] All of the arrested students, however, acknowledged that they had borrowed their main arguments from Ukrainian programs on foreign radio stations such as BBC, Voice of America, and Voice of Canada because the available official information in Ukraine was not convincing. As we see, again, cultural consumption in the form of listening to radio contributed to activities that the KGB interpreted as nationalistic and thus dangerous anti-Soviet crimes.[25]

As KGB reports noted, the rise of Ukrainian nationalism in the "closed rocket city" was a result of the new demographic and political developments after 1956. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, political prisoners who had been indicted for "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" and spent their prison terms in the GULAG were released, but were not allowed to return to their homes in Western Ukraine. These prisoners, called *banderovtsy* in official documents, were either participants in or supporters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) from the Trans-Carpathian and Galician regions of Western Ukraine. When the Soviet Army had suppressed the patriotic anti-Soviet movement after 1945, thousands of its participants spent their prison terms and then exile in Siberia and Kazakhstan, far from Ukraine. KGB officials tried to prevent any contact between these former political prisoners and their homeland in Western Ukraine.[26]

By the mid-1960s many of these ex-prisoners had settled in the eastern, more Russified regions of Ukraine. KGB officials tried to control their movements and isolate them by locating them among the more diverse, and less ethnic Ukrainian, population of the Dniepropetrovsk and Donetsk regions. By 1967, 1,041 former political prisoners classified as "Ukrainian nationalists" from Western Ukraine settled in a single region of Dniepropetrovsk. Their presence threatened ideological and political control of the region because these people lived not only in the countryside but also in strategically important cities.[27]

Sokul'sky's Debate and Honchar's Cathedral

The Western Ukrainian city of L'viv was always a source of trouble for the KGB operatives from Dniepropetrovsk. The main leaders of Dniepropetrovsk's young poets group had either direct contact with intellectuals in L'viv or had graduated from L'viv State University. Ivan Sokul'sky took classes at L'viv University for one year before entering Dniepropetrovsk State University. His close friend and supporter, Vladimir Zaremba, who covered Sokul'sky's career in his articles in local periodicals, also came to Dniepropetrovsk from L'viv.[28]

In April 1968 Sokul'sky decided to organize "an evening of poetry" at the Pridneprovsk Palace of Culture and invite all the young poets in Dniepropetrovsk to attend. But the KGB had other plans. On May 16, 1968, a KGB officer visited the party committee of the energy plant and strongly recommended that the local administration stop any activities by the new club.[29] Afraid of KGB persecution, Sokul'sky quit his job at the energy plant's newspaper and tried to

avoid any contacts with his friends. Thus, a noble patriotic example of young idealistic Ukrainian poets was destroyed by police interference.

During the spring of 1968 the local ideologists began a new ideological campaign against Oles' Honchar's novel *The Cathedral* (*Sobor* in Ukrainian), which was blamed for "the dissemination of Ukrainian nationalistic ideas."[30] Despite the campaign, *Sobor* became the most popular book among the young intellectuals of Dniepropetrovsk region, especially among university students. According to the KGB, students called Honchar's novel an epoch-making book that was "widely read by everyone even during classes."[31] But suddenly a local newspaper published an "Open Letter by the University Freshmen from the Department of History" with very strong criticism of Honchar's novel. Many students in the same department and who loved the novel were shocked by this article. They decided to discuss the novel and this negative letter as a group and send their response to the same paper along with their rejection of "the freshmen letter," which they considered a fake.

On May 20, 1968, two sophomores from the History Department, Yuri Mytsyk and Viktor Lavrishchev, without consulting with department administrators, posted an announcement about a debate devoted to *Sobor* planned for May 22.[32] After reading this announcement, Professor F. Pavlov, the chair of the History Department, visited the classroom where classmates of Mytsyk and Lavrishchev were loudly discussing the situation surrounding Honchar's novel. All students were filled with indignation because the local periodicals published only the negative reviews of *Sobor.* In addition, the fact that the "Open Letter" had come from their department caused the biggest frustration among the student-historians. They told Pavlov, "The whole letter was falsified; it was a fraud, prepared under the pressure of the University administration because some freshmen, whose names were included in this letter, confessed they had never read this novel." Pavlov, wishing to calm down his audience, promised the students his personal permission for a debate. Moreover, a secretary from the department party committee met Mytsyk and Lavrishchev on May 21 and supported their idea as well.

But under pressure from the KGB, the DGU administration and the party committee intervened and cancelled the debate. Meanwhile the KGB secretly began to monitor the activities of Mytsyk, Lavrishchev, and other devotees of Honchar's novel. Lavrishchev and Mytsyk were called to the department for long, unpleasant conversations with Chairman Pavlov. Eventually, on May 22, the DGU administration threatened to expel them from the school. After these threats, both Mytsyk and Lavrishchev stopped discussing Honchar's novel with their classmates. These threats and the subsequent pressure from the KGB even after expulsion traumatized the students. Mytsyk later became a teacher of Slavic history in that same department, but never mentioned this story to his colleagues and students. Moreover, he became carefully guarded and avoided any conversation about politics and Ukrainian patriotism in his department.[33]

Loyal Students and Progressive Thinking

KGB and party ideologists used the anti-Honchar campaign as a pretext for suppressing any sign of a Ukrainian nationalist movement and punishing those who had displayed some

enthusiasm and persistence in defending the Ukrainian language and culture. In June 1968, Sokul'sky and his friends wrote "A Letter from the Creative Youth of Dniepropetrovsk," in which they tried to summarize all instances of KGB repressions of the Ukrainian patriots. From September through December of 1968, this letter was sent to various offices of party, Komsomol, and Soviet government organizations in Kiev and Dnipropetrovsk. In June 1969 the KGB arrested the authors and, in February 1970, a Dniepropetrovsk court indicted them as political criminals.[34]

"A Letter from the Creative Youth of Dniepropetrovsk" is a good demonstration of the loyal pro-Soviet intentions of its authors. They called themselves "progressive Ukrainian youth, who were brought up in Soviet schools and colleges, educated with works by Marx and Lenin, Shevchenko and Dobroliubov." They criticized the "anti-Ukrainian" campaign in Dniepropetrovsk, which they said was started by local administrators as a reaction to the publication of *Sobor*. The authors presented this campaign as the "wild and stupid persecution of honest Ukrainian citizens, who are the devoted builders of communism," a persecution that could be compared only with actions of Maoists in China.[35] "If we are Marxists," they wrote "we need to change this [Dniepropetrovsk] reality to make it fit the Leninist norms and Soviet laws rather than to persecute all progress-sively thinking Ukrainian citizens, who are loyal to Marxism-Leninism."[36] They finished the letter with an appeal to leaders of the Ukrainian government to protect Ukrainian culture from Russification. They also asked to punish those who started the anti-Ukrainian ideological campaign in Dniepropetrovsk. "Such campaigns," they reminded the Ukrainian leaders, "bring the seeds of animosity and hatred in relations of two brotherly socialist nations, Russians and Ukrainians."[37]

This letter is a fascinating demonstration of loyalty to Soviet state and to Marxist ideology. KGB officials and Communist ideologists were reluctant to classify the Sokul'sky case as "anti-Soviet crime" because they themselves used the same ideological language of Marxism-Leninism and the same arguments of "progressive development of mature socialism" as did Sokul'sky and his friends. Consequently, both sides of the conflict had to portray their opponents' behavior (reading and writing in Ukrainian) as a "deviation" in Soviet cultural production and consumption. One side blamed the other either for a "betrayal of Leninist nationality polity" or "anti-Soviet provocations."[38] The ideological campaign of 1968–1969 in Dniepropetrovsk created a model that the KGB could use when it needed to suppress any "ideological deviation" in the region.

Western Music with Ukrainian Words

During the 1960s and 1970s, both Communist ideologists and KGB officers complained about another non-cultural [bad] consumption, specifically Western mass culture, including rock and disco music, blue jeans, and so on. By the mid-1970s the local police had encountered several very unusual forms of Western rock music consumption, which, surprisingly, became connected again to national Ukrainian history.

In 1970, Dniepropetrovsk rock bands (officially known as "vocal instrumental ensembles") incorporated the major international rock music hits in their "repertoire" for dance parties.

These hits included “Girl” by the Beatles, “As Tears Go By” by the Rolling Stones, “Venus” by Shocking Blue, and “Suzie Q” by Creedence Clearwater Revival. Ukrainian musicians covered these songs with their own lyrics in the Ukrainian language. While Soviet officials may have considered the Ukrainian versions of “Girl,” “As Tears Go By,” and “Suzie Q” as typical romantic poetry about love, “Venus” in Ukrainian was very different.[39]

Originally the Dutch band Shocking Blue composed “Venus” in 1969 as a record single, but it was also added to their 1970 album, “At Home,” which became very popular in Great Britain and other European countries. BBC radio shows played “Venus” through all of 1970. Even Viktor Tatarskii, a Soviet radio DJ, included this song in his radio show on Moscow radio station “Maiak” in December 1970. Local music studios all over Ukraine used this hit in their music material for “greeting card recordings” together with traditionally popular Soviet songs by Muslim Magomaev, Eduard Khil, and Edita Piekha. The average Dniepropetrovsk pop music fan ordered more “music greeting cards” featuring “Venus” than recordings of popular Gypsy songs or folk songs by Zykina or Vysotsky. Before 1970 only young customers ordered music greeting cards with foreign popular music (predominantly by the Beatles and Rolling Stones). After 1970 even people in their 30s and 40s ordered the Shocking Blue song.[40]

To some extent, the immense popularity of this song was connected to its new Ukrainian lyrics. The Ukrainian version of “Venus” became a song about the Ukrainian Zaporizhian Cossacks, who fought enemies of the Ukrainian people while trying to defend their native land and religion. The new Ukrainian lyrics were simple but catchy: “Dnipro flows into the Black Sea, and there will be a disaster for Turks, when the Cossacks will arrive and kill all the Turks. Hey Cossacks, glorious Zaporizhian Cossacks etc.”[41] The Cossack-themed “Venus” had five or six versions from different parts of Ukraine. This song became very popular not only among young fans of rock music, but also among disco patrons. Even native Russian-speakers danced when this song was performed in Ukrainian. It was a beginning of a new phenomenon —a “Ukrainization” of English rock songs. A similar “nativization” of English rock music took place among Russian musicians as well.[42] They covered “Yellow River,” a popular song by New Christie Minstrels, with Russian lyrics about Karlsson, a fictional character from a children’s book by Swedish writer Astrid Lindgren. The Moscow rock band Vesiolye rebiata “Funny Guys” covered the Beatles song “Drive my Car” from the “Rubber Soul” album with Russian lyrics about “A Small Old Car.”[43]

The Ukrainian nativization of English songs was an interesting new form of cultural consumption among Ukrainian rock music lovers. The Russian-speaking dance-hall visitors in Dniepropetrovsk were not offended by a song that idealized Ukrainian Cossacks; in fact, they preferred to dance to the Ukrainian version rather than the English original. To some extent, the popularity of the patriotic theme about Ukrainian Cossacks reflected a growing consumption of Soviet Ukrainian historical novels among the population of Dniepropetrovsk during the 1970s. According to library records, besides the traditionally popular adventure stories by Alexander Dumas or Arthur Conan Doyle, historical novels about ancient Ukrainian heroes written by Semen Skliarenko, Ivan Bilyk, and Pavlo Zagrebel'nyi were most popular among young readers of Dniepropetrovsk.[44]

Neither Communist ideologists nor KGB operatives objected to the Ukrainian versions of the song. In the late 1970s the rock band from the DGU Physical Technical Department still sang the Ukrainian song “Cossacks” to the “Venus” melody. As one police officer noted, “It is better to have Soviet young people dance to their national song ‘Cossacks’ than to American rock and roll.”[45] Since the primary ideological priority was to limit “dangerous” Western influences on Soviet youth, an idealization of the Ukrainian national past was acceptable as an alternative to an idealization of the capitalist present. Such permission for pop music consumption is especially remarkable, coming so soon after the Dniepropetrovsk KGB launched a concerted effort to persecute local young poets. The Sokul'sky group was targeted for presenting an idealized version of Ukrainian national history—the same topic as the popular song “Cossacks.”

Because of the All-Union Komsomol discotheque campaign, which reached Dniepropetrovsk in 1976, both Komsomol leaders and Komsomol activists became involved in the organization and supervision and delivery of various forms of popular music consumption. After 1976 the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol required Dniepropetrovsk Komsomol leaders to participate actively in the new discotheque movement triggered by the Komsomol of the Baltic republics in 1974–1975 (Milinteiko 1977; Ivashura and Manevich 1977).[46] The rapid spread of this movement made this region exemplary for many Soviet ideologists, who used the success of the central Dniepropetrovsk discotheque as proof that the new forms of socialist leisure for Soviet youth were efficient methods for disseminating ideological propaganda. Komsomol ideologists in Kiev praised the Dniepropetrovsk region for “efficient organization of disco club movement.” Soon thereafter, the city of Dniepropetrovsk was announced as host of the “first All-Ukrainian republican final festival contest of the discotheque programs” scheduled for October 1979 (Belich, October 20, 1979; Belich, October 24, 1979).

The city Komsomol organization in Dniepropetrovsk published a special report about the achievements of the central city disco club *Melodia* before this festival, which summarized major forms and methods of “music entertainment” in the city. This report was widely circulated during the All-Union festival. It praised local disco clubs for propaganda related to “Ukrainian national music forms and Ukrainian glorious history.” Many guests in the city used this publication as a guide to city nightlife (*Zdes' mozhno* … 1–4). During the first year of its existence, *Melodia* organized 175 thematic dance parties with special music lectures that attracted over 60,000 young attendees.[47] In 1979 many *apparatchiks* who were involved in this movement were promoted and awarded for “excellent ideological and educational activities among regional youth.” By the beginning of 1982, more than 560 youth clubs—including 83 officially registered discotheques—existed in the Dniepropetrovsk region.[48]

Dancing to a Soviet Tune

However, Komsomol ideologists and their KGB supervisors still faced a very serious problem. Young pop music consumers apparently preferred Western hits to Soviet ones. A majority of rock music enthusiasts rejected completely what they called Soviet *estrada* (pop

music). Therefore, Komsomol ideologists began promoting discotheques that presented mainly Soviet music forms, including songs from various national republics. *Apparatchiks* responsible for the discotheque movement touted the Western Ukrainian band "Vodograi" and the Byelorussian band "Pesniary" as examples in the Soviet tradition rather than alien forms of Western pop culture. To show their ideological loyalty and local patriotism many DJs in Dniepropetrovsk included comments about "glorious Ukrainian history" and criticized "capitalist exploitation in the Western countries."[49] They also made sure to emphasize class struggle in their comments. Still, though, these "acceptable" lyrics were about Ukrainian Cossacks or melodious Ukrainian poetry, which were not very popular among local KGB operatives. Eventually, the KGB supervisors of the disco movement had to accept these stories and national Ukrainian music on the local dance floors. For them it was a lesser evil than embracing the capitalist music culture from the West.[50]

Both KGB and Komsomol *apparatchiks* praised the high level of Soviet patriotism promoted by the Dniepropetrovsk central city discotheque in contrast to the famous L'viv disco clubs in Western Ukraine. One KGB officer who vis-ited both L'viv and Dniepropetrovsk clubs during April–May 1979 criticized "a lack of patriotic themes in L'viv programs and bad pop music consumption on L'viv dance floor."

> The Western rock and disco music dominated on L'viv dance floor. . . . L'viv disco clubs did not include Ukrainian popular songs in their programs. L'viv disc jockeys did not cover any problems of Soviet or Ukrainian history and culture. Their comments were only about the Western style of life. It is a paradox, but our Dniepropetrovsk discos (in a mainly Russian speaking city!) had more Ukrainian music and presented more information about our Soviet Ukrainian culture in one week than all L'viv discos did this in the entire month. I was pleasantly surprised when I heard in the Dniepropetrovsk disco club a good story about our Ukrainian Cossacks' struggle with Turkish invaders for the freedom of our Ukrainian nation. You would never have such stories in L'viv disco clubs. Their disc jockeys talk only about the most fashionable trends in American pop culture. We need to support our Dniepropetrovsk initiatives in disco movement that differ from the Americanized disco clubs in L'viv. Patriotic material about our Ukrainian history and culture on the Dniepropetrovsk dance floor will educate young people, while an idealization of American pop culture and ignoring Ukrainian history and culture in L'viv disco clubs will confuse and disorient our Soviet citizens and transform them into apolitical cosmopolitans.[51]

Again, the themes of good and bad cultural consumption were used to evaluate the disco club movement in Soviet Ukraine. But this time the problems of national history and culture were also featured in these evaluations. Paradoxi-cally, for the justification of the ideological reliability the Dniepropetrovsk ideologists invoked elements of Ukrainian culture in opposition to a dangerous Westernization of the youth culture. The Westernization was associated not only with the "capitalist West" but also with L'viv, the most Westernized city of Western Ukraine. Such engagement of Ukrainian cultural elements against Westernization was one of the more ambiguous elements in the Soviet ideology of late socialism, which had to address the problems of leisure and entertainment among the youth of national republics such as Ukraine. On the one hand, Communist ideologists had to resist the Western cultural influences on the dance floor, using any available Soviet music forms, including national Ukrainian ones. On the other, they confused the local young consumers of mass culture by officially supporting and elevating these cultural forms, which usually were associated in the Soviet ideological discourse with the so-called bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism.

Eventually, the Communist ideologists and KGB officers who controlled cultural consumption in Dniepropetrovsk created a confusing and disorienting ideological situation for

the local youth. They promoted Western forms of entertainment such as discotheque, and at the same time, tried to limit the influence of capitalist culture with a popularization of the Soviet national forms, including Ukrainian music and history. The KGB was alarmed by rising Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and tried to suppress any extreme enthusiasm for Ukrainian poetry and history. And yet, the entire system of Soviet education and Communist ideology was built on promoting progressive national cultural models of the socialist nations in contrast to the "degenerate capitalist culture" of imperialist nations. As a result, besides the forms of Western mass culture, the controversial ideas of Shevchenko and images of Zaporizhian Cossacks became part of cultural identification among the young members of mature socialist society in the "closed" city.

Cultural consumption depended also on a changing demographic situation in Dniepropetrovsk. A combined constant in-migration of non-Ukrainian ethnic groups and the ideological pressure during the 1960s–1980s resulted in Russification becoming the main trend in cultural development of the region and especially in Dniepropetrovsk. *Yuzhmash,* a rocket manufacturing factory and a high priority for the KGB officials, also became a major source of the growing Russ-ification in this city.[52] The Ukrainian language was steadily losing to Russian during the 1970s and 1980s. An overwhelming majority of non-Ukrainian ethnic groups preferred Russian to Ukrainian. More and more Ukrainians chose Russian as their primary language. In 1979, 12.6 percent of all Ukrainians in the region claimed that Russian was their native language. By 1989 this number grew to 15.2 percent. In the cities this number increased from 16.4 percent to 18.9 percent.[53]

Soviet youth consumed popular culture by reading books, listening to radio, watching movies, and recording music. Young people in Dniepropetrovsk not only consumed but also produced new cultural forms that challenged traditional notions and the ideological discourse of local *apparatchiks*. Moreover, the local ideologists tried to use different forms of entertainment, such as discotheque, for Communist propaganda. But the very usage of Western music forms for propaganda made these forms legitimate for everyday ideological activities and justified the immense popularity of these Western forms among the local youth. As a result, KGB and party ideologists tried to neutralize these forms with propaganda based on Soviet national cultural models, including Ukrainian ones.

Young people who lived in Dniepropetrovsk were confused and disoriented by the shifting ideology. The prevailing ideological discourse and cultural situation emphasized a leading cultural role of only one language, Russian. But at the same time, Ukrainian Soviet ideologists inculcated in the young generation a respect for certain selected figures of national Ukrainian history, such as Bohdan Khmel'nytsky or Taras Shevchenko, and for some forms of Ukrainian culture as well. After many years of this indoctrination and Ukrainian independence, this generation was ready to consume the familiar forms of Ukrainian culture as legitimate symbols that connected their former Soviet ideological discourse to the new, post-Soviet one. But because of the ideological confusion of late-Soviet socialism, these symbols became intermixed with various forms of both Soviet and Western popular culture. Such a situation created a very peculiar regional form of identity among the local youth. The Dniepropetrovsk version of cultural identification differed significantly from the forms of Ukrainian national identity associated with less Russified regions of Ukraine.

The young people of the Brezhnev era, the last generation of late socialism in Dniepropetrovsk, developed their national identity through a dual process, 1) of seeing themselves as the cultural descendants of the late Soviet civilization with some legitimate elements of Western mass culture and Ukrainian national forms, and 2) of viewing themselves as the opposites to the extreme Westernization and Ukrainization, traditionally associated with the Western Ukrainian city of L'viv.[54]

Notes

1. Derzhavnyi arkhiv Dnipropetrovs'koi oblasti (hereafter DADO), fond 22, opis' 15, delo 252,1: 62.

2. DADO, f. 416, op. 2, d. 1565,11: 306–307.

3. *Naselenie Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti* …, 1991, 4.

4. By the 1980s the Dniepropetrovsk missile plant manufactured 67 different types of space ships, 12 space research complexes and four defense space-rocket systems. These systems were used not only for purely military purposes by the Ministry of Defense, but also for astronomic research, for global radio and television network, and for ecological monitoring. *Yuzhmash* initiated and sponsored the international space program of the socialist countries, called "Interkosmos." Twenty-two of the 25 automatic space Sputniks of this program were designed, manufactured, and launched by engineers and workers from Dniepropetrovsk. The Soviet Ministry of Defense included *Yuzhmash* in its strategic plans. The military rocket systems manufactured in Dniepropetrovsk created a real material base for the newly born Soviet Missile Forces of Strategic Purpose. On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, *Yuzhmash* had nine regular and corresponding members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 33 full professors, and 290 scientists holding a Ph.D. They had the privilege to award scientific degrees and had a prestigious graduate school at *Yuzhmash*, which attracted talented students of physics from all over the USSR. *Dnepropetrovskii raketno-kosmicheskii tsentr* (1994); *Dnipropetrovs'k: vikhy istorii*, 209–211, 229. See also Lukanov (1996, 13). Many specialists consider the unique rocket complex "SS-18" manufactured by *Yuzhmash* as an important material factor that pushed Soviet and American administration in the direction of *détente*. See Gorbulin (1998, 6, 24–31).

5. Brezhnev himself began his career in the region of Dniepropetrovsk, and he brought his former comrades to the Kremlin as well. Even after the "downfall of the Brezhnev clan" in Moscow in 1983, when Yuri Andropov began his struggle "with corruption and nepotism" among the Soviet *nomenklatura*, members of this clan played a prominent role in the political life of Soviet Ukraine. In 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev sent a special committee to check the political situation in Ukraine. This committee represented the department of Ukrainian party organizations at the organizational sector of the CPSU Central Committee. The report of the committee proved that 53 percent of Ukrainian executive officials came from Dniepropetrovsk. See Pikhovshek (1996a, 8; 1996b, 15).

6. Because human identities are formed out of people's everyday actions and interaction in different forms of consumption, it is important to include cultural consumption in a discussion of identities. As Madan Sarup observes, "Cultural consumption is [now] a mode of being, a

way of gaining identity. Our identities are in part constructed out of the things we consume—what we listen to, what we watch, what we read, what we wear, etc. In this way, the market . . . offers tools of identity-making. Our identities are in part a result of what we consume. Or to put it another way, what we consume and how we consume it says a great deal about who we are, who we want to be, and how others see us. Cultural consumption is perhaps one of the most significant ways we perform our sense of self. This does not mean that we are what we consume, that our cultural consumption practices determine our social being; but it does mean that what we consume provides us with a script with which we can stage and perform in a variety of ways the drama of who we are" (Sarup 1996, 105, 125).

7.The pioneering study in English on the Soviet cultural consumption (Boym 1994) concentrates mainly on Leningrad and Moscow. The very good anthropological study of late socialism by Alexei Yurchak (2006) focuses mainly on Leningrad. Risch (2005) examines Soviet hippies concentrates, especially in L'viv, while Wanner (1998) offers a more balanced approach.

8. DADO, f. 19, op. 60, d. 92,1. 3, 4, 8–9, 14–15. During one year (1971) in Dnieprodzerzhinsk, the second-largest industrial city of the region, local police organized more than 150 raids, arrested 120 radio hooligans, and confiscated their radio and sound-recording equipment, which cost more than 3,500 rubles on average.

9. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 25.

10. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 25.

11. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 25–26. Evgenii Chaika, a 16-year-old student from Dniepropetrovsk high school No. 42, wrote numerous letters to BBC radio about his love of rock-n-roll. "It is impossible not to love the Beatles," he wrote in one of his letters, "I have listened to their music since 1963. I want to listen to their song "19th Nervous Breakdown" again. (Apparently, he confused the Beatles with the Rolling Stones.)

12. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 21–27. Compare the obvious similarities of KGB complaints with the German ideologists' reaction toward U.S. rock-n-roll in Poiger (2000, 184–97).

13. DADO, f. 19, op. 60, d. 85,1. 7, 17. See complaints of the party leaders in DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 2,1. 142–43. Author interview with Igor T., KGB officer, Dniepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991. For more about Soviet black marketers of Western goods called *fartsovshchiks* see Yurchak (2006, 138, 142, 201–202).

14. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 1–18. Mazhara noted that a significant part of religious and "revisionist" literature came through socialist countries, such as Poland and Romania, and some of nationalistic literature came through Czechoslovakia.

15. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 2.

16. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 3.

17. This university's department later was divided into two different departments: history and philology. What follows is based on documents from DADO, f. 9870, op. 1, d. 48,1. 9–11.

18. DADO, f. 9870, op. 1, d. 48,1. 9–11.

19. In April 1960, Natalia Televnaya, head of the literary studio at the Palace of Students in Dniepropetrovsk, was fired "for anti-Soviet nationalistic remarks" made in public. DADO, f. 9870, op. 1, d. 48,1. 16–18.

20. DADO, f. 19, op. 50, d. 56,1. 17–19. Citation is from 1.19. According to the new KGB investigation in September 1965, Yurii Zavgorodnii, a poet who had moved to Kiev, brought a photocopy of the West German study by I. Koshelivits, "A Modern Literature in the Ukrainian SSR," to his Dniepropetrovsk friends. Through his cousin A. Vodolazhchenko, who was an active member of the group of young poets and a junior student of the evening classes at the historical-philological department of DGU, copies of this book reached other DGU students such as Ivan Sokul'sky. KGB experts considered Koshelivits' study about the history of Ukrainian literature, which was published in Ukrainian, to be a book of a dangerous nationalistic content. By the end of November 1965, the KGB had reports about A. Vodolazhchenko's "nationalistic inclinations." He once remarked in class that "the old generation was outdated, it does not know and does not understand a modern youth."

21. DADO, f. 19, op. 50, d. 56,1. 20.

22. DADO, f. 19, op. 50, d. 56,1. 20. For similar events in Kiev, see Farmer (1980, 119–20).

23. See a KGB case of DGU students M. Mikhailov and N. Polesia in 1967 (DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 5–6). See also the similar case of Leonid S. Gavro, an engineer at the Dniepropetrovsk Institute of Metallurgy. See also about Soviet dissidents in the recent anthropological studies, especially Oushakine (2001) and Yurchak (2006, 102–108, 130–31, 143–45).

24. It was a typical position of many Ukrainian Soviet patriots who were accused in "bourgeois nationalism." Author's interview with Professor Yurii Mytsyk, January 15, 1992, Dnipropetrovs'k. See a case of Vasilii Suiarko in 1968 at DADO, f.19, op. 52, d. 72,1.69–73.

25. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 6.

26. On December 18, 1967, KGB officers discovered that ex-prisoners had established a very busy correspondence with members of their families who had migrated abroad after 1945. In one of the letters, which was sent from Canada to Dniepropetrovsk, its author wrote to his relatives in Soviet Ukraine: "I suggest you to join the Communist Party, Komsomol, and please, get more and better education whenever it's possible. But do not forget in your soul and your heart that you are Ukrainians. When you get higher offices of government and get higher education, then Ukraine will be free. . . .The more Ukrainians join the Communist Party, the more influence these Ukrainians will get among the ruling elites. Only Ukrainians who will be members of ruling elite could save our Ukrainian collective farmers (*rabiv-kolgospnykiv*) from the Moscow yoke . . ." (DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 9. Citation is from 1. 8).

27. The KGB established a special surveillance of Aleksandr Kuz'menko, a bus driver from Dniepropetrovsk. During the Nazi occupation he was elected as a team leader of Lotskamenka, the Ukrainian young nationalist organization in Dniepropetrovsk district. In 1944, when Soviet troops liberated the city, Kuz'menko was sent for eight years into labor camps. In 1956 he came back to Dniepropetrovsk and became a target of a new KGB investigation. Now he was suspected in disseminating in public "anti-Soviet rumors" and criticizing "Soviet reality." As KGB discovered, by the beginning of 1968, Kuz'menko had already established close relations with different "nationalistically disposed" people in Kiev. Among these "nationalists," KGB officers included Ukrainian writers such as Ivan Dziuba and Oles' Honchar, and descendants of the Ukrainian na-tional poet Taras Shevchenko. It is

noteworthy, that links to Taras Shevchenko's relatives were considered in official correspondence as "ideologically dangerous" for KGB operatives (DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 10).

28. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 100–102.

29. DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 90–91, 99.

30. Oles' Honchar's novel *Sobor* debuted in January 1968, in the first issue of the literary magazine *Vitchyzna*. It later was released in a paperback edition that March as part of a special series, "Novels and Tales." Honchar told a story of a small town Zachiplianka on the banks of Dnieper, where workers of the local metallurgical plants tried to preserve an old Cossack cathedral and protect it from a local party official's plan to destroy it. Using a cathedral as a symbol of Ukrainian national and cultural awakening, Honchar addressed a number of important problems for development of the Dnieper region: industrial pollution, betrayal of national values and ideals, as well as a role of old Cossack traditions and preservation of Ukrainian language, culture and natural environment. The church described in Honchar's novel was in the cathedral of St. Trinity in Novomoskovs'k (near Dnipropetrovsk). This cathedral has a unique place in Ukrainian history. A Ukrainian Cossack self-taught architect, Iakym Pogrebniak, built this cathedral in 1770s with funds from the Zaporizian Cossack society. It is built completely out of wood; the constructionworkers did not use a single iron nail. The Soviet government closed the church after World War II, and Dnipropetrovsk party leaders drew up plans to demolish it. Honchar and other patriots of national history tried to preserve the cathedral. That is why many characters and settings in his novel were reminiscent of real people and places of Dniepropetrovsk region. The first secretary of the Dniepropetrovsk regional committee of the CPSU, Alexei Vatchenko, recognized himself as the inspiration for Volodymyr Loboda, a career-minded apparatchik in the novel, who betrayed his father and planned to destroy the cathedral itself. Vatchenko was enraged and in March 1968 began his personal attacks against Honchar who was a head of the Union of Writers of Ukraine in those days. During the first three months of 1968, Honchar's novel received only positive official reviews in Ukrainian periodicals. But by the end of March the situation had turned into a wave of extremely negative and nasty reviews and criticism. Moreover, Vatchenko organized an attack against Honchar during a Plenum of Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in Kiev on March 29, 1968. Vatchenko accused Honchar of distorting reality, idealizing the Cossack past, and promoting nationalism. P. Shelest, the first secretary of CPU, tried to be circumspect regarding Honchar because N. Podgorny, head of the USSR Supreme Soviet, supported Honchar. Later on, the state publishing house stopped publication of Honchar's novel, and Honchar himself was sacked as head of the Union of Writers of Ukraine in May 1970. But Honchar was never expelled from the Communist Party or arrested, despite Vatchenko's efforts to punish the writer. See Koval (1989); Honchar and P'ianov (1997).

31. DADO, f.19, op. 52, d. 72,1.53. See also memoirs of the famous Ukrainian political dissident Leonid Plyushch, with a contribution by Tatyana Plyushch (1979, 174–75).

32. This section is based on archival document from DADO, f.19, op. 52, d. 72,1. 95–96, and my personal conversation with Yurii Mytsyk in April 1990.

33. The KGB decision to instigate secret surveillance is documented in DADO, f.19, op.

52, d. 72,1. 95–96. See also a publication of this document in *Ternystym shliakhom do khramu,* 148–49, 256. He did not tell his students the details of this story until the *perestroika* era. See also Mytsyk (1998).

34. DADO, f.19, op. 54, d. 113,1.29–31; *Ternystym shliakhom* (1999, 260, 261); Sokul'sky (2001, 489, 491). Sokul'sky was accused not only of writing the letter, but also in disseminating copies of articles by a "General P. Grigorenko" in defense of Crimean Tartars, "A Current State of the Soviet Economy" by Soviet academician A. Aganbegian and a book by Czechoslovak scholar Molnar "Slovaks—Ukrainians." All these documents were considered "anti-Soviet propaganda" by the Dniepropetrovsk KGB. The police discovered original versions of Sokul'sky's poems "Freedom," "Nostalgia," and "Sviatoslav." The ideas of those poems were also interpreted as "anti-Soviet, nationalistic material." Later, KGB dropped the charges of circulating Aganbegian's article and Molnar's book.

35. "Lyst tvorchoi molodi," quotations are from *Molod' Dnipropetrovs'ka v borot'bi proty rusyfikatsii,* 9, 17.

36. Ibid., 15–16. They reminded their opponents of Lenin's advice about how to fight nationalism in the former Russian Empire. First of all, Communists had to resist "the great Russian chauvinism," and only afterwards should they fight on behalf of the oppressed nation's nationalism, which was always a reaction to Russian chauvinism.

37. Ibid., 18–19.

38. See especially Tsukanov (1970). The author even asked: "What is criminal in a concern for Ukrainian language?" See also Vyblaia (1970), Shylo (1970), Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy (hereafter DASBUDO), Fond upravlinnia v Dnipropetrovs'kii oblasti), Sprava 24613, t. 7, ark. 300–317; Ivanenko (1999, 561–68). Savchenko became a famous Ukrainian writer. See also Savchenko' memoirs: Ivanenko, (2001, 278–81). Recent anthropological studies about Soviet dissidents include Oushakine (2001) and Yurchak (2005, 102–108, 130–31, 143–45).

39. Author interviews with Suvorov, June 1, 1991; Andrei Vadimov, Dniepropetrovsk, July 20–21, 2003; Eduard Svichar in Vatutino, Cherkassy region, Ukraine, June 8, 2004.

40. Author interview with Vladimir Demchenko, a former public lecturer of the "Society of Knowledge," Dnipropetrovsk, January 12, 1992. In the late 1950s, the Soviet government created a network of "music studios," audio recording stores (musykal'nyi salon, or muzykal'naia studia in Russian), where people, for the relatively high price of two rubles, could record holiday greetings with popular songs on a small, flexible vinyl disc. These "music studios" allowed people to record their favorite melodies.

41. "Dnipro vpadae v Chorne more, to turkam bude gore, koly kozaky pryplyvut' i turkiv vsikh ub'iut.' Kozaky, zaporiz'ki kozaky …" in Ukrainian. Author interviews with Suvorov, Vadimov, and Svichar.

42. For the Byelorussian version of "nativization" of rock music, see Survilla (2003, 187–206).

43. This Moscow band released this song on the "*Melodia*" label during the same time (Ryback 1991, 106). See also Troitsky (1987).

44. See Skliarenko (1961, 1963), Bilyk (1972); Zagrebel'nyi (1980). Author interview with Vladimir Demchenko, a former public lecturer of the "Society of Knowledge,"

Dnipropetrovsk, January 12, 1992. Author interview with Vitalii Pidgaetskii at the Department of History, Dniepropetrovsk University, February 10, 1996. Author interview with Vadimov.

45. Mentioned by Suvorov during interview with author. Author interview with Andrei Vadimov, Dniepropetrovsk, July 20–21, 2003. Author interview with Igor T., a KGB officer, Dniepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991.

46. See about this All-Union campaign in Troitsky (1987). According to Troitsky, the first "typical" Soviet discothèque was organized in Moscow in 1972. Artemy Troitsky and his friend, Aleksandr Kostenko, rented special musical equipment from their musician friends and operated this "dancing enterprise" inside a café at Moscow State University. As Troitsky noted, they developed a special structure and scenario for this discothèque, which became a norm for other Soviet discothèques. "The first hour was dedicated to listening; that is I played music by 'serious' groups like Jethro Tull, Pink Floyd, King Crimson, and talked about their histories. . . . After the 'listening' hour, people spent the next three expressing themselves on the dance floor." Ryback (1991, 159–60), White (1990, 76–79).

47. DADO, f. 17, op. 11, d. 1,1. 28.

48. DADO, f. 22, op. 32, d. 1,1. 44.

49. For more about Ukrainian and Byelorussian national themes in the city disco clubs, see DADO, f. 17, op. 10, d. 1,11. 87, 98; op. 11, d. 25,1. 88; op. 12, d. 18,1. 15; f. 22, op. 36, d. 1,11. 36–37. See also articles in the local periodicals: Chenous'ko (1978), Titarenko (1978), Rodionov (1979), Belkina (1979).

50. Author interview with Igor T.

51. Author interview with Igor T. See also the author's interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dniepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993. Author interview of Serhiy Tihipko, a director of "Privatbank" in Dniepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993.

52. In 1959, 70 percent of 2,705,000 people, who lived in the region of Dniepropetrovsk, resided in the cities. In 1970, this figure grew to 76 percent of 3,343,000 people. See Poliakova (1998, 227–37).

53. Goskomstat (1991, 100, 102, 106, 116, 117).

54. As an example of such identification see biographies of Yulia Tymoshenko, a "heroine" of the Orange Revolution: Popov and Mil'shtein (2006, 52–89). For Tymoshenko's biography in English, see Wilson (2005, 18–22).

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Chapter 4
Soviet Ethical Citizenship: Morality, the State, and Laughter in Late Soviet Lithuania

Neringa Klumbytė

This chapter explores Soviet power and citizenship by focusing on laughter and morality in late-socialist Lithuania. I argue that laughter served the Soviet state's agendas by reproducing officially sanctioned values of ethical behavior and good citizenship.[1] Laughter was a means to promote various civic and individual virtues, such as individual responsibility to the public; individual conscientiousness, honesty, and sincerity; open-mindedness; respect for others; simplicity and modesty; creativity, critical thinking, spirituality, and moral purity.[2] It was a powerful tool used to create the Soviet citizenship regime. However, the citizens who laughed were simultaneously contesting official moral values and reinterpreting them. By being active and moral citizens, rather than dissidents and revolutionaries, people changed the official Soviet moral order in unanticipated ways.[3]

This chapter explores critique of everyday life in *The Broom*, a humor and satire journal.[4] I draw on ethnographic research that I have conducted in Lithuania since 2003. During my summer research trips in 2009 and 2011, I specifi-cally focused on *The Broom* and its history. I carried out archival and media research and interviewed readers, artists, journalists, and writers who had either contributed to *The Broom* or served on its editorial board in the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, I analyze how journal editors, contributors, and readers in Lithuania in the 1970s and early 1980s reproduced morality and citizenship through humor and satire, how state-sponsored genres of humor mediated civic engagement, how various moral values empowered people to act in a politically and morally appropriate way, as well as how the writers, editors, and readers negotiated official moral values through laughter.

Morality, Governmentality, and Soviet Citizenship

After Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 Secret Speech condemning Stalin's atrocities, the Soviet state no longer used terror and violence as mass control mechanisms. The Khrushchev era, like the subsequent Brezhnev period, was characterized by a system more meticulous and thorough in its attention to each individual than the more openly repressive Stalinist regime (Kharkhordin 1999, 298). Morality became an important part of Soviet governmentality. Its importance was unprecedented in Soviet history (Field 2007).

In 1961 the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued the landmark "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism," the single most authoritative and enduring statement on the nature and content of Soviet moral-ity (Feldman 1989, 153). The 1961 code consisted of 12 tenets, 11 of which addressed human relations: devotion to the Communist cause, love toward the Socialist Motherland, and to Socialist countries; friendship and respect for other socialist societies and among the peoples of the USSR; hard work; collectivism; humane relations and mutual respect between people; honesty; truthfulness; moral purity;

simplicity; modesty in social and personal life; mutual respect in the family; and concern for the upbringing of children.[5]

Soviet theorists envisioned a grandiose role for morality in the new post-Stalinist epoch: its principles would eventually replace law and force in governing all interactions between individuals (Field 1998, 602). They declared, "Moral norms in socialist society gain greater and greater meaning . . . in developed Communist society they will be the only form of regulation of the relations between people" (Kosolapov and Krutova 1961, 82; cited in Field 1998, 602). The Code was supposed to be superior to all other ethical systems. It was the "most fair and noble morality" in existence, expressing the "interests and ideals of all laboring humanity."[6] Socialist principles of communism, such as work, peace, freedom of all nations, equality, brotherhood, happiness, and the free and all-embracing development of every individual, were considered to be an expression of the highest moral progress.[7]

Formulations of communist morality included moral prescriptions that had been common in the Stalin era.[8] The unwritten moral code of the Stalinist era emphasized the values of modesty, sobriety, sexual propriety, material restraint, honesty, openness, and loyalty, as well as good hygiene, efficient work habits, and "cultured" activities, including reading and attending the theater (Hoffmann 2003). Social activism and commitment to the collective and communist ideals were also endorsed in the Stalin years. For Party members, immoral behavior could be grounds for expulsion, prison, or even execution. Placing moral infractions on the same level as political infractions was a permanent part of Stalinist rhetoric and practice (Hoffmann 2003, 79).[9]

After the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, the government's emphasis on "communist morality" sparked additional educational, legal, and propagandistic efforts in the Soviet republics. In Lithuania, some schools of higher education introduced courses on ethics (Žemaitis 1981). In response to the 24th (1971) and 25th (1976) Communist Party Congress decisions about the importance of moral upbringing, various institutions initiated new research on ethics (Žemaitis 1981). At the 1976 plenum of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) Petras Griškevičius, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPL, emphasized the importance of research in ethics, the need for ethics specialists, as well as the significance of professional ethics and moral culture (Žemaitis 1981, 302–303). In 1977, the Lithuanian SSR ministry for college and special secondary education issued the law, according to which all colleges and universities in Lithuania had to teach courses in the ethics of Marxism and Leninism (Žemaitis 1981, 306).

In the 1970s and 1980s in Lithuania, various social groups were authorized to monitor moral behavior of citizens. In addition to Party and Komsomol (the Communist Party's youth wing), writers, educators, judges, policemen, health-care and social workers, neighbors, local bureaucrats, as well as trade union officials were involved in teaching citizens the elements of communist morality. Every citizen could participate in collective *vospitanie* (Lithuanian *auklėjimas*, upbringing, education) through a host of new and newly revived volunteer institutions and organizations, such as *druzhiny* (Lithuanian *draugovininkai*), teams that patrolled the streets to arrest hooligans, drunks, and other disturbers of public order; *domkomy* (apartment-house committees), comrade's courts, work collectives, and various parent–school

organizations (see also Field 2007, 18–19). Many people distrusted these institutions and organizations. But citizens also turned to them for help and support, especially when other means were ex-hausted or unavailable.

In Lithuania various institutions, research organizations, and grassroots initiatives reflected the pan-Soviet preoccupation with morality. Lithuanian moral theorists elaborated on works by Russian moral theorists, creating a common Soviet moral space and shared values of good socialist citizenship. As in the Soviet moral codes, Lithuanian ethical theory emphasized dedication to communism as the highest moral standard, which encompassed all other moral standards (Gaidys et al. 1979, 98–99). It emphasized the importance of specific moral traits, such as industriousness, fairness, modesty, conscientiousness, goodness, sensitivity and helpfulness, friendliness, mutual help, and collectivism. A socialist person had to be spiritually mature, educated, and cultured. He also had to be devoted to humanness (*ištikimybė žmoniškumui*) and to the collective cause; he was expected to be responsible and consistent in public as well as in private relations. A socialist person had to be brave, tough, and able to control and respect himself. He should not succumb to materialism (*daiktiškumas*), careerism, indifference toward the public interest, impoliteness, unfairness, crudity, pomposity, alcoholism, theft of public property, and hooliganism (Gaidys et al. 1979, 119). One negative role model was the snob (*miesčionis*), a person who thought about nature, people, society, and the state as well as spiritual and material values in consumerist terms. The snob tried to find profit everywhere. He was a conformist and an opportunist, more interested in his career and personal prestige than society as a whole. His self-interest and arrogance were expressions of his selfishness. According to Justinas Lazauskas (1982) a snob was a mediocre person who was happy with himself. [10]

The History of *Šluota* (*The Broom*)

The Broom was an illegal journal first published in 1934 by artists and revolutionaries from the Lithuanian Communist Party, in Kaunas region. At that time Lithuania was an independent presidential republic with Kaunas as its provisional capital. The title of the journal and the images on its covers made clear the communist agenda: to sweep unwanted bourgeois elements and values out and to purify society from the ills of militarism, capitalism, and clericalism.[11]

The first issue had 16 pages, as would issues published later in Soviet Lithuania. Some of the first issues contained illustrations and caricatures; others covered various events that appealed to “communist” sensibilities and were not necessarily humorous. Seven issues of *The Broom* were published between 1934 and 1936. In 1936, publication of the journal was discontinued, most likely due to the persecution or relocation of the journal’s major contributors (Bulota 1984, 6). The next issue—the first legal edition—was published on July 12, 1940, nine days before Lithuania officially became a new member of the USSR.

The Broom published 23 issues in 1940 and 25 in 1941. These issues celebrated the freedom of the workers and peasants. They lampooned former and current enemies of the people, including speculators, imperialists, capitalists, clerics, landlords, the rich, intellectuals, and bureaucrats. *The Broom* critiqued various problems of everyday life, such as

laziness, procrastination at work, wastefulness, irresponsibility, selfishness, and alcoholism. Work, specifically socialist work in a collective, and commitment to the public good and a socialist future, were celebrated and contrasted with prior labor relations based on class differences. The issues published in 1940 and 1941 critiqued the bourgeois Smetona (the president of Lithuania in 1926–1940) regime, used communist rhetoric, and actively promoted political agendas geared toward building a new, socialist society. The journal shut down in 1941 when editor-in-chief Stepas Žukas fled Nazi-occupied Lithuania. In 1956 the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party resurrected *The Broom* and moved its headquarters to Vilnius.

The post-Stalin era *Broom* was very different from its predecessors. The main characters in earlier editions, such as landlords, the rich, the clergy, and kulaks, were absent from the 1956–1957 issues. While in 1940 and 1941 blame for social ills had been directed predominantly outside one's imagined socialist community (i.e., the capitalists, imperialists, enemies of the new socialist state, and the bourgeois class), now the journal turned its focus inward (i.e., we, the workers, are the ones who procrastinate, pilfer from the workplace, drink, and are selfish). Several pages in the 1963 issue nicely sum up various immoral types. Gathered together under the rubric of "Winter Preludes" are caricatures of a vagabond (*perėjūnas*), a bootlicker (*pataikūnas*), a bureaucrat, a bribetaker (*kyšininkas*), a gossiper (*pletkininkė*), a heartbreaker (*širdžių ėdikas*), a drunk, and a loafer (*veltėdis*).[12] Moreover, now a new socialist class comprised of bureaucrats, managers, factory, state, and collective farm directors, and other new elites (but not Party or government authorities) has replaced the old enemies of the state.

The journal's subject matter also shifted in 1956, condemning shortages, shoddy goods and substandard services. The family and interpersonal relations also gain an increasing presence. Ordinary topics without any specific socialist or political meaning, such as fishing stories, seep into *The Broom*, too. The journal also continues to criticize social disorders addressed in the 1940 and 1941 issues, such as lying to officials, abusing public order for private interest, or procrastinating at work. However, by now the laughter is much lighter and lacks the customary revolutionary seriousness.

In 1956 there is a noticeable shift not only in the target of critiques, but also in their tone —*The Broom* became more cynical and detached and continued that slant into the 1980s. The motif of the broom, of purifying and cleaning society disappeared from the pages and by late socialism few readers even knew the origin of journal's name. Many readers, journalists, and writers would likely smirk at *The Broom*'s former revolutionary spirit, since few of them could identify with its former revolutionary agenda. For artists, a new elite group of professionals, the journal was an outlet for art, not revolution. Gone was the revolutionary critique of social vices and firm belief in a bright future and perfection of a society. Rather, the revived journal carried a routinized cynical critique of certain groups of people, not because they opposed the socialist order, but because they transcended everyday values that many citizens and artists shared. This critique also manifested pragmatic adjustment to socialist life.

The popularity of *The Broom* rose from 20,000 copies in 1956 to over 100,000 copies in the 1980s.[13] Thus, at its peak, there was approximately one journal copy per 30 inhabitants. Although the actual number of copies sold is unknown, this journal was widely known and

read in the 1970s and 1980s. It was the only journal of humor and satire in the Lithuanian language and much more popular than the pan-Soviet and Russian *Krokodil*. Moreover, *The Broom* was profitable, unlike many other newspapers and journals, such as *Tiesa* (The Truth) and *Komjaunimo Tiesa* (The Komsomol Truth). In addition to circulation numbers, readers' memories indicate the overwhelmingly positive reception of *The Broom*. During my interviews, just mentioning *The Broom* elicited a warm smile followed by pleasant memories of reading, collecting, purchasing, and sharing *The Broom* with others. Some of *The Broom*'s stories, jokes, and characters were still retold in the late 2000s, and I heard several people quoting *Broom* jokes during my summer research in 2009.[14] Indeed, not everything in *The Broom* was equally liked, but the content was diverse enough to satisfy most readers.[15] Importantly, for many readers it was the best of what was available in the popular press.

In 2008 Jurgis Gimberis, the writer and satirist, expressed regret that *The Broom* did not survive post-Soviet times.[16] After independence, "Big hopes. Sacred things. Sacred slogans. There was no place for laughter, critique, satire. How can you cut the sacred tree? [literally 'cut the branch' on which you presumably sit]." According to Gimberis, *The Broom* in Soviet times was very balanced,

> There was serious, and simple, vulgar and intellectual humor. Everything you want. Now it is hardly possible to revive it. Maybe that's why I am not inter-ested in humor anymore. I almost don't write. I earn money translating foreign literature.[17]

Kęstutis Šiaulytis, a *Broom* artist and editor, argued that *The Broom* was "a publication of a sophisticated humor culture. Now if people laugh, they most frequently laugh at all kind of nonsense."[18] Pleasant smiles and memories of the readers as well as artists' and writers' commentaries indicate that socialist laughter was also their own.

Ethics of Everyday Life: *The Broom* in the 1970s–early 1980s

Soviet leaders were well aware of the political and ethical functions of humor and satire. Khrushchev claimed, "Satire is like a sharp razor; it shows human tumors and quickly, like a good surgeon, takes them out."[19] Jonas Bulota, a Lithuanian journalist, educator, and satirist, writing about *The Broom* in 1964 stressed, "*The Broom* has to speak about serious things in a cheerful way. It has to laugh at various ills that hinder our march to the bright communist future. Healthy laughter is the best medicine against all kind of ills and imperfections" (Bulota 1964, 2). Thus, *The Broom*, like other journals of humor and satire, provided a platform for perfection of society, for *vospitanie*; that is, for criticizing, complaining, reporting on authorities or neighbors, and condemning collectively and individually disproved actions. Readers and the majority of editors and contributors did not think that they were building a *socialist* society when they read *The Broom* or published it. Nevertheless, they performed ethical citizenship through state-provided venues, recirculating and reproducing Soviet morality, as well as shaping themselves into ethical citizens. In many cases, their moral stance coincided with the state's. However, as the following discussion will show, *The Broom* did not follow Soviet moral prescriptions at all times. There was a selective reading of official moral codes, reinterpretation of official morality, and presentation of alternative moral values.

This way *The Broom,* the active agent of the state and a platform for socialist moral upbringing, was infused with various personal emotions and values that reshaped the official moral orders. The socialist moral universe in the pages of *The Broom* was neither completely official nor completely private; it was a zone of coexistence and political inti-macy among censors, writers, editors, artists, and readers alike (see Klumbytė 2011).

Work and the Collective

In socialism, productive labor was central to state ideology, and the workplace was an important site for personal and collective engagement.[20] All the ethical considerations of socialist personality and citizenship emphasize work as a site of self-fulfillment that gives meaning to one's life. For example, Lazauskas (1978, 1980), a Lithuanian philosopher, argues that a socialist person feels a responsibility for society, recognizes public interests as superior to his private interests, and works for the good of a society. Work must be his most important life purpose and simultaneously the most important area for individual's self-expression (Lazauskas 1980, 20–21). Similarly, Česlovas Kalenda, a Lithuanian philosopher and moral theorist, argues that work is a moral category—it is an individual's life goal and a need (Kalenda 1981, 88).

Poor work ethics such as dawdling at work, drinking, and pilfering received considerable attention in the pages of *The Broom*. Workers who call in sick just to stay home, or otherwise use work time and space for personal gain and pleasure are criticized and ridiculed. In Rimantas Baldišius's cartoon, a man with a suitcase is walking through the corridor. He says: "I can feel the smell of coffee, it means everyone is at work already."[21] Readers got the inside joke, since in Soviet work culture coffee signified taking a break and socializing.

Satires and jokes ridicule various bureaucrats and managers for ignoring work ethics and the needs of the collective. As Douglas Rogers argues, *khoziain*-style relationships have been central to Soviet-era ethics of governance. They entail rights and obligations between the state or non-state actors and people and presuppose a moral community (Rogers 2006, 920). *Khoziain* (Lithuanian *šeimininkas*) means master, owner, boss, administrator, manager, man of the house; it is a person who is responsible for the public good and the well-being of a collective; someone who works for the people and takes care of them (Rogers 2006, 915). *Khoziain*-style relationships are an ideal promulgated in the pages of *The Broom* by journalists and readers alike. In a story "Be careful—a private owner!" Albertas Lukša writes about Petras Kilas, director of the state farm "Merkys," who abandoned a state-sponsored project to build a house of culture for the residents of a town and turned his attention to starting a new settlement, in which the tallest and most beautiful house was his own.[22] Lukša writes:

> Houses for workers were simple, small, and comfortable. The house for the state farm director—the most comfortable; there were eight rooms. However, the cost of the director's house was the same as the cost of the workers' one-storey houses. What kind of a director he were, if he couldn't find ways to create much better life for himself for the same price![23]

Next to his new house the farm director also built a barn and a garage with a large basement. For the impressive roof he used logs that were originally in-tended for closets in workers' houses. In this example the director of the state farm violates the ethics of the

khoziain-style relationship, under which he was supposed to take care of his people and to prioritize public and collective interests over his own.

The lack of a good *khoziain* is often cited to explain why things go wrong in the workplace and why public interests are abused. Various cartoons poke fun at "bad" *khoziains* for not taking care of public property, failing to provide for the collective, laziness, and their lack of commitment to the public cause. Bad *khoziains* not only transgress the ethics of work, but also violate the moral contract between authorities and workers. By laughing at Soviet work culture, artists, writers, and readers reproduced work-related values and structures of authority and power.

Work, Consumption, and Service

Shortages, networking, and indifference, as well as salesclerks with their hand in the till, poor service, and low-quality goods define the Soviet culture of consumption and service. Some wary consumers took calculators and counted everything along with salesclerks.[24] In Voldemaras Kalninis's cartoon there are two tables with scales. The bigger table has big scales that obscure the smaller table, so the customer cannot see the second scale.[25] This cartoon invokes the widespread practice of salesclerks giving less change or overcharging for purchases. Readers recognize the culture of double standards where salesclerks adjust their scales to show more weight than there actually was, while other consumers, usually acquaintances and friends of store staff, were surreptitiously provided with better cuts of meat, cheese, or vegetables at lower rates and actual weights.

Similarly, cafeterias and restaurants often diluted the coffee or spirits served to customers. A. Brička in his satire presents an attorney defending Angelė Ginkūnienė for diluting vodka and cognac in a cafeteria. According to the attorney, her actions were beneficial because: (1) none of her customers got drunk, so they showed up at work on time next morning; she also saved working people's health and energy and contributed to the state's wealth, and (2) she contributed to the well-being of a family, since husbands returned home not completely drunk. It is so nice when "A loving mother kisses a husband, happy kids run around, and dishes, pillows, and cactuses are not destroyed. Such ideal harmony strengthens the most important cell of the state—a family." After giving several other justifications, the attorney concludes that Ginkūnienė was doing a job beneficial to the state. Therefore, the court was asked not only to recognize her innocence, but also to acknowledge that Ginkūnienė positively contributed to workers' health, productivity, and happiness.[26]

Other retailers were absent from their workplace for a variety of reasons. Shoppers frequently found signs hanging on shop doors with messages such as, "The salesclerk has gone to make a call." Such signs were ubiquitous, usually indicating use of public time for personal purposes.[27] Another announcement—"We don't work *today.* It's a cleaning *hour* (*sanitarinė valanda*, emphasis added)"[28]—refers to popular cleaning days (or hours) during which institutions were closed to address hygiene concerns and orderliness. For many workers this was a day off from their regular work responsibilities. Another common reason for closing was "technical difficulties," which could entail a variety of things. Jonas Šiožinys in his

epigram “It works!” in *The Broom* writes:

“It’s already the second week, M.M. store is closed. Every day they find a different excuse” (from a reader’s letter).

Monday morning—

There is no light. Closed.

Tuesday morning—

Receiving new goods. Closed.

Wednesday morning—

Inspection. Closed.

Thursday morning—

The cleaning day. Closed.

Friday morning—

Audit. Closed.

Saturday morning—

Recalculation. Closed.

Sunday morning—

It’s written in black on white,

O my goodness!

The store exceeded the plan!

How? Don’t ask me . . .

[through the back door].[29]

This culture of absences was common not only in the retail sector, but also in various state institutions. State authorities and various bureaucrats were famous for their unavailability. While state authorities could not be directly criticized in *The Broom,* various anonymous officials and managers are taken to task for their chronic absenteeism and procrastination. On the 1970 cover of *The Broom,* Arvydas Pakalnis’s cartoon features a circle of tables with bureaucrats. Every second table is empty with the notes on it: “I’m at the meeting.”[30]

Low-quality goods and sloppy work annoyed many consumers. Cracked pipes, leaky ceilings, peeling walls, and unfinished construction or renovation of apartment buildings were an everyday experience for many Soviet citizens. In the *Broom*’s “Following readers’ letters” column, Vytautas Katilius writes that you have to wait for a refrigerator repairman for three days instead of going to work; in the evening you have to take your broken shoes back to the shoe repair shop even if they had been “fixed” in the morning.[31] However, the author’s major grievance is shoddy kitchen stools that break often. He learns that the stools are manufactured using moist wood. This wood cannot be dried because the cauldron in the factory that should dry the wood does not work. And it does not work because the factory has not had a conveyer belt for several years. “Are kitchen stools just a trivial matter?” asks the author of the article and continues:

Well, I doubt it. … Of course, a stool is not a set of furniture or a refrigerator. It costs only a little more than five rubles. However, today a stool broke down, tomorrow your pocketknife, after tomorrow … and then we will feel that all these small things become a big matter that poisons our blood, and [interrupts] normal work or rest.[32]

Typically, all the faults cited have moral undertones. "All these goods were made by human hands, materials were used, salaries were paid, even bonuses, etc.,"[33] finishes his satirical retrospection Katilius. Darius Mykas, in the story "Doesn't work," takes a more "optimistic" stance. According to the author, in Soviet cities half of the vending machines don't work. But only those people who do not see any progress complain about it. Because the other half of the machines is not broken and this is a step forward! A big step![34]

Rarely, moral critiques were directed at the system itself. For example, in a cartoon by Arvydas Pakalnis on a cover of the first issue of *The Broom* of 1981, a salesclerk is telling a family of snowmen with two small snow-children: "I'm sorry, but currently we do not have nice clothing for kids, you should come in the spring."[35] Above the cartoon there is a quote from the USSR Central Committee project for the 26th Party Congress: "Special attention has to be paid for the production and quality of children's items." While many cartoons only indirectly referred to the state and regime, this open bluntly criticizes the state's inability to provide for its citizens.

Cartoons and jokes also poked fun at the tradition of *blat* (networking, connections). Ilja Bereznickas portrays a father, who is an artist, talking to the day care director. She tells him, "We have a child whose father is an artist, but if you become a plumber, maybe we will take him." The joke is a commentary on overcrowded day care centers and arbitrary acceptance rules. The director prefers someone who can exchange his skills in case it is needed. Meris Kaniauskas, in a short anecdotal report, explains why students want to become pharmacists or shop managers. One student wants to be a pharmacist so she can access scarce medicine for her mother. Another student wants to be a shop manager, so she can have many nice shoes and make everyone envious. Interestingly, the last student wants to be a son-in-law. When the teacher asks whose son-in-law he wants to be, the student responds: "Comrade teacher, be more careful!"[36] Being the son-in-law of an important person, such as a Communist Party elite member, opened access to various resources; something that the elites tended not to discuss publicly. These instances mock corruption, self-interest, and the negative aspirations of citizens. These various transgressions of communist morality were concerns for the authorities, as well as artists, writers, and readers. While the state authorities projected socialist ideals to build a socialist society, many citizens simply wished to live in an orderly and comfortable social universe.

The consumption and service culture ridiculed in *The Broom* exposed the official ethics of work and of consumer-provider relations. While people turned away from official slogans that promoted the same values, from the authoritative discourse and official agendas, they often laughed when a similar discourse was repeated in a humorous form.

Family Life

Both the 1961 moral code and Brezhnev-era moral theories called for conscientious fulfillment

of familial obligations. Writing about the Khrushchev era, Field argued that everyday life seemed dangerously resistant to communist reconstruction. Various bourgeois habits remained, including domestic violence and alcoholism, but also religious practices and the problem of *meshchanstvo*, which included materialism, small-mindedness, an exclusive concern with family and personal life, and a corresponding lack of social involvement. Soviet moralists condemned individuals who have refused to sacrifice personal comfort for the greater good, as communist morality demanded (Field 2007, 13, 16; see also 1998).

The Broom most often ridiculed marital relations. Men are portrayed as incurable drunks, while women are devoted fighters on behalf of the family. In one example, a husband is ridiculed for not fulfilling his family obligations:

A husband returns in the evening angry and tired:

"Why are you so unhappy?" asks his wife.

"That's your fault! You told me to go to the parent-teacher conference, but you didn't tell me where our kid goes to school."[37]

Some women gossip and crave material goods, but these vices seem to be minor when compared to the moral degradation of men. According to one joke, the best way to make a drunk husband go home from a party is to tell him that there is another bottle at home.[38]

In general, men are lampooned in *The Broom* far more than female characters. Directors, bureaucrats, fishermen, alcoholics, and assorted clerks, lovers, and cheaters are uniformly men. Women are not portrayed as central characters, they are either lovers, wives (sometimes assuming centrality because husbands come home drunk), or saleswomen. Women are also gossips, mean old fat ladies, or disrespectful characters that transgress family values and societal ideals of a mother and a wife. In the 1975 *Broom* story about finding the perfect woman for Vincas, the narrator focuses on negative feminine characteristics. Vincas himself, according to the author, does not lack anything—he has golden crowns, a cooperative apartment, a fur coat, and a diploma. He still has a full head of hair, and he's not even 50 yet. His friends think they have found the perfect partner for him. A woman who is excellent, does not lack anything. The next task is to convince Vincas that she is right for him:

"She is well-off. The salary is ninety rubles," I told him.

"And two hundreds on the side," added Jonas.

"She is educated. She attended three vocational schools."

"Honest. In the store where she worked, all salesclerks were put in prison, she was only on probation."

"Smart. When she got divorced, she got a car from her former husband without any court. And she left her son to him. She doesn't take what she doesn't need."

"Sincere. Yesterday we finished four bottles at her place," explained Jonas.

The future groom became uneasy.

"Don't exaggerate," I told Jonas. "Vincas will think that something is wrong. She is not a drunk. Remember, she said: 'My norm is one bottle, that's it'."

……

"She loves family. When Algis's wife was on vacation, she lived with Algis for two weeks. Cleaned his apartment. Bathed his kids."

"Sexy," I said.

"How do you know?!" asked the groom. "I don't. …" I was embarrassed, "some acquaintances told me."[39]

Vincas's "fiancée" is a parody of the ideal woman. The portrait of Vincas also makes fun at social perceptions of an ideal man. Golden crowns, a fur coat, a diploma, and an apartment do not say much about Vincas as a moral subject. Indeed, they may point to his materialism and snobbishness. *The Broom*, in this case, actively participated in drawing the moral landscape of femininity and masculinity within and outside the context of a family.

Family was an important agent in building a socialist society, thus its disintegration and immorality were both public as well as private concerns (see Field 1998). As with work and consumption, by criticizing marital relations, family and gender issues, the critics and readers recirculated official moral values and fashioned themselves into moral citizens.

Soviet Ethical Citizenship

The Moral Subject

In line with Brezhnev-era decrees, Lithuanian moral theorists emphasized the need for vigilance and a strict moral upbringing for children. Every individual was to cultivate their own moral values and shape themselves into moral, socialist subjects. Many theorists argue that individual moral progress is closely interconnected with social moral progress (see Antanas Gaidys et al. 1979). Alcoholism, for example, was a personal, but also a social, problem. Bronius Kuzmickas (1980, 39) claimed that alcoholism is "immoral because it numbs people's consciousness and moral activity. Alcoholism weakens spiritual powers, destroys us as morally responsible people, as moral subjects."

Similar moral attitudes toward alcoholism are reproduced in *The Broom.* In the 1977 *Broom* Liudmila Paškevičienė, a policewoman at a rehabilitation center for drunks, tells a true story about her clients. According to Paškevičienė, she and her colleagues work as educators, nurses, and as moralists. They lecture the drunks and show anti-alcoholism films. Drunks arrive to the rehabilitation faci-lity from everywhere: the streets, public squares, transportation hubs, restaurants, and even from workplaces. They are grouped into three categories, first, a boozer (*latras*) whom you have to wake up and take to the clinic because he cannot get up himself. Boozers usually are found on the pavement, in a park, or on a bench. The two other categories are drunks who can walk and drunks who are aggressive. The story provides names, jobs, and places where actual people were "collected." Some are still wearing their work attire. Paškevičienė also discusses how badly alcoholism affects family relations:

Jonas Gečas has good hands. His work was valued in the Vilnius furniture factory. However, his taste for alcohol is also special. It's already a couple of years that he drinks non-stop. . . . The shelter is like a home for him. And his family doesn't have time to relax. Drunk and rowdy Gečas fights. His swearing hurts his young son who cries because of such "happiness." [Because of his father's drinking] his performance at school is also affected.[40]

"There is no cock without a crest, and no larger collective without its boozer," moralizes Paškevičienė. Although the drunks are taken by the scruff of the neck at work and taught manners, they still keep drinking. The collectives take responsibility for such workers, because they are their collective problem and collective shame, according to Paškevičienė.[41]

Why was alcoholism a prominent topic in *The Broom?* It did reflect a larger social context where drunkenness was widespread. Mikhail Gorbachev, who became CPSU general secretary in 1985, was famous for his anti-alcoholism campaign, which sparked new jokes, cartoons, and anecdotes about drinking and teetotalers. But even before Gorbachev, the bottle and a tipsy father, worker, or lover were common characters in *The Broom.* The popularity of this theme might also relate to the fact that the majority of *Broom* artists and editors were men who were exposed to the predominantly male culture of drinking. A cartoon by Andrius Cvirka shows a man, a lobster, and an iguana having a drink. The man tells them: "If I don't have a shot, all people look like animals, monsters, and beasts."[42] A cartoon by Andrius Deltuva shows two men whose trucks are smashed into each other. They have a bottle in front of them and appear drunk. Both men tell the policeman writing up the report that they just had a few shots to celebrate the fact that they survived the accident.[43] Similar alcohol-drenched folklore is recorded in other examples. From an explanation given to the factory's comrades court:

> Comrades' facts are slanderous. I did not swear. I was drunk and I was going back home to my wife. I stopped at the fence and tried to talk to myself in order to understand how well I will be able to explain myself at home.[44]

Various other negative personal traits, such as subservience, hypocrisy, bragging, interest in the material (as opposed to spiritual, but not religious) realm, arrogance, careerism, lying, laziness, and civic irresponsibility are ironically and cynically criticized in *The Broom.* The journal pokes fun at *spekuliantai*, people who resell goods for profit, as well as their customers. Greed is despised, while modesty and simplicity are admired, as are spirituality (*dvasingumas*), a quality that entails disinterest in material things, responsibility to the public, conscientiousness, honesty and sincerity, open-mindedness, respect for others, and simplicity, characteristics that make a person moral and beautiful.

Collective values and interests are expected to be above personal preferences; however, comfort and private success in many cases were not deemed selfish. The new moral code is a significant departure from the revolutionary values of asceticism and proletarianism. As Anna Paretskaya shows in Chapter 2, the late-socialist state embraced post-collectivist values by promoting private life, professionalism of the working class, as well as material consumption. In the 1975 edition of *The Broom* M.O. Kovas, a reader, writes about two women (real or imaginary), former classmates, both intellectuals, one from a village, another from Vilnius.[45] The story, "About Non-historical Materialism," shows how well both women live. Birutė, from a village, has a *Žiguliai* car (a Russian *Lada* model), a color TV, visits cities, theaters, concerts, and restaurants, but still craves city life and is envious of Irena. The author notes that Birutė doesn't know how much time and energy Irena spends visiting cosmetologists, tailors, fighting for underwear in a flea market, and working hard through connections to get other things. Both lifestyles are criticized for materialism. Birutė is also criticized for not being able to enjoy the comfort and social life she has, while Irena is censured for her conspicuous consumption.

In Antanas Zabielskas's satire "The Most Unhappy Man," two friends meet after not seeing each other for a long time. One wonders what has happened to his friend and why he looks so bad and unhappy. The unhappy guy's head is sunk into his otter-fur collar. His eyes are gloomy behind gold-framed glasses. His body, squeezed into fashionable suit, looks somehow limp. He is unhappy because he has a new job—he works as the chief cook at a restaurant, which signals to the readers that he makes a lot on the side. The unhappy man tells how troubled he is: the salary is only 90 rubles, but he has to give to the director at least 200 every month. So he has to count every kopeck … he couldn't wish such a life even on his enemy! His friend notices the thick wedding ring when the unhappy man takes a stylish lighter out of his pocket. The unhappy man sees his friend looking at the ring and starts complaining that he will have to pay for his wife's fur coat. It's a dog's life! And now he was going to get tires for his "Volga" [the most prestigious car available in Soviet Lithuania]. "I'll have to pay again! It is so hard, so hard." Finally, they both get on a bus. The man looked so unhappy that a pregnant woman and an old man both got up and offered to let him sit down.[46]

As the above example illustrates, consumption was a morally contradictory experience. Edmundas Krakauskas (1976, 81), a Lithuanian moral theorist, has argued that from a perspective of communist morality, improving material conditions provides a basis for the development of communist relations; it is not a goal in itself. Although the socialist state viewed consumption as citizens' "right" (Verdery 1996), there was a "tension between an imperative to display socialist consumer products in the best possible light and to promote their correct (and tasteful) use in order to modernize and civilize the populace, but at the same time to discourage conspicuous consumption as an indicator of status, the undue influence of fashion, and unnecessary waste" (see György 1992, 19–21, cited in Fehérváry 2009, 438). Like state authorities, *The Broom*'s readers were engaged in negotiation, discussion, and redefinition of consumption as a moral practice. In the above example with the unhappy man, consumption is shown to create tension between having and not being able to escape the curse of wealth. The clear moral of the story is that goods and consumption do not bring happiness. To the contrary, they may make you unhappy, preoccupied with yourself, distant from community, and blind to the "real" values.

However, this contradiction may be reflected in a different way—consumption, especially consumption of foreign goods, can make you happy. As *The Broom* records: "Happy children are born with a shirt, the happiest [children with shirts] made abroad."[47] Thus, *The Broom* illustrates that contradictory moral values coexisted in society—both a willingness to consume and a distaste for wealth and the wealthy.

Cartoons and satires also advocate warm and caring relationships, friendship, mutual understanding and respect, and openness and sensitivity to others' concerns. This shared humanity intertwined with and created the Soviet values of personhood. One cartoon, for example, shows how a woman carrying a small child in one arm and a bag in another approaches a long line of other female shoppers. The women all size her up:

Woman 1: "Just look! All of them 'with children'! [She has] such a hat!"

Woman 2: "Such a snake!"

Woman 3: “When they go to the movie, they know where to leave children!”

Woman 4: “She is evil!”

Woman 5: “You can tell at once that she is a speculator!”

Woman 6: “It is very likely that this child is not hers!”

A woman with a child: “I don’t need oranges, I want a trolleybus ticket.”

Woman 7: “Oh, then, please, go ahead [you don’t have to stand in line].”[48]

This cartoon mocks women shoppers, their inattentiveness and insensitivity to a woman with a child. While the cartoon may be read as a critique of the Soviet economy of shortages, it also instructs people to preserve moral values in situations like stressful shopping experiences.

Moral Activism

In line with the state agenda, readers used *The Broom* as a public forum to expose various social problems. They were active guardians of morality, as the Party and its ideologues expected, as well as voluntary builders of Soviet ethical citizenship. Writing to *The Broom* was a common practice; in the early 1980s, the editors received over 3,000 letters (Bulota 1984, 9). Reader gripes ranged from their dissatisfaction with various services to notices about general social ills and public issues like the lack of benches for tourists. For example, in Kapsukas, meat was being wrapped into an old journal paper.[49] In Kamajai, a small town, the bus randomly stopped at one of the three different places, and you could never predict where it would stop next time. In a humorous description of how passengers tried to guess where the bus was going to stop on a particular day, one Kamajai resident concluded that it was a good exercise in winter to run from one place to another, and treat oneself to a burst of energy.[50] Things could be worse, according to the letter writer, since in Pabališkiai, another small town, the train often did not stop at all.[51]

Alexei Yurchak (1997) considers similar reporting and complaint writing as a form of action available to activists who were disliked by “normal” people. Although it is true that many complainers were not respected within their communities, peer groups, and among neighbors in general, many also did complain when other means of reaching goals were more difficult or unavailable. In her study of divorce cases in Khrushchev-era Russia, Field shows that occasionally people resorted to official rhetoric and invoked communist morality either explicitly or less directly “by trying to compel party and societal groups to correct their spouses’ behavior.” Communist morality was regarded by people “as a powerful language that could be invoked to help them with more immediate personal concerns, such as reining in wayward spouses or subduing officious in-laws” (1998, 610). Among the letter-writers I interviewed, some received responses, others did not, but in all cases they were proud to tell me about fulfilling their civic duty in a way that was neither specifically Soviet nor political, from their point of view.[52] They did not see their letters as a form of activism, but as something very ordinary, something that they had to do on behalf of others and themselves.

Readers reported various injustices and asked *The Broom* for help. For example, a flax

factory was built in Kudirkos Naumiestis in 1974. However, the construction site around the factory lingered until 1977, when a report and photo were sent to *The Broom*. A. Portačenko, the director of the factory, complained that he couldn't get an explanation from the Jurbarkas Construction Management, the company that built the factory. He "asks *The Broom* to announce it in the journal. Maybe public critique of the construction company will help to clean the territory of the factory from construction waste."[53] The director of the factory was right to anticipate the *Broom*'s help, since a public critique and *The Broom*'s intervention often did help. Persons or organizations that violated public rules and abused them for private interests, were punished with various fines, reprimands, and ordered to solve the issues at hand. In rare cases, people lost jobs or were demoted to less prestigious positions.[54]

Complaints reflect readers' deep concern about pollution. For example, in Širvintos, waste from a pig farm was contaminating the water in a nearby river. Different inspectors asked the farm director to fix the problem; however, the river pollution only increased. Although the director was punished once and paid 30 rubles in fines, in the end he even received a bonus. "What are our laws for?" asks A. Šaulys, the author of the article.[55] Fridrikas Samukas's cartoon on the cover of the 1977 *Broom* shows a beach covered with trees and shrubs and a man getting into the water. In the background, there is a factory spewing black smoke and a pipe that dumps waste into the river. When the man lifts his leg out of the water, his skin has dissolved and only bones remain on his foot.[56] Like the readers' complaints about the pig farm, the cartoon raises public awareness of pollution.

Although complaints about the morality of authorities and state responsibility for pollution and other things addressed above are common in *The Broom*, the journal mainly focused on small matters and everyday experiences, such as stealing of electricity or producing moonshine. For example, A. Vambaris and A. Liepkus reported about moonshine producers, naming real people: J. Aleševičius from Vilkiškiai, E. Tretjakevičius from Sadiūnai, J. Garackevič from Matuizos, and others. The story is structured as if a devil were sent to visit all the places were moonshine is being produced. The devil tastes the home brew and can hardly get up. Finally, after spending three days in a ditch, he arrives back to hell. Here he is praised and rewarded for his courage and for tasting such a nasty thing like moonshine. The moonshine producers also receive their "prizes": they paid fines or were arrested for their "good deeds." [57]

Actual people, accused of being swindlers, crooks, and violators of public order and morality were profiled and ridiculed in *The Broom* alongside cartoon characters. Although denigrating, belittling, and shaming stories about them along with their pictures were not featured in every issue, drawing attention to them must have been a powerful way to reassert moral values.

Moral Shifts

Journalists, artists, and writers were not completely free to laugh at what they wanted to in *The Broom*. References to sex, nationalist themes, violence, any explicit critique of the Communist Party, the socialist regime, or Soviet leaders were not welcome in the journal. The editorial

board members whom I interviewed admitted that they did not feel these restrictions to be burdensome. Since they were so used to them, they almost never questioned the rules. Jonas Varnas argued that he did not deliberately violate the rules since he did not want to put the editor in a bad position in case his tricks were revealed. Thus, censorship worked at several levels: artists and writers engaged in self-control while choosing their topics, then the Party secretary who worked at *The Broom* screened issues before publication. Next, it went to the journal's vice director and then to the editor-in-chief. Then, the issue was taken to *Glavlitas* (General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press), where censors reviewed it. If the issue was approved, it received a number that appeared on the last page of the issue. And lastly, the published issue had to be approved by *Glavlitas* again to receive permission for distribution.[58]

Writers and journalists were relatively more constrained than artists, since visual art was more difficult for the censors and the Central Committee to understand. Goda Ferensienė and Laima Zurbienė, who were on the editorial board of *The Broom*, related that it was much more difficult to hide some plots and meanings in written works.[59] Epigrams and aphorisms were written in Aesopian language, unlike feuilletons. Writers sometimes came up with generalizations such as "those in power can do anything." You had to be careful, remembered Zurbienė, not to make explicit commentaries about the state. A clear allusion to the *local* government was necessary if you spoke about government. For Ferensienė and Zurbienė, *The Broom* was a space of creativity, freedom, and self-fulfillment. The state and the Party were somehow outside of their vigorous everyday work culture, which was mediated by warm interpersonal relations in the publishing house. Officialdom was embodied by outsiders like the Central Committee members who inspected issues of *The Broom*. The "state" also existed in the form of rules, regulations, and an irrational bureaucracy, which had to be publicly acknowledged, and which, according to Yurchak (2006), was de-territorialized by carving out a space of normalcy and relative freedom within it. Like Yurchak's "normal people," the *Broom* writers, journalists, and artists in Lithuania felt free in their universe, they did not see themselves as oppressed or engaged in resistance. They perceived themselves as the cultural, artistic, and social elite.

Thus, the relationship between state authorities, editors, artists, journalists, writers, and readers cannot be reduced to simply oppression *or* resistance (see also Klumbytė 2011). Laughter itself blurred the distinctions between state and citizen, public and private, the hegemonic and the sincere. It was a powerful weapon of the state only in the sense that it made people laugh at something that was funny *for them*. At the same time, it was a powerful weapon of the people, since it made the "state" laugh at something that was funny *for them*. Laughter, thus, produced a comfort zone of political intimacy, i.e., a coexistence of state authorities and other subjects in fields of social and political comfort, togetherness, and dialogue as well as in zones of shared meanings and values (Klumbytė 2011). Ideals about ethical citizenship took form in these zones of togetherness. Artists and readers were able to infuse officially sponsored humor with their personal emotions and sentiments, to shift the Soviet moral order, and make it personal.

There were different ways of reinterpretation that contributed significantly to the moral rearticulations of the Soviet ethical universe, such as silence, Aesopian language, aesthetic

rearticulation, and national recontextualization. Aesopian language implied that there was text behind the text; for example, the critique of individual bureaucrats or pollution might have really been aimed at the Soviet system itself. The critique of bureaucrats, factory, collective, and state farm directors was consistent with official rhetoric about the prevalence of some shortcomings in socialist society. *The Broom*'s ability to speak about it followed the state agenda to monitor citizens' behavior through popular and moral means. However, *The Broom*'s authors extended the critique to Soviet socialism and the Soviet state. Cartoons and stories depicting bad *khoziaieva* in many cases built a narrative about the Soviet economic regime being ridden by inefficiency, shortages, and corruption.

National rearticulation, which was also often narrated in Aesopian language, displaced the stress from "our" national problems to the problems of the Soviet Union. The Aesopian critique of the Soviet system often implied negativity toward the Communist state. Censors, editors, artists, writers, and readers were united in the nationalist laughter at the "Soviet" other. In this way, they reasserted national identity and reimagined a national community. Cartoons and stories, for example, about pollution in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, coded a negative commentary about Soviet and, thus, foreign industrialism and pollution. These sentiments became highly popular during *perestroika,* when nationalist sentiments found expression in the ecological movements of the late 1980s.

Aesthetic rearticulation was a means to challenge public norms and official genres with artistic means. As Kęstutis Šiaulytis inferred, writing "US" on a cartoon meant "Union Soviet" rather than "United States." The corpulent, sluggish bodies of the bureaucrats may have pointed to Brezhnev and his cronies rather than just any other official (see Klumbytė 2011). Moreover, many new young artists, who joined *The Broom* in the 1970s, followed Western authors, such as Herluf Bidstrup, a Danish socialist caricaturist, and Western styles, such as styles of French authors publishing in communist *L'Humanité* which was available in kiosks in Vilnius.

Unlike in *Krokodil*, there was no dominant canon in *The Broom.*[60] Tolerance for experimentation and originality coexisted with the search for new aesthetic forms. Comic strips—considered a capitalist genre—appeared in *The Broom* under the mantle of "experimentation." Šiaulytis recalled that when some one in Moscow complained about the comic strips, they disappeared from the pages for a time, only to reappear later. Modern artistic styles, according to *The Broom*'s artists, made *The Broom* one of the most prestigious humor and satire journals in the USSR. They narrated independence, experimentation, and modernity.[61] They were semiotic forms of transgression of the Soviet canon and its "socialist" forms of expression, prevalent in *Krokodil*. These new forms were often contested and renegotiated—artists remembered editors questioning the very long noses of their characters or knots on the frames of cartoons, or too abstract style in general. But the dialogue and negotiation did not lead to uniform and controlled forms of expression or a search for a new language of *socialist* art. Instead, the process gave rise to new pluralistic aesthetic languages of *The Broom* that contributed to moral rearticulations by opening space to discourse about art and professionalism, which was perceived to be beyond ideology.

Silence also could reshape the Soviet moral universe. Some of the topics that were prominent in official moral theorizing did not regularly appear in *The Broom.* There were few anti-nationalist or anti-religious critiques; cartoons, poems, and satires did not reinforce the

ideals of devotion to the communist cause, love of the socialist motherland, and friendship with socialist countries. How-ever, some critiques of the West and capitalism were published in *The Broom* since they were required.

And finally, a culture of coffee breaks and shots of vodka. Absenteeism, poor work ethics, and alcoholism were ridiculed in pages of *The Broom*, but all were part of the work culture of *The Broom* artists, journalists, and writers, just as much as any other citizens. Their recollections were punctuated by phrases such as "We did not show up in the mornings." "We went out for coffee." "We gathered in bars and restaurants to discuss everything." "We had a good time." "It was a wonderful time full of celebrations." "We worked little and then went out for drinks." "Artists from other republics took a taxi to come to Vilnius to drink with us."[62] Alcohol and, much less so, coffee were a means to bridge the gap between "official" and "private" as well as to reshape the official moral universe of work ethics, moral purity, and discipline. Kęstutis Šiaulytis echoed others in his recollections about the editorial board: it consisted of wonderful people, and even Jonas Sadaunykas, the Communist Party secretary, who pretended to be serious and used to tell others that he is to some extent a Stalinist, was actually a warm person who liked to drink. Laima Zurbienė recalled that her colleagues, when they got drunk, used to point good-naturedly at each other—"You are an informant." "No, you are, how come they accepted you to *The Broom* with such a past." Informants were present in every work collective, but nobody knew who the informant was in *The Broom*. It was a very good and beautiful collective, assured Zurbienė, and the mystery informant contributed to its spirit by not reporting on them. Indeed, it is this personalized work culture that ultimately describes socialism in the 1970s and 1980s rather than the official codes of conduct anticipated in "The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism." It is also this culture of togetherness along with its own moral universe that former *Broom* artists, journalists, and writers long for today. This culture neither was nor is perceived as "socialist" or "Soviet." Goda Ferensienė, after reading my 2011 article on *The Broom*, commented that my extensive use of "socialist" in the article is out of place; "we were free," she assured me. Her comment indicates the apparent paradox that this chapter explores—to be a Soviet citizen did not mean identifying with Soviet state agendas and perceiving himself or herself as "Soviet" or "socialist."

These various ways of reinterpretation and transgression demonstrate how pliable the Soviet moral universe was in the Soviet-Lithuanian culture of humor as well as how unstable, contextual, and situational the notion of the "Soviet state" is. The Soviet moral regimes were open (even within some constrains) to negotiation and dialogue and to articulation of alternative discourses and values. At the same time when artists, journalists, writers, and readers negotiated official values, they also actively reproduced some of them, created new aesthetic languages that were acceptable to the officialdom, and shaped their own moral worlds.

Conclusion: Laughter and Lightness

Laughter was a type of experience that Czech writer Milan Kundera would probably label as

"light" in the Soviet culture of seriousness.[63] Imagine a picture with a man walking on the street with a woman. His arm is resting on her shoulder in a somehow ungraceful manner. It looks like her shoulder serves as his support. Moreover, she is holding a small piece of luggage while he has nothing in his hands. *The Broom* asks its readers to think of a caption for this picture. Here are some of the readers' suggestions:

B. Karabelnikas from Plungė: "[He is] (spiritually) disabled" [*Invalidas* (*dvasios*)].

A. Juškienė from Kėdainiai: "She is starting to bear her cross."

V. Vegienė from Klaipėda: "A heavy, but pleasant load."

The most interesting comment is provided by *The Broom* itself: "*The Broom* has nothing to add since the responses show that the readers evaluated the behavior of this clumsy bumpkin (*netašyto jaunuolio–stuobrio*) in the right way."[64] Such playful and amusing involvement in shaping moral values is hardly imaginable in the other genres of official Soviet media, such as major newspapers. While the official newspapers were commonly distrusted, *The Broom*, even if censored and published by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, was perceived as a grassroots media. Morals were taught via humor. By reading the journal and laughing at cartoons and jokes readers were absorbing and defining Soviet ethical citizenship. They laughed at something that was also personal. Official public values and personal values in many cases overlapped in laughter. Thus, even if agendas were different—the state authorities aimed at perfection of socialist society along certain communist ideals while individuals had an interest to live in a moral and just society that could yield comfort, respect, and rewarding social and individual life—laughter dissolved distinctions between public and private, the state and the citizen. Laughter was a light way of being together and being Soviet.

Ideals of ethical citizenship recirculated in *The Broom* pages in the 1970s and early 1980s was a product of authorities, *Broom* collaborators, and readers. Through laughter people introduced their own emotions, sentiments, and values that did not necessarily reflect official moral agendas, but received the aura of official-ness by being published in *The Broom*, the Communist Party journal. Furthermore, ethical citizenship was also shaped by various textual strategies, such as Aesopian language; artistic techniques, such as depictions of plump bodies of managers and bureaucrats; and nontextual means, such as silence about certain subjects, or celebrations with coffee and drinks that displaced some of official moral values and reinterpreted communist morality. Journalists, writers, and artists, some of them representing state authorities, rearticulated the Soviet ethical universe by adding alternative interpretations and silencing other formulations promoted by the state in many other spaces. Thus, to be an ethical citizen and to follow some officially prescribed moral values did not mean being a communist (or socialist), believing in the bright communist future, and supporting the Soviet state and its leadership. It was to live late-socialist epoch as one's own personal masterpiece.

Notes

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Goda Ferensienė, Šarūnas Jakštas, Kęstutis

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1. I understand citizenship not simply as rights, duties, and obligations guaranteed by the law, but as a process of self-making and being-made in everyday interactions and in relation to nation-states and transnational processes. In my analysis, citizenship is a cultural formation grounded in moral orders, power and authority relations, and belonging to the nation-state. On cultural citizenship see Rosaldo (1999).

2. These ideals should be understood in the Soviet cultural context. Individuals had to think critically, but explicit critique of the state was often unacceptable. Similarly, spirituality was cherished, but religious spirituality was disproved (see Honey on spirituality, in Chapter 5 of this volume).

3. I am not arguing that what was happening in Lithuania had an effect throughout the USSR.

4. I predominantly focus on the 1970s and 1980s, since most of my informants worked or contributed to *The Broom* during this time. Although most of my examples are from the 1970s and early 1980s issues of *The Broom,* I include some examples from the 1960s issues as well. Their rhetoric and style was consistent with the 1970s and early 1980s rhetoric and style.

5. XXII S"ezd KPSS, Moscow: Politizdat, 1962.

6. XXII S"ezd KPSS, 3: 317–18. See Field (2007) and Kalenda (1981).

7. For discussion see Kalenda (1981, 91).

8. See Hoffmann (2003, Chapter 2) for discussion of moral values and communist morality under Stalin. Hoffmann specifically focuses on communist morality among Party members.

9. Deborah Field (1998, 601) argued, "What changed during the Khrushchev period was not the content of communist morality but the greater importance ascribed to it." Jan Feldman argued that the interest in the nature and role of morality increased over time during the Soviet era. In the First Party Program of 1903, the word "morality" appeared only once; in the Second Party Program of 1919 the word did not appear at all; in the Third Program of 1961 the word appeared more than 20 times (Feldman 1989, 148).

10. See works by Bondarevskis (1981); Gaidys et al. (1979); and Lazauskas (1978, 1982).

11. On the artists' agenda see Bulota (1984).

12. There is one more category, literally, a recyclable paper worker (*makalatūrinis darbuotojas*), the meaning of which I was not able to find out. See *Šluota* 1963 (2) 4, 6–7.

13. According to the official publication records, in 1971 there were 120,082 copies published. High publication numbers persisted throughout the 1980s; in 1986 publication rates were still as high as 112,053. The numbers decreased in the early 1990s.

14. Specifically, I heard people quoting jokes about Kindziulis, a popular joke series in Soviet times, but less so in post-Soviet times.

15. Informants liked cartoons, short satirical commentaries, foreign humor, jokes, and anecdotes. Some readers claimed that they preferred certain cartoonists over the others. Satires and reports on various social ills were not so popular.

16. Ferdinandas Kauzonas interview with J. Gimberis. "Kaip mudviem su J. Gimberiu nepavyko" [How I and J. Gimberis failed]. *Respublika*, April 3, 2008, http://www.kamane.lt.

Last accessed March 20, 2009.

Actually, *The Broom*, albeit with short breaks, has been published in post-Soviet times. The journal format has been much smaller and the quality of publication is inferior to the quality of the journal in Soviet times. This illustrates, according to Šarūnas Jakštas, not only the state of the journal, but also the troubled life of post-socialist humor (per-sonal communication with Šarūnas Jakštas, July, 2009). *The Broom* was published online in 2012.

17. Ferdinandas Kauzonas interview with J. Gimberis. The decline of humor is also noted by some scholars in the former Soviet Union (Barker 1999; Yurchak 1997, 182) and in Eastern European countries (Verdery 1996, 96).

18. Ričardas Šileika interview with Kazys Kęstutis Šiaulytis, "Negalime būti tik praeiviai nereaguojantys į tai, ką mato" [We can't be just passerbys who do not react to what they see]. *Literatūra ir menas*, August 22, 2003. Similar attitudes about the decline of humor are expressed by other writers and artists who contributed to *The Broom* in Soviet times. See Jurga Petronytė's interview with Valdemaras Kalninis "Linksmajai dailei—podukros dalia" [Humor visual art is like a stepdaughter]. *Vakarų ekspresas*, March 31, 2006,http://www.ve.lt/?rub=1065924826&data2006-03-31&id=1143728862. Last accessed December 22, 2009.

19. From a speech during a meeting between the Party and the government and literature and art specialists, March 8, 1963. Cited in *1934–1964 Šluota. Karikatūros*. 1964.

20. On labor in socialism and post-socialism see Berdahl (1999), Dunn (2004), Ashwin (1999), Kideckel (2008).

21. Rimantas Baldišius cartoon. *Šluota*, no. 5 1985: 2.

22. Albertas Lukša "Atsargiai—privatininkas!" [Be careful—a private owner!]. *Šluota*, no. 1 1971: 5.

23. "Atsargiai—privatininkas!"

24. "… Pačių skęstančiųjų reikalas" [… responsibility of the drowning]. *Šluota*, no. 5 1980: 11.

25. *Šluota*, no. 1 1981: 8.

26. *Šluota*, no. 21 1971: 7.

27. *Šluota*, no. 19 1977: 2. Many short anecdotes in *The Broom* are cited without an author.

28. *Šluota*, no. 1 1981: 7.

29. *Šluota*, no. 1 1981: 2.

30. *Šluota*, no. 3 1970.

31. Vytautas Katilius, "Didelės smulkmenos" [Big small things]. *Šluota*, no. 1 1981: 2–3.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Šluotos kalendorius, 1976: 79.

35. *Šluota*, no. 1 1981: 1.

36. *Šluota*, no. 4 1980: 11.

37. *Šluota*, no. 3 1970: 7.

38. Šluotos kalendorius 1971: 19.

39. Juozas Bulota. "Visapusiška moteris" [Universal woman]. *Šluota*, no. 10 1977: 10.

40. Narrated by Liudmila Paškevičienė, written by Andrius Gelvaitis. "Pavargusiųjų

prieglauda" [Shelter for the weary]. *Šluota*, no. 15 1977: 5.

41. Ibid.

42. A cartoon by Andrius Cvirka. *Šluota*, no. 20 1977: 4.

43. A cartoon by Andrius Deltuva. *Šluota*, no. 18 1967: 10.

44. *Šluota*, no. 1 1966: 5.

45. *Šluota*, no. 5 1975: 2–3.

46. A. Zabielskas "Nelaimingiausias žmogus" (The most unhappy man). *Šluota*, no. 1 1966: 8.

47. *Šluota*, no. 9 1977: 4.

48. *Šluota*, no. 5 1975: 8–9.

49. *Šluota*, no. 5 1965: 14.

50. *Šluota*, no. 3 1970: 13.

51. *Šluota*, no. 4 1980: 15.

52. During my research in post-Soviet Lithuania in the mid 2000s, villagers on several occasions remarked that now there is nowhere to turn to with their problems. Even if they did not write complaint letters themselves earlier, many knew people who did. In W. Becker's film "Goodbye, Lenin!" Alex's mother writes similar letters of complaint, the only publicly meaningful activity that she can undertake while being sick.

53. A. Portačenko. "Ir paskelbti prašom …" [We ask you to announce]. *Šluota*, no. 19 1977: 12.

54. For example in the 1977 issue of *The Broom*, it is reported that D. Milutis, the director of one of Telšiai factories lost his job because of his disrespect and ignorance of people and public organizations. *Šluota*, no. 20 1977: 15.

55. A. Šaulys. "Kietas riešutėlis" [Tough cookie]. *Šluota*, no. 9 1977: 3.

56. *Šluota*, no. 15. 1977.

57. A. Vambaris and A. Liepkus. "Šalčininkų galulaukėse." *Šluota*, no. 10 1977: 6–7.

58. In the 1980s, especially during the Gorbachev era, the journal became increasingly liberal, the space for open discussion expanded, and nobody was afraid of any kind of repressions.

59. Goda Ferensienė worked in the literary division of *The Broom* and left the journal in the 1960s. Laima Zurbienė was hired in the 1970s and like others cited in this article worked in *The Broom* until the 1990s.

60. On *Krokodil* and especially Boris Efimov, see Norris (2009).

61. According to Kęstutis Šiaulytis, only the Estonian *Pikker* followed Western trends and was more modern than Lithuanian *Broom*. But *The Broom* was still the best humor journal in the USSR, Šiaulytis related, because it made humor available to everyone. *Pikker* published humor that was very intellectual and elitist (personal communication with Šiaulytis, summer, 2011).

62. The note about taking a taxi to Vilnius most likely refers to the 1960s, since, according to Kęstutis Šiaulytis, because of editorial board changes in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, such gatherings were discontinued even if close relationships between some people prevailed.

63. I am borrowing the notion of seriousness from Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) who spoke about the official state-sponsored culture of seriousness.

64. *Šluota*, no. 5 1965: 14.

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Chapter 5
Pluralizing Practices in Late-Socialist Moscow: Russian Alternative Practitioners Reclaim and Redefine Individualism

Larisa Honey

The fall of the Soviet Union helped fuel the rapid growth of alternative health organizations that celebrated individualism and self-exploration. At first glance this development seemed to reflect the new processes of neo-liberal democratization in Russia. Exploring this avenue of social change through ethnographic fieldwork and life-story interviews revealed a far more complex reality, however. While conducting fieldwork in Moscow among practitioners of alternative spiritual health disciplines, I learned that many devotees had begun practicing in the 1970s through officially sanctioned Soviet health classes, often starting with yoga classes in state Houses of Culture. Rather than a spiritual wasteland, their stories reveal a space permeated with practices promoting individualism and responsibility and indicate that Soviet science was engaged in innovative approaches to health and self-development. Life histories of alternative practitioners point to an emerging pluralism of activities and beliefs that pre-date the political and economic changes instituted under *perestroika*.

Weaving through individual stories and published accounts from the late Soviet period, this chapter explores the practices of women involved with alternative spiritual health. My findings are based on archival research, participant observation, and a collection of 50 interviews conducted over a period of 17 months in post-Soviet Moscow. I focus here on the life stories of contemporary practitioners who began their spiritual health journeys during the Brezhnev era. Highly educated, the women highlighted here were successfully employed within the state system and were not members of the dissident community. Sveta, an engineer for the first half of her adult life, is now the co-director of an alternative spiritual health organization with members throughout Russia, Europe, and the United States. Valentina, a professor of English as a Second Language, has become a specialist in the field of alternative teaching methods and teaches self-assertiveness training, particularly to young women. She continues to learn new methods of spiritual health through the numerous trainings offered in contemporary Moscow. Zoya, formerly a music teacher at a state school, now works at an alternative school and participates in a wide range of spiritual health trainings. Her primary base is currently Sveta's organization, which has come to replace the collective atmosphere she misses from Soviet times.

While many of their health activities were separate from the state, these women were involved with state programs and supported certain Soviet ideologies and values. Critical of the state's implementation of these values, they worked through state avenues to negotiate their own interpretations and expressions. In their narrative accounts we see that even before structural changes were set in place, people were involved with spiritual and other activities that promoted notions of individualism more generally associated with Western forms of neo-liberal society. Many of the activities that flourish in the current alternative health movement in Russia were already taking place during Soviet times, including occult study groups and large self-organized health clubs, and there was widespread interest in yoga and alternative teaching

and psychological methods.

Notions such as self-improvement, personal responsibility, and freewill were being promoted not only by individual searchers, but also by scientists and doctors in the official sphere. Some scholars argue, in fact, that such concepts were an integral part of the Soviet system and the cultivation of communist consciousness (Kharkhordin 1999; Yurchak 2006). While Kharkhordin interprets the Soviet state's promotion of such activities as aimed ultimately at the submission of the individual will to the will of the collective, my own interpretation fits closer with Yurchak, who notes that an unintended consequence of such state promotion was the provision of space for creative exploration.

Building on Alexei Yurchak's (2006) work, I argue that the alternative health sphere is an example of a de-territorializing milieu, where Soviet citizens enjoyed outlets for creative pursuits and were encouraged to work toward self-cultivation and independent thinking. Interaction between the state and creative people nourished the alternative movement as practitioners developing their particular understandings of individualism and collectivism. Finding support in collective spaces while working toward self-improvement, practitioners did not fully reject or accept Soviet ideals; instead, they formed unique interpretations that are visible today and often mistakenly taken as signs of neo-liberal Westernization. The activities of these women indicate a lively, if limited, creative space within the Soviet sphere, and their stories help bring to life traditional structural accounts of Soviet society and offer insights into the role of average citizens in the decline of the Soviet system.

Structural Accounts of Soviet Health

Top-down accounts address the structural restraints of the Soviet system and provide a framework for ethnographic studies that can illuminate processes taking place at the ground level. Many structural approaches emphasize the absence of institutions of democracy building in post-Soviet Russia and focus instead on the "legacies" of Soviet society that prevented Russia from entering the modern world (e.g., Cockerham 2002; Harloe 1996; Pipes 1996; Millar and Wolchik 1997, Rose 1995, 2000; Saivetz 1996). According to Michael Harloe (1996, 5), the focus within the academic community on legacies initially was a response to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank perspective that post-Soviet Russia was a "blank slate," simply in need of capitalist institutions. Underlying the legacy approach is an assumption of the negative social effects of socialist institutions and ideologies. Russian and Soviet "legacies" are viewed as the cause of enduring problems in post-Soviet society, such as increases in crime (Szelenyi 1996), poverty (Shelley 1996, 136), and the declining health of the population (Rose 1995, 2000; Cockerham 2000, 2002; McKeehan 2000; Siegrist 2000). Due to the continued influence of Russian and Soviet legacies, it is argued, the Russian people do not have the required attitudes and the Russian state does not have the required institutions to build a prosperous and pluralistic democracy.

Political scientist Richard Rose develops this idea more fully in relation to Russian health. Rose characterizes the Soviet health care system as having a collectivist orientation and, as a result, patients maintained a passive relationship with the system and did not invest individual responsibility in health. He maintains that the health crisis in post-Soviet Russia has been

particularly severe because Soviet society did not promote social cohesion between the state and citizens. Ordinary Russians, according to Rose, isolated themselves from the state and relied on face-to-face contacts. The resulting social formation was an "hour-glass society," where citizens cut links with the state in order to protect themselves from the repressive totalitarian regime. While citizens depended on the state for social support, the lack of reciprocal contact meant that supply and demand were often left unmatched. He argues that such "'anti-modern' organizational pathologies created a stressful society with negative effects on human capital" (Rose 2000, 1424).

Cockerham, Snead, and DeWaal (2002, 52) take this argument a step further, explicitly connecting Soviet collectivist attitudes with poor health outcomes, noting, "The persistence of a 'Homo Soveticus' personality type in Russian society today, described as a 'collectivist' who rejects individual responsibility, supports the notion of a socialist heritage undermining the enactment of positive health lifestyles for many people." Integral to this argument is the totalizing influence of top-down directives from the state. Rather than interpreting and negotiating state doctrine, Soviet citizens are portrayed as receivers of a doctrine that "taught people that their individual values were of minor importance and there was little reason to pay much attention to their health. If they got sick, the government would take care of them" (Cockerham, Snead, and DeWaal 2002, 46). The internalization of the value of the state over their own self worth is viewed as particularly strong for those Russians who continue to value the socialist system today (Cockerham, Snead, and DeWaal 2002, 51–52). This argument rests on several key assumptions, including: (1) Distrust in the state results in disengagement from the state; (2) Distrust of the state equals the dismissal of state values; and (3) Collectivist attitudes lead to passive citizens who are unable to take responsibility for their own lives.

At the ethnographic level we see a more complex picture of events. The life stories of contemporary alternative health practitioners indicate that within this hour-glass society some Soviet citizens indeed were able to carve out a space for self-exploration and initiative and that this occurred in dialogue with the state. Within this dialogue, citizens developed practices and beliefs that blend traditions of Russian mysticism, Soviet social values, and pragmatic attitudes, creating a unique strain of individualism tempered by a concern for collective well-being.

Rather than finding such social values and collectivist sentiments to be alienating or signs of a passive populace, my work supports Melissa Caldwell's (2004) argument that the behaviors and strategies found within a system of social welfare can foster social cohesion, flexibility, and resilience. Where she found social cohesion and active individualist agency in the tactics and social lives in post-Soviet Moscow soup kitchens, I found a strong sense of community and a reverence for "the collective" within Soviet alternative circles, where individual achievement, self-development, and physical health were equally admired. While members of the post-Soviet alternative sphere continue to create this sense of a collective community through their participation in "trainings" and membership in spiritual health groups, their interests in individual development, physical health, and spirituality are rooted in the Soviet era.

Dialectical Constructions of Individualism and Collectivism

Within the Soviet period, unique processes and interactions developed contextually specific understandings of and approaches to such notions as "individualism" and "collectivism" that do not translate directly into the same culturally constructed understandings of such notions in the West. It is those Soviet constructions that are now in dialogue with the West. I suggest that the practices and beliefs of the Russian alternative sphere reflect a unique Russian interpretation of individualism that incorporates notions of the collective. Rather than standing alone, the support and social bonds created within the collective provide the individual with the confidence to pursue self-development and creativ-ity. In the case of the three women featured here, this collective support and individual development figured centrally in their abilities to later forge new career paths during the economically unstable years of *perestroika*.

My argument builds on Kharkhordin's work on Soviet programs of self-training and "work on oneself" (1999), but I take the discussion in a different direction, focusing on the ways alternative health practitioners re-interpreted this work in ways unintended by the state. Kharkhordin also sees the development within Soviet society of a particular understanding of individualism and collectivism. In his work he explains how "work on the self" was an integral part of the Soviet educational system and ideology, creating a particular focus on the individual that encouraged the development of the "New Soviet Man." He argues that the focus on the individual here was ultimately aimed at the collapse of individual desires into those of state collective ideals. Soviet citizens, he argues, were called on to develop their wills in order to learn how to control their own desires. Kharkhordin focuses his work on the processes of self-critique and the public shaming that took place during critiques of individuals within the collective. Here the individual and collective take on the ominous roles of enforcers of Soviet morality. Cases where self-critiques led to expressions of individuality not sponsored by the state are interpreted as unintended consequences that resulted in duplicitous behavior by people forced to hide their individualism from the collective and the state.

I contend that the individualism expressed so fervently within contemporary alternative spiritual health circles in Moscow is indeed largely a Soviet cultural construction, reflecting an ongoing dialogue with culturally constructed understandings that continues into the present. But unlike Kharkhordin's duplicitous rebels, who publicly abided by the state's practices but privately disagreed with or disregarded them, or the self-criticizers whose sense of the collective was formed by its practices of conforming critique, the women I worked with found comfort and support in their collective spaces and, working earnestly toward self-improvement, developed strong notions of individual worth, importance, and responsibility. Their position vis-à-vis the state was neither oppositional nor conforming. While alternative practitioners were subject to the same social engineering projects as all citizens, their alternative practices opened up an avenue for dialogue with the state that encouraged independent assessments and creative responses. This creative sphere allowed the opportunity for practitioners to utilize the philosophy of "work on the self" as a path toward self-understanding. Within this sphere, the impetus toward self-critique became funneled toward self-realization and social critique.

Sveta's experience is a vivid example of this process. She was not a dissident. She did not

participate in protests and did not work against the system. At the same time, she did not actively support the Soviet system. She did not vote in official meetings—"why vote when there's only one choice?" she asked, and she did not accept what she called "all of the falseness and lies." Rather than protest, she "tried to see the good in things as they were, and it was easy to find the good. One of the good things was the sense of unity—if only it hadn't been based on lies and falsehoods." But in her small groups of friends, she notes, the unity was real and not false. And in these groups she incorporated some of the practices she learned during the official meetings organized at work, including self-criticism. She recalled how she initiated an activity where each participant would share one thing they did during the previous week that they were not satisfied or happy with. This was done as an avenue of self-exploration and learning rather than judgment and continues to be an element of her spiritual development repertoire today. Women like Sveta, who entered the alternative health sphere during the Soviet period, were engaged in a dialogue of multiple prac-tices and values. While rejecting the domination and dogmatism of Soviet ideology, these women engaged with—and selectively incorporated—Russian, Soviet, and global traditions and values into their lives, reinterpreting them for their own self-development.

Ever working to elevate and cultivate themselves and the world around them, members of the Russian alternative sphere, in fact, reflect the revolutionary spirit of the avant-garde, those members of the revolution whose creativity, intellect, and ethics would lead the way. Drawing on Yurchak (2006), I propose that they are in a sense the spiritual avant-garde of the new era. In the Soviet context, according to Yurchak, emphasis was placed on the need for revolutionary education. The "liberation of culture and consciousness in communism" could only come about through the education and cultivation of the population (Yurchak 2006, 12). We find several of the principal characteristics of the alternative sphere encompassed in the seemingly paradoxical ideology that developed during the Soviet period. As the avant-garde became institutionalized, Yurchak explains, "The Soviet citizen was called upon to submit completely to party leadership, to cultivate a collectivist ethic, and repress individualism, while at the same time becoming an enlightened and independent-minded individual who pursues knowledge and is inquisitive and creative" (Yurchak 2006, 11). While the goals appear paradoxical and mutually exclusive, Yurchak argues that the late Soviet state allowed for and actually participated in the development of new spaces for expression, what he calls a de-territorializing milieu. Within this milieu citizens could enjoy multiple outlets for creative pursuits—often promoted and supported by the state. In other words, the state was involved in a dialectical process that encouraged enlightenment and independent-mindedness, contributing, according to Yurchak, to the ultimate demise of the state. Having been granted spaces for development and encouraged to seek optimal development, people with creative and strong personalities were brought together in spaces where their creativity and strivings took them ultimately to unforeseen realms. It is here, in this dialectical interaction between the state and creative people that we see the engines of *perestroika* starting to emerge. I argue that it is here, in these ambiguous spaces Yurchak calls de-territorializing milieus, that the nascent alternative movement in Russia was nourished and began to flourish, and where its members developed their own particular understandings of such concepts as individualism and collectivism, one that closely intertwines notions of individual rights and social rights. With the collapse of the

Soviet state, members of the alternative spiritual health community continued their avant-garde role as spiritual and ethical teachers. I submit that the continued focus on education and development of the spiritually elevated individual reflects a certain Soviet individualism now interacting with a more globalized Russian space. In other words, not all signs of individualism and personal responsibility are symbolic of neo-liberal Westernization, but rather stem directly from processes put in motion during the late Soviet era.

Women's nontraditional practices helped them break the bonds of the totalizing discourses of Soviet ideology. While Foucault notes that "the power of the state to produce an increasingly totalizing web of control is intertwined with and dependent on its ability to produce an increasing specification of individuality," the alternative methods helped practitioners attain a critical understanding of this process and of themselves (Foucault 1984, 22). Working toward conscious awareness, their practices served as a form of democratic education much like that promoted by John Dewey (1918), who envisioned democracy as an ongoing pursuit of an "ideal of the future," an ever-evolving organic entity that grew out of the participation of thinking individuals with a well-developed sense of personal responsibility, initiative, and concern for the social (Dewey 1918, 202). Dewey valued in the ideal of democracy and the opportunity it could provide for individual development and self-expression, seeing in it a space where each individual had "a chance to which no possible limits can be put, a chance which is truly infinite, the chance to become a person" (Dewey 1918, 201).

Soviet women's alternative health practices aimed to overcome habitual influences and develop autonomous, socially responsible citizens who could take control over their own lives. In many ways their lives epitomized Deweyan democratic pluralism in action. Not passive objects of biopolitical power, these women took up political and social discourses and incorporated them into their lives in ways that empowered them as agents of their own destiny. Many of those who started their alternative journey during the Brezhnev era continue their practices in the post-Soviet era, bringing with them the ongoing struggle for self-development. Uniting their interests in collective values and independent thought, they feel an alienation from dogmas of any kind. The critical stance they developed during late socialism leads them to question the Orthodox tradition of redemption through suffering as well as the Soviet virtue of deprivation and self-sacrifice. Instead, countering prevailing stereotypes, they create systems of belief and practice that acknowledge lessons to be learned from suffering and crisis but focus on the joy that can be found in life on earth today. The body and physical health are the building blocks for attaining these goals. Similarly critical of autocratic and oppressive practices of the State—both Soviet and post-Soviet—they at once embrace freedoms of expression and liberty as well as the social rights promoted by the Soviet Union, all the while maintaining deep concerns about the fragility of both.

Soviet Alternative Spiritual Health Practices

Ethnographic research reveals that people found ways to carve out portions of Soviet space to create an environment for spiritual and personal experimentation, and they created for themselves an active and nurturing alternative spiritual health movement that, even in Soviet

times, resembled aspects of the alternative sphere in the West. Several key factors worked in conjunction to create this space where alternative spiritual health practices could be explored and even encouraged during the Soviet period.

One of the most important points in this regard is the simple fact that the Soviet period was not an information vacuum. While the thousands of books currently available on the whole spectrum of alternative ideas and practices were not available, books, newspaper articles, and journals were published on such themes. While many official articles on alternative themes were often critical, they did offer information about alternative viewpoints. Those interested could glean practical tips and ideas even from the most critical of the articles that I found. At the same time, many topics that would be considered alternative—and thus marginalized or rejected within the scientific community in the West—were openly researched and discussed in Soviet Russia. A review of this literature points to three further important factors in the development of an alternative health movement, all of which are interrelated: *the importance of health in So-viet ideology; Soviet research into "hidden human reserves;" and the relationship with India.*

Health and Soviet Ideology

Many women involved with alternative health practices began their spiritual paths within the physical health sphere. While questions of spirituality were discouraged and certain activities could lead to negative repercussions in the workplace or even persecution at certain points in Soviet history, the state's focus on health allowed many spiritual ideas to develop under the banner of healthy living. Health was an important part of Soviet ideology (see Rivkin-Fish 1999; Bernstein 1998; Barr 1996; Waters 1991). A healthy population made for a healthy and productive workforce, and much socialist realist propaganda artwork is devoted to posters promoting good hygiene and healthy living (Bernstein 1998; Waters 1991). The years of war leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 left the country in a state of economic turmoil and in a serious health crisis. In 1918 the People's Commissariat of Public Health (*Narkomzdrav*) was established to combat this (Bernstein 1998, 191). Lenin viewed this health crisis as a political emergency, and early on he emphasized the importance of health in the development of socialist society, declaring in 1919 at the Seventh Congress of Soviets: "Either the louse defeats socialism or socialism defeats the louse" (Barr 1996, 307). The Narkomzdrav began a campaign of "sanitary enlightenment" to educate the population about health and hygiene, as it was believed that politically "conscious" socialists must also be health "conscious;" all responsible citizens must take care of their health (Bernstein 1998, 192).

This focus on health continued into the late Soviet era. Following a tour of Soviet health facilities in the early 1960s, American physician Milton Roemer made the following observations:

> Health education is in evidence everywhere. The hospitals and polyclinics are lined with posters, and even outside on the hospital grounds there are billboards with health messages. Some of these are more matters of political propaganda about Soviet health achievements than hygienic education, like the bar-chart indicating that the ratio of doctors to population in the USSR was better than in the USA or any other country. In the hospitals, however, the graphic presentations are de-voted to child health, control of respiratory infection, insect control, nutrition and so on. Much use is made also of simple leaflets. In one hospital we

visited there was an elaborate system of audio-visual health education, requiring only the pressing of buttons on the wall. Most remarkable perhaps is the requirement that every Soviet physician in a polyclinic should spend a half-hour daily in specific health educational activities with a group or a family. Health promotion is emphasized through a widespread program of physical culture. (Roemer 1962, 385–86)

Similar findings were observed by visiting medical professionals during the Brezhnev era. While critical of certain aspects of the Soviet health system, American nurse Thelma Ingles was impressed with the system of health education and promotion that she found in the Soviet Union, noting that group meetings, high schools, camps, radio, and television were all used to promote health among Soviet citizens (Ingles 1970). The continued popularity of health-promotion posters was noted in a 1980 review of the Soviet health system by two British medical doctors (Ryan 1980). Soviet newspapers were another important source of health promotion and the value of physical activity. A 1968 edition of *Vecherniaia Moskva,* for example, advertises "Trains of Health," cross-country ski trips arranged by the Borough of Travel and Excursions of the Moscow Council to promote healthy social activities and exercise ("Poezda Zdorov'ia" 1968). A 1971 article in *Pravda* extols the virtues of exercise and editorializes about the need to maintain the stadiums so that more people become involved in physical activities (Frolov 1971).

Largely ignored by Western health advisors, a Soviet science of healthy lifestyles developed during the Brezhnev era and became institutionalized as an academic field in 1980. Initially conceptualized as a science of health for the "practically healthy," prevention and health promotion were key aspects of the research conducted at the Kiev Scientific-Research Institute of Medical Problems of Physical Culture of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine between 1968 and 1986 (Apanasenko 2000, 11). Coined "Valeology" (the science of health) in 1980 by Israel Brekhman, this science placed the healthy individual at the center of attention and focused on health maintenance and disease prevention. In Kiev, Valeology was closely tied with sports medicine, while Brekhman's center in Vladivostok is known for its work on medicinal products aimed at healthy individuals (Apanasenko 2000).

Hidden Human Reserves

In conjunction with this focus on health and healthy lifestyles, the Soviet Union was a source of innovative methodologies in the realm of health, art, and pedagogy. Many methods that today would be considered alternative in the West were incorporated into the official health sphere. Some of the same ideas ascribed to alternative health groups in Russia today can be found in books and articles in the mainstream Soviet press. These articles and books reveal that Soviet scientists were researching hidden potentials, or "human reserves," and healthy lifestyles and were encouraging the exploration of supernatural phenomena, traits common to the activities and beliefs of contemporary alternative practitioners worldwide. While several of these phenomena could be interpreted as methods for gaining self-control in order to better serve the state, within the context of alternative practitioners they became methods for self transformation and empowerment.

Influences from India

Indian spiritual beliefs play a significant role in the alternative sphere in Russia and throughout the world. While access to Indian spiritual literature may have significantly declined during the early Soviet period, interest was renewed and literature again became more readily available with the strengthening of ties between the two governments in later years. In 1971 India and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year treaty of friendship, which aimed at economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. Increased interest in all things Indian allowed for greater access to Indian practices, particularly under the guise of health promotion.[1] Given the interest within the Soviet scientific community in "hidden potentials," it is not surprising that such practices as yoga and meditation were readily incorporated into Soviet health practices. Those interested in issues beyond the physical sphere could further their understanding with "cultural" articles in the press or underground *samizdat* articles passed among friends.

Hatha Yoga: An Entrance to Alternative Soviet Space

The intersection of health promotion, "human reserves" research, and India often began with Hatha yoga, which had already reached the status of a fad in the Soviet Union by 1973 (Shabad 1973). In addition to the increased cooperation between the Indian and Soviet governments, the rise in popularity of yoga has been traced to three primary sources: (1) the influence of Dhirendra Brahma-chari, known as the "Indian Rasputin," who was invited in the 1960s to teach yoga to Soviet cosmonauts; (2) the 1970 Soviet documentary film *Indian Yogis: Who Are They?* and (3) the influence of the Society of Krishna Consciousness, whose leader visited the Soviet Union for four days in 1971. In 1979 Soviet authorities permitted the Krishna Consciousness publishing house to participate in the Moscow International Book Fair, where they offered books on India's Vedic traditions and other religious themes in addition to yoga and vegetarianism (Shabad 1982). By 1982 the popularity of yoga was publicly acknowledged by the Soviet newspaper *Sotsiolisticheskaia industriia*, which, in the wake of growing concern over the mounting influence of the Krishna movement, noted, "It has become fashionable in the Soviet Union to fast for health reasons and to follow all sorts of diets, and yoga advocates vegetarianism" (Shabad 1982). The influence of yoga was further evidenced in 1984 when Indian astronaut Rakesh Sharma was invited to conduct yoga experiments while participating in a Soviet space mission ("First Space Test" 1984). Officially against yoga, the Soviet state clearly had an ambivalent relationship with the practice, and individuals were able to learn about it through both state and underground means.

The intersection of health, India, and "human reserves" is illustrated in the life story of Sveta, the co-director of Ascension, a contemporary alternative health organization I worked with in Moscow. She is a model of the Soviet alternative spiritual health searcher, and her story provides a quintessential account of an alternative health journey that started in the time of Brezhnev. She was a leading member of Healthy Family, a branch of Cosmos, one of the largest spiritual-health movements in Russia in the 1980s, and she continues to play a leading role in the contemporary alternative scene, with activities that take her throughout Russia and beyond. The starting point of Sveta's journey, however, begins earlier, with health problems and a failing marriage. But even at this early juncture we see the convergence of spirituality and physical health as well as the first indications of the important role India and Indian

thought would come to play:

In 1976–1977 I studied Hatha yoga for the first time. That was before Healthy Family, it was during my first marriage. That was a very difficult marriage. And I had continuous headaches. That was in addition to gynecological problems. … At that time the first groups of Hatha yoga appeared in the Soviet Union and I ended up in one of them. I studied for two years and the headaches completely disappeared. And I couldn't feel any of the gynecological problems, and so I stopped doing it. Because everything was good, so why keep working on it? But everything returned—in 1984 before my divorce—it all happened around the same time. But when I was studying Hatha yoga of course I also read literature about it because I was interested in various aspects of it. At that time I read the *Bhagavad Gita* for the first time.

Although this initial introduction to alternative methods and Indian spirituality did not lead immediately to active involvement with a larger social movement for Sveta, we see that already in the 1970s, practices traditionally associated with the alternative sphere were developing in Russia. The India connection was a key aspect of this development. One result of the cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and India was the discussion of Indian philosophies in the mainstream Soviet press. One example is a 1980 article in *Izvestiia* titled "Conversations on health: help yourself with happiness" (Dembo 1980). Written by a Ukrainian doctor, the article discusses yoga, the importance of positive thinking, and the patient's own responsibility toward his or her health, all of which are key elements of the contemporary alternative sphere. In fact, Sveta's own post-Soviet book is called *How to Live in Happiness*, and positive thinking and personal responsibility are central themes. But here in the *Izvestiia* article we find a Soviet doctor who, looking to India for inspiration, discusses several new methods for alleviating stress and regaining health and places a strong emphasis on the importance of individual attitude and will:

When a patient comes in and complains about pain in the heart, shortness of breath, or nightmare-filled sleepless nights, first of all you need to attend to the difficult situation. A doctor's arsenal will have many methods for healing neuroses. There is medication, well-known and very new, hypnosis, auto-training, the gymnastics of yogis, and self-hypnosis. But no form of healing can replace the will of the patient and his belief that he will be healed. (Dembo 1980, 3)

While technically Dembo does not use the term "yoga," he clearly intends this. He also offers a positive assessment of it and other methods that today would be considered "alternative." Furthermore, he highlights the important role of the self, the individual will in the healing process. His promotion of individ-ual development runs counter to Western accounts of Soviet medicine as passive and focusing more on illness than healthy living. Yoga is again discussed in connection with the will and self-control in an article from 1984 about the latest research endeavors of the Pavlov Institute of Physiology. This article also points to several key characteristics of the Russian alternative movement: positive thoughts, the power of the self, and holism, all of which were encouraged by Pavlov over a century ago and continued to be investigated by Soviet scientists.[2] The Indian yogis' abilities to master mind and body are offered as support for Soviet science and ideology. According to the article, Pavlov had stated, "It is the duty of the physiologist not only to teach people how to correctly, that is, usefully and pleasantly, work, rest and eat, etc. But also how to correctly think, feel and desire . . ." (Manucharova and Nevel'skii 1984, 3). And the accomplishment of such feats requires the development of self-control, not just of the will and thoughts, but also control over the actual physical organism—the heartbeat, blood pressure, and even the electrical activity of the brain. According to the article, the possibility of such control is evidenced by the practice of Indian yogis.

For many of the women I worked with in the alternative sphere, Hatha yoga was the first step into the spiritual world. Although the focus in state sanctioned groups was purely on the physical health aspects of the exercises, many became interested in the philosophy behind them and began exploring it more deeply. Several later made pilgrimages to India once restrictions were lifted after 1991. Valentina, a professor in her fifties, was led to yoga by her husband, who began practicing in the 1970s. I met Valentina at a course on NLP (Neuro-Linguistic

Programming). At these meetings she often exchanged Orthodox prayers with the other participants. In the late 1970s, however, Valentina was not baptized and had only started to become involved with alternative spiritual health activities. Here she discusses a period shortly before graduate school:

My husband studied in courses for clairvoyants. It was around 1984 or 1985. They were private secret courses. Simply it was an acquaintance of an acquaintance—she discovered it in herself and she started to teach it. And before that I studied yoga with my husband. He studied yoga before we got married, and then when I moved here and we got married, he showed me some of the yoga exercises and we started regularly doing yoga. He had gone to a class in some sort of house of culture. There was a circle or society. It was out in the open. That is, yoga began to spread under the guise of physical education. That is, there are special exercises, gymnastics, and gymnastics of yoga. It was purely physical yoga, just Hatha yoga, but still there were already books that were typed out and not just Hatha yoga, but also Raja and already some sort of interest in such things already existed in my husband's family. And then he went to the clairvoyance classes.

We see here an example of the dialectical relationship between alternative practitioners and the state. Houses of culture were state-run spaces offering opportunities for individuals to develop themselves and to meet others. It was through her husband's interaction with such a place that Valentina became familiar with the practice of yoga and where her interest in healing and the hidden powers of the body began. This was to develop much more strongly with her later involvement in a variety of alternative teaching methods, particularly suggestopedia, a method founded by Bulgarian psychologist Georgii Lozanov in the 1960s and introduced to American and Canadian foreign language departments in 1971 (Bancroft 1978).

If Hatha yoga was often the entrée into alternative health practices, such practices, in turn, led to a more spiritual exploration of Indian philosophy. Here Sveta continues her discussion of the early years of her involvement with occult circles and the Healthy Family group. She explains the appeal of Indian philosophy and some of the important lessons she struggles with to this day:

In 1977 I read the *Bhagavad Gita* for the first time and Hatha yoga and somehow for many years it stayed with me because I felt that here there was a lot of food for the soul and the intellect, which I don't find in the Bible. For the soul there is something, but there's practically nothing for the intellect. But that is something unitary—[*edinyi*]—for me—emotions, feelings, principles, and intellect. This sense is very strong in the *Bhagavad Gita* and in Indian thought more generally just like they have much more for the mind, and no less love for the soul, and much deeper. So India already got into my soul. And in 1984 with the Healthy Family, the first spiritual book I read was *Agni Yoga*, by the Rerikhs. And I read it like a song, like something that long has been inside of me. As if everything is obvious, of course it's like that, of course it's mine, no question. And then almost immediately after that I read, already now at a much higher level, the books of Krishnamurti. That is a remarkable teacher of course who said that all those teachers and gurus are all like mold, that is, this is absolutely the son of Shiva, and I consider myself a daughter of Shiva. That is a teacher that destroys all authorities, that destroys all fossilized principles, which is very important now because we're on the threshold of a completely different life, new thinking. Well, that was all mine, no question, although even today there are a few of Krishnamurti's ideas that, well I understand them with my mind, but I haven't matured enough for them.

I know that it's necessary to become unattached—this is very strong in Hinduism, especially strong with Krishnamurti, although his work is not completely Hindu, but this is what all of our illnesses teach us—don't become attached—first of all to your stereotypes—stereotypes of what we should be like. I want to become thin. But I'm not able to. I eternally weigh more than I want to weigh. Sometimes I'm able to quickly lose weight but then I gain it all back. It doesn't work. So why am I attached to such a stereotype? I mean, if it doesn't bother me a lot? Also, don't become attached to people close to you. This is really difficult. It's the most difficult task that God has given us because of course all people are attached to their loved ones, their children, etc, even to our pets. But as for attachments to things, to material I don't have a problem.

In this discussion we see the back and forth between the spiritual and the physical, as Sveta weaves between discussions of the philosophy and depth of Indian spiritual thought and the

practical application of such thoughts to her physical shape and relationships with those she loves, who she feels attached to despite the Hindu philosophy of disattachment. We see here the intellectual appeal that Indian philosophy offered her, as well as the anti-authoritarian and anti-materialist views that drew her closer to such thought. The *Bhagavad Gita,* Shiva, and yoga are all direct Hindu influences, but Sveta also was strongly influenced by the Rerikhs and their work *Agni Yoga* as well as Krishnamurti, who was groomed from childhood as a Theosophical prophet. These particular influences are no coincidence. In fact, a 1984 *Izvestiia* article about a cultural exchange between India and the USSR called Nikolai Rerikh "a spiritual bridge between our country and India" and notes that Rerikh referred to India as the "natural sister of *Rus'*" (Kuznetzov 1984, 5).

As with her first experiences with Hatha yoga, Sveta's second voyage into the world of alternative spiritual health was also triggered by physical illness. This time she moved from official state classes in Hatha yoga to an underground health movement, where she began exploring psychology and the powers of the mind, deepened her studies of Indian spirituality, and delved into Orthodox Christianity. Her whole family was under duress and in need of healing. The official channels were offering little help, so she began a search for alternative ways to heal her family.

Towards the end of 1983 my whole family except me was completely sick. My son had severe psychiatric problems and it was understood that they were incurable. These problems were ensured by the relatives of my husband, along the male line. We aren't taught—in schools or college—what are called the signs of psychiatric illness. And when I got married at a young age I of course didn't notice anything. We were in love, but it was all very difficult. It became clear later and doctors told me that along the male line, that is, his father and my son had signs. So towards the end of 1983 my son had psychiatric problems, my second husband was depressed because his first wife wasn't allowing him to see his daughter. . . . And my daughter was diagnosed with a chronic illness. She had gastritis. She was then eight years old. And the worst was she had an inflamed kidney. It was a serious illness, and she spent time in the hospital several times and that would help a little bit, but it's an illness that doesn't go away, and doctors, that is, official medicine, confirmed that this diagnosis is never lifted. A person has it forever.

By nature optimistic, Sveta was not deterred by the negative prognosis offered by official medicine. She began searching for help, and during this search she came upon Healthy Family, a movement that to this day continues to play an instrumental role in her life and worldview. While the movement no longer exists as such, many of the leaders are still active in the alternative health sphere in Moscow, and many of those who no longer work together on a regular basis, still gather together for the yearly summer spiritual health retreat they started during the early 1980s.

But I was always an active person, and today I'm the same and have never believed in the complete victory of any type of evil. I know that there's always something you can do. We just know very little and official medicine knows very little in order to truly help. But we had already tried lots of hospitals and medication with my daughter and also with my son, and I saw that they didn't help or if they did help it was very temporary. Then I began to search for nontraditional methods. And my friend at the time also was looking for nontraditional methods of treatment, and together we came across this remarkable club called Healthy Family that was in Moscow. These people united in order to lead healthier life-styles than was accepted as the norm in our society. It was nontraditional in that every Sunday hundreds of people gathered with their children, starting with newborns, and pregnant women participated in the movement. First we met on the outskirts of Moscow, by the ponds, but then we moved to Gorky Park in the center of Moscow, which strangely enough is right nearby where our group gathers today. We jogged and did various exercises and swam all year round. That is, we swam in water in the middle of ice. They even threw newborns into the ice water. And that movement I think was extremely important in general for Russia. It was primarily in Moscow and sev-eral thousand people participated. Later they broke up into smaller groups, and our group had around 100–200 people at various different times.

Many of the activities of the Healthy Family club focused on physical health, on jogging, eating nutritious food, staying active. But even early on there was a spiritual aspect to their practices. Meditation and the connection between a healthy body and healthy spirit were actively pursued. Water birthing in particular is highly revered in the Russian alternative community as a more spiritual and loving way of giving birth, and the children who are born this way are widely considered to be more spiritually developed. Sveta continued:

And children who were, so to speak, christened in ice water right after they were born, grew up very healthy. Along with this we had a movement called conscious parenting, where birthing took place in water. Igor Borisovich Charkovsky, who is known in America, was the founder of that movement, and now people participate in it throughout the world. Children are born completely different. And they grow up completely differently. They are open, happy, they're friendly towards nature and they're much healthier. And the most important of course was the cold water, which created a micro-stress for your organism, which then called up all the protective strengths of the organism in the fight against illness. This is the method of Porfiry Ivanov. He was the main teacher, but unfortunately by that time he had already left the earthly plane, but in his name our teachers taught us to be friends with cold water and of course the most important thing—even more important than cold water—was that one has a completely different mood. There was a mood of unity. That word remains key for me to this day in terms of how I judge myself and of everything that happens around me. If something is working for unity then it's positive. If it's for disunity then it goes without saying that it's negative to me. And the club Healthy Family taught us to find unity with nature. Children were taught that nature and we are one.

This feeling of unity that Sveta found in this club reflects a deeply held conviction. She hopes to see one day a unity of spiritual beliefs, a unity between science and religion, and a unity between people of all nations. Her notion of unity expresses a pluralistic vision of the future, which she imagines as a unity of individually developed strong personalities. It is a pluralist vision rooted in her activities during the Soviet era. In her vision, the individual gained significance not only as the transformer of his or her own life, but because of the nature of the universe, each individual thought contained the potential to influence the outside world. The power of inner potentials required control over their manifestations and a deep sense of responsibility toward others.

We see here the influence of her intellectual background and an affinity with the healing philosophies forwarded by Pavlov and the Soviet doctor, A. Dembo. The focus is on the thinking individual who works to live in a conscious manner, with control over mind and body. Furthermore, individual development is not only for personal self-improvement or gain. A person's thoughts and actions can affect people the world over. We are individuals joined as one in unity, which is why self-control is so very important. One path to such control involves the deep exploration of the unconscious self, a search for the "deep causes" of illness. It is here that the "incorrect" thoughts and behaviors noted by Pavlov could be discovered and transformed. Sveta continues:

At that time there was very little literature available on the theme of clairvoyance. I don't remember. If there was, there was very little. We learned to feel sick organs with our hands and to heal each other and for several years we worked doing that, we healed people. It was all within the framework of the club Healthy Family and it was always free . . . This work was free because we made our money as an engineer and mathematician. I was a programmer. And in addition several times a week we helped people. But then we realized that it wasn't correct. Because if the clairvoyant or healer simply takes the illness out, on the energy level they harmonize the field of a person and the illness gradu-ally leaves, nevertheless the cause remains. And we understood that the cause of a person's illnesses lies within his thoughts, in his incorrect emotions, incorrect worldviews. And these reasons remain and they continue to act and either the old illness returns or he gets new ones. And we're not talking only about physical illnesses. But certain incorrectnesses of interrelations are manifested. Or a certain hole/blunder [*prokol*] in one's fate manifests itself. And we understood this and started studying psychology.

While she began studying psychology at a state medical institute, Sveta continued her alternative activities in the underground Healthy Family movement. At this point, she still had not changed careers, but we see the development of a sense of personal responsibility that eventually manifests itself in both her decision to take her fate into her own hands and in the type of healing methods she chose to practice, moving from clairvoyant healing to methods that focused on the active participation of the patient.

The club was absolutely not official and absolutely not a state club. Simply people. There's an interesting story. Sometime in 1983 several adults who were tired of the fact that official medicine couldn't do anything to help with health, started jogging in Novodereevo. This is a sacred area of Moscow. There are remarkable ponds there and relatively clean air for Moscow. This group was headed by Anatolii Soloviev. They had come from the club "Cosmos." . . . And there they found a rather elderly woman who was giving lessons to children—some sort of dynamic meditation and they were throwing them into the ice water and these two groups united and formed Healthy Family . . . And then a small group of clairvoyants was formed. Soloviev started this group, called Self-Perfection. And here we worked on our negative traits. There were a lot of interesting methods there. And then we learned how to see with our hands that which isn't visible to the eyes.

We see here the complexity and contradictions of the period. Hundreds of people were gathering in the center of Moscow, outside in a public park, and learning about healthy living and alternative healing methods. And yet the practices were not openly sanctioned by the State and therefore practitioners were at the whim of Party *apparatchiki*.

And so back to Healthy Family—in 1984, in January, starting in the beginning of January we all started meeting on Sundays, and on Thursdays we also studied aerobics and other exercises, and we also separately studied clairvoyance. And in the middle of January my daughter, despite everything, said she also wanted to go into the ice holes. But her kidney disease requires continuous warmth. But we decided to try it anyway because we understand that micro-stress can truly do miracles. And there was a miracle. We brought along her medication in case something happened. Of course, we didn't need the medication. And my child's face, which previously had been completely sallow-colored, suddenly became rosy. She literally changed right before our eyes. About 10 months later we went to the doctor and she had tests done and the doctor said you know in general it's possible to retract the diagnosis. But we still need to observe her. And then again a year later we came back, and she had had several tests done during the year, and they declared her cured, which simply never happens with that disease. And she didn't have any more attacks, right up to the end of school when she stopped practicing all of this and she quit running—she used to run a lot—but then in order to get her school leaving certificate she needed to pass exams, which she did very well, but she started smoking and three months later she was married and her health went downhill again. But that's another story. It's her own choice.

We see here that Sveta had given up on the medical system because it could not provide a cure for her daughter. Her positive attitude and belief in the infinite possibilities of the human organism led her to keep searching. And yet, she did not completely reject the medical system. She returned for tests and used her alternative methods in conjunction with the medical analyses to chart the progress of her daughter's health. Sveta describes the changes as miraculous and truly believes that people are capable of miracles. But it is up to them. Her daughter made the choice then to jump in the ice hole, but later she also chose to neglect her health. While Sveta is not happy with her daughter's choice, she understands it is her daughter's responsibility.

Soviet Innovations: Encouraging Individuality

Blurring the lines between official and unofficial practices, Soviet innovations in health and medicine incorporated elements of mind–body development. Principles learned in underground groups were reinforced in official state spheres. This blurring between scientific and spiritual

questions is evidenced in the provocative headline of the science section of a 1974 edition of *Literaturnaya gazeta:* "Live Forever: Is it Possible? Is it a Reasonable Goal?" Here an academic and a science-fiction author debate the scientific feasibility and ethical dilemmas of extending the typical human life span. Touching on human reserves and gene research, the possibility of significantly extending life is taken under serious consideration (Gurevich 1974).

Shortly after this debate, this topic is developed into a new scientific field called *yuvenology,* which promoted healthy lifestyles and underscored the limitless hidden potentials of the human body. According to a 1982 *Izvestiia* article, the Social Institute of Yuvenology opened in Moscow in 1977 and brought together specialists from many fields: Geneticists studied the liquidation of illnesses; psychologists and cyberneticists studied ways to improve intellect. The goal of this science is to "teach a person to use his physical, moral, and intellectual gifts—hidden reserves—in order to preserve the parameters of youth for the whole extent of his long and fruitful life" (Nat and Shabel'skii 1982). Key to this science is emotional stability, rational eating habits, motor activity, and toughening. Through lectures, the institute promoted such activities as "Self-regulation—the path to health and long life," "New Aerobics," and "Effective trivialities that improve health and longevity." They also organized healthy walks and runs in the woods. According to the article, the head Yuvenologist, L.M. Sukharebskii, was 83 years old at the time but did not even look 55. Sukharebskii explains in his own words how he maintains his youthful vibrancy:

> Until I was 55 I was a normal person with many bad habits that regularly ruined my life. And then I thought about how to change my style of life. I stopped smoking, started to diet, taking into consideration the particularities of my own organism. I built a home gym in my apartment—very simple one. I go to bed at the same time and I get up at 5 A.M. Morning exercises, contrasting shower, for breakfast I have a glass of warm water with strawberries. My diet consists of bread, vegetables, juice, and I eat meat once a week. I should say that rational eating plays an important role in the formula of health. It's been established, for example, that the rational limitation of the amount of food consumed lengthens life by 30 to 40 percent. And also it's important not to forget about such effective means against stressful situations that await the contemporary person every day, such as mini-auto-training (Sucharebskii in Nat and Shabel'skii 1982, 6). (06–17–1982; IZV-N0.168).

We see here the basic elements of Healthy Family and the contemporary alternative health scene—exercise, toughening, a healthy, primarily vegetarian, diet, self-regulation, and control. The science is action-oriented, encouraging individual responsibility for health. While spiritual questions do not arise in the *Izvestiia* article, the experiments into hidden reserves and potentials segue smoothly into the alternative sphere's strivings toward higher selves and self-perfection.

This notion of self-control, perfection, and the unity of body and mind is highlighted in a 1983 *Izvestiia* article about hypno-therapy. According to the article, Vladimir Raikov was a doctor-psycho-therapist and professional artist who had been researching hypnosis for 20 years. The *Izvestiia* article enthusiastically describes how Raikov was able to use hypnosis to bring out artistic abilities in people who had previously never even touched a paintbrush. Like Sveta and Healthy Family, he was tapping into the subconscious. According to the article, Raikov worked at a regional medical clinic in Moscow and used hypnosis to cure such mundane problems as hypertension, ulcers, heart disease, and alcoholism. His claim to fame, however, was his artistic work.

Raikov believed that the process of creating art gives people a feeling of freedom, liberation, and confidence, all of which help them tap into their inner potentials and improve

their quality of life. Hypnosis helps people mobilize their strengths and overcome their fears, Raikov says, and can help them realize their full potential in any activity. According to the article, the goal of hypnosis is ultimately to "help a person find himself" and "to give a person the possibility of attaining his own individuality, and to mobilize his intellect and undiscovered strengths for solving important problems" (Aleksandrova and Tutorskaia 1983, 5).

The Soviet newspaper articles reviewed here provide a positive assessment of yuvenology, yoga, hypnosis, and the search for "human reserves" and inner potential. Seen in conjunction with the life stories of these practitioners, a complex picture of the late-Soviet period begins to emerge. A dialectic between state and underground practices served to encourage innovative approaches to health, personal responsibility, and the development of individual will and creativity. While many practices were still underground, we see evidence of experimentation in the realm of health in the late Soviet era.

Alternative Soviet Collective Space

Such innovation can be found in the re-interpretations of "the collective" and collective space. As underground and official health practices worked to underscore individualism and innovation, they also provided a space for collectivism, unity, and a sense of responsibility to society as a whole. Often this responsibility was directed toward the development of the younger generations. While family illnesses brought Sveta to the Healthy Family club, Zoya, a music teacher, was primarily attracted to its social aspects and the developmental potential they held for her daughter. She noted that the activities were best conducted in a group rather than simply on one's own:

> The club existed half-legally. A girlfriend of mine brought me there. It was mostly by word of mouth. And it was all done under secret of night. When my mother-in-law found out she had a fit. She began calling, searching. She made things very unpleasant for me. She was scared. What I did was pour cold water on her [my daughter]. My daughter was still small, she was not yet three years old. . . . There was such a pleasant and joyful atmosphere that I haven't seen anything like it since then. Maybe only at Sveta's club now. And that club, what attracted people to it. Indeed there was an atmosphere of health within the club. We gathered in Park Kultury Gorkogo. We talked about cleansing the organism, about urine therapy, about the fact that you can fast and not die, and that you can live without antibiotics.

Zoya was attracted to the atmosphere created when the group gathers together in the park. She sees many parallels between Healthy Family and Ascension and was drawn to the warmth and sociality of both clubs. And while she notes that the activities at Healthy Family were forbidden, they were somehow available and actively pursued. The club even had its own membership card and logo, adding to it a certain modicum of officialdom:

> But at the club we studied everything, everything that was forbidden to study—astrology—but that we studied in people's apartments. Someone would offer up their apartment. And at that time the dues were five rubles a month so that the club would stay together somehow. Just like Sveta now collects twenty. And we didn't pay anything else. I was struck and surprised by these people. They risked their own safety. From what I heard they even attracted fatally ill people. I didn't need that kind of help. But I believed them and am endlessly thankful to them for everything. I also studied yoga then and then like Sveta's Wednesday evenings now. . . . Then it was a different day. . . . We had a very interesting membership card. There were two dolphins and inside they formed an image that looked like a mother and inside of her was a child. That was our emblem. And you could choose any activity. There was yoga, simply discussions about health, and then even after the club fell apart I continued to follow these things.

I have such pleasant memories of that time. But mostly we worked on toughening and being healthy. Toughening is done when you want to be healthy without medicine. For example, you rub something on yourself. But they didn't give us anything. They gave us a basket and we walked barefoot in the snow. You know, you start out at home in the bath and then more and more. My daughter loved it. When there was snow we never missed a night. Every evening, when it was dark, because lots of people gathered and screamed out swears. My spouse would have killed me. So our group ran around and then you needed to rub your feet so the snow didn't melt. It's painful. It even feels like hot drops of water after the snow. It's a very revitalizing procedure. But you really don't get sick if you regularly strengthen your system. We did that every day in the winter. But I no longer do it. It was a group activity. They said that it's better to create a collective field. . . . If you go alone then the people around you who see you and don't understand could harm you somehow. So it's better to do it as a collective.

Zoya continues to participate in activities with Ascension—she goes to the weekly meetings, takes trainings, and attends the summer retreats, but there is a sense of nostalgia in her recollections of the Healthy Family period. The community feeling inspired by gathering together outside in the dark of the night is no longer there, and she clearly misses it. Her nostalgia became more apparent as I got to know her better after our interview, when we shared a tent during the annual alternative health retreat that attracts hundreds of practitioners from all over the country. She wished that such events could happen more frequently and lamented that they no longer took place in Moscow.

Zoya is not alone in feeling a sense of a lost collective. It is a sentiment heard often when speaking about the Soviet period, that back then people spent time together and really cared about each other. Friendships were strong and even though some of the collective activities were required—such as pioneer work, student field work, or even work meetings—the friendships and camaraderie that developed there were real, and many now regret their passing. But the depth of relationships that developed in the circles of people who met in secret at night or in friends' apartments seem to be particularly missed by some.

Zoya's assessments of Soviet social policies also factor into her nostalgia. Initially happy with the fall of the Soviet Union, she regrets that more Soviet social values and practices have not been maintained:

We were happy. We were extremely happy. I got my whole *podezd* to vote for Boris Yeltsin. No one wanted to vote, I convinced them. But then afterwards everyone asked—so what has your Yeltsin done? We were so for the democrats. But what did we end up with? Although of course things did become freer. A few positive steps were made, at least on the level of spiritual freedoms. But financially things became very difficult. Before there was more confidence. Now people don't have that. People end up homeless. When I see the impoverished I simply get a lump in my throat. Before we didn't have that. At least something was there. Now it's dirty, worn. I don't know. . . . We bought my sister an apartment, a co-op. That was still back then. But it was affordable. We bought it in installments . . . I don't know how pensioners live. There are some discounts for them, but I really don't know how they survive. I work in a private school, and still I spend so much on food. My salary at the school is $170 a month. In regular schools they get even less. But I also make another $100 on private students. And then June, July, and August are considered naked. Olga works part time. But the youth are able to get by. Maybe they already have different mentality. We can't adapt to this new life, but they are already oriented to it. I don't know. Some things are worse, some better. But probably things have become a bit freer. It's easier to breathe. But on the other hand it's really difficult for the elderly. They need to do something. Or our rich businessmen should. Before, during Gorky's time, there were special homes for the poor, where they could shower and eat. And then that's also become a business. I read in the paper that there's now a whole mafia that targets the impoverished.

Zoya's nostalgia is not simply based on idealized visions of collective practices. She also reveals a deep concern for the social conditions of those worse off than she, although she herself is not wealthy. Her attitude toward societal changes in Russia is ambiguous and nuanced, indicating how difficult and misleading social science designations can be. Would she be included in Cockerham's category of socialist supporters or not? It appears she would

straddle more than one category, complicating attempts at simple correlations between socialist values and health lifestyle practices.

Even Sveta, with her focus on the individual and flourishing alternative health center still longs to recapture the sense of unity and community she felt during the days of Health Family. One way she strives to do this is with Ascension and its group meditations. Here she discusses these meditations and her plans for the future:

> And so, all that is left is our project is the Temple of Peace. The project is called Our House—the Planet Earth. And so that Russia becomes the *anahata* [heart chakra] of humanity and so that all of humanity finally becomes an endless unity, and that all of those wars would end . . . we propose—first in Russia and then later maybe in other places on the planet—a center of integrated thought and peace making that we call the Temple of Peace. . . . There students will study the teaching methods of various countries in order to find something in common, they will study different languages and the cultures of the world, etc. . . . The Temple of Peace is in essence community. It's a center of psychological relief, it's cooperation in common deeds. It's a children's center and cultural dialogue. . . . For now it's a symbolic temple where every religion can find a dialogue, they can gather together and organize a common prayer for peace.

It is this joining of the spiritually developing individual within the common group that is key to the contemporary alternative health scene in Russia.

While life-story interviews focus on women in Moscow, Soviet newspaper articles reveal that these alternative group health activities were taking place throughout the Soviet Union, not just in Moscow. This positive sense of the collective and social atmosphere of the Soviet alternative health scene, where individual self-development was nurtured and encouraged was recounted in a 1984 article by Eduard Kondratov, who traveled the country and conducted anthropological-type research on alternative practices. One story is about a group in the southern Russian Samarovskii region that is strikingly similar to Healthy Fam-ily. While Kondratov writes with a skeptical and at times condescending attitude, he describes in detail how he traveled extensively around the Soviet Union and "met people who did such things as share recipes for receiving living or dead water, who were experts of Tibetan medicine, those who ate raw food, clairvoyants, and even one alien" (Kondratov 1984, 3). He participated for an undisclosed amount of time with the Samorovskii group, which he found practicing in a large ravine:

> They ran barefoot along the wet forest paths, intensely creating a bio-field around themselves, standing on their heads. They would say 'om' and focus attention on one organ of the body and then another.

During his research he interviewed an engineer he called Nina, who told him,

> Is it interesting? Of course. Otherwise I wouldn't go. I don't have any aches, but I want to be stronger—physically and psychologically, especially in regards to my will. The abilities of our organism, it turns out, are limitless. If, of course, your spirit has a body.

Discussing whether she likes the people in the group, she continues:

> Very much. There are people to talk to. And not about jeans or strawberries at the dacha. Here there are very nice intelligent people. They're interested in eastern philosophy and live spiritual lives.

Conclusion

Out of the life histories and published documents of the late-Soviet period, a picture begins to emerge that stands in stark contrast to conventional top-down Western depictions of Soviet life,

which focus on the negative, anti-democratic legacies of the Soviet system. In Soviet Houses of Culture, city parks, doctors' offices, research centers, and private apartments, we find an atmosphere of creative discovery where people are taking active control over their health and are working to develop their individuality. Through a dialectical interplay between the state and individuals, these spaces where independent thought, self-development, and individual initiative are encouraged and experienced. Unlike Rose's and Cockerham's passive health consumers or Kharkhordin's collectives that encourage self-critique only to create more submissive citizens, we find here a collective space that offers support for people to develop their individual talents and personalities. Within these dynamics, unique understandings and conceptualizations of individual and collective developed. Soviet alternative health practitioners came to value personal experience and appreciate the inner potentials within the individual. At the same time they maintained a strong sense of social responsibility toward their collective group and the world around them. Significantly, these practitioners were ordinary Soviet citizens—not dissidents. They were engineers, doctors, teachers, and while they were critical of authoritarian rule, and none I spoke with wish for a return of the Soviet system, they remain avid supporters of certain social values of the period, such as the focus on education and the value of human relationships over wealth and consumerism.

The contemporary alternative health scene in Russia reflects the individualist and collectivist values that practitioners developed within the Soviet space. Interpretations that see the latter as simply holdovers from the past and the former as evidence of neo-liberal Westernization erase the agency of Soviet practitioners and fail to appreciate the dynamic processes taking place both within the de-territorializing milieu of Soviet space and continuing within the contemporary globalizing scene. The demise of the Soviet system did not leave citizens in an ideological void or trapped in old ways of thinking. Instead, we find contemporary post-Soviet practitioners actively engaged in the dynamic process of interpreting, expressing, and developing their own unique conceptualizations of individualism and collectivism. Most notably, their life histories reveal a critical engagement with ideas, practices, and ideologies within the Soviet context. Incorporating official Soviet methods of self critique and self-improvement into their alternative practices, members of the Soviet alternative health sphere developed a Deweyan democratic approach—focused on individual inquiry and growth—that continues to inform their thinking and way of life today. Rather than inculcating a particular ideology or instigating a dissident reaction, a critical approach arose that facilitates conscious self-development, social engagement, and active personal responsibility, all initiated within the de-territorializing milieu of Soviet space.

Notes

1. According to Sergei Zhuk, the interest of Indian culture more broadly in the Soviet Union is also attributed to popularity of the Beatles and the Indian influences in their music (personal correspondence).

2. Alexei Yurchak suggests that perhaps it was Pavlov's focus on the physiological origins and aspects of such phenomenon that led to their scientific investigation during the Soviet period (personal correspondence).

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Chapter 6
Football in the Era of "Changing Stagnation" The Case of Spartak Moscow

Robert Edelman

Communism did not give the citizens of the Soviet Union much freedom of choice, but sport was one of the few areas of life in which ordinary folk did have options. The peoples of the Soviet Union were free to support their favorite teams and free to worship their own sporting heroes. It was never possible for the authorities to dictate fan loyalty, especially when it came to the country's most popular game, football. There were teams supported by factories, trade unions, student groups, the police, and the army. In picking a favorite, members of the largely male sporting public were making subjective statements with objective implications about who they were and what they thought about the world around them. Those choices, which created group solidarities, were expressed publicly (at and around the stadium) and in semipublic discourses (on streets and in courtyards), but the decision to support one or another club was at the same time private (in the apartment and family kitchen, in front of the radio and later the television).

Picking a favorite club throughout the world was one of many small steps through which each individual created a self. It was also true for the Soviet Union.[1] In the early 1990s, soon after the breakup of the USSR, a Soviet anthropologist explained the implications of these choices to a visiting British journalist:

> In a Communist country . . . the football team you supported was a community to which you, yourself chose to belong. . . . It might be your only chance to choose a community, and, also, in that community you could express yourself as you wished. To be a fan . . . is to be gathered among others and to be free."[2]

The loyalties of Soviet fans rarely changed. From the mid-1930s on, the popular preferences for Spartak expressed on football fields manifested attitudes toward a variety of institutions and groups, including the party-state.

The dream of Communist leaders may have been to dominate all areas of human life, but football was one field of human activity in which a purportedly powerful Soviet state exercised limited control. To be sure, the regime's intervention in the game over the course of Soviet history was a constant. But the game proved to be what the British journalist Simon Kuper has called a "slippery tool" in the hands of dictators; it could also be, to use James Scott's famous phrase, a "weapon of the weak" (Scott 1990, 120). In expressing a wide range of grievances, many citizens of the USSR did not resort to violence, but, as the history of Spartak shows, they resisted the power of the regime in ways that were indirect, surprising, and unexpected.[3] Something similar happened under other authoritarian regimes. In Franco's Spain, the Catalan club Barcelona became a symbol of regional autonomy, as did Athletic Bilbao in the Basque country. In Argentina under the generals, critics of the regime were more likely to support Boca Juniors than River Plate. Even if football did not support outright opposition in the USSR, it did help Soviet citizens resist the regime's incursions into the privacy of friendships and family, preserving in the process some small piece of their souls.

During the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, Spartak Moscow, more than any other Soviet football team, came to embody the sentiments of its fans. It was, if not always the best, certainly the most popular of all Soviet clubs. Although not the only reason, support for Spartak was meaningful politically because it represented a symbolic challenge to those supporting Dinamo, the rival team funded by the secret police. More than any of the other civilian sides in the Soviet league, Spartak gave its fans a way to distance themselves from the hated "structures of force" (the police and army) who ran their own teams, such as Dinamo and the Central Sports Club of the Army.[4] The Spartak–Dinamo rivalry was especially acute under Stalin, reflecting both the intense clash between the state and society as well as the dominant position of these two teams in the Soviet football league. This rivalry lessened in the 1960s with the Soviet "thaw" and the game's expanding reach in the country. By the time of Brezhnev, Spartak had been well assimilated into the state structures—specifically the Communist Party's Moscow City Committee (Gorkom)—and had as many friends in high places as its great rival, Dinamo. The model of overtly politicized sport that explains much behavior before 1964 cannot be sustained for the latter decades of Soviet power. Instead, Spartak's evolution during these years can better be read as a marker of broad social trends that did not directly reveal popular attitudes toward the state. The old duality of state–society relations, expressed by the Dinamo–Spartak rivalry, had broken down.

Spartak before Brezhnev

The four Starostin brothers (Nikolai, Aleksandr, Andrei, and Petr) formally founded the Spartak Sport Society in 1935, but the club's history actually spans the entire twentieth century. Throughout the many twisting and wrenching changes of Soviet history, the Starostins' team took on new forms, both reflecting and influencing the swiftly evolving society of which it was so visible a part. Spartak traces its roots to a particular working-class neighborhood of prerevolutionary Moscow, the Presnia, where the Starostins led their young pals in games of street football. During the 1920s they took advantage of the semicapitalist New Economic Plan (NEP) to create a series of local teams that became successful business enterprises. With Stalin's accession to power, the Starostins adapted to new circumstances and organized Spartak. Through energetic and sometimes inspired networking, the brothers found political and financial support for their club. Such was their great sporting success and massive popularity that they ran afoul of the secret police, whose own team had previously dominated Soviet soccer.

The Starostins were arrested during World War II and sent to the gulag. With its leaders away, Spartak's fortunes suffered. In 1954 the brothers returned from exile to their careers as part of the first wave of returnees. During the years of cultural relaxation and optimism under Khrushchev, Nikolai took back the helm of the team, found new sponsors, and again led Spartak to the top of the Soviet league; the period known as the "Thaw" proved to be Spartak's Golden Age. By the end of the tumultuous year of 1956, marked by Khrushchev's famous "Secret Speech" denouncing Stalin, Spartak had won the league, and the Soviet national team, composed primarily of Spartak players, took the Olympic gold medal. After Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Nikolai Starostin was forced to adapt to increased competition from newly

powerful provincial sides. Once again, he changed his approach. This time he violated many of the principles that had guided his work previously. All of his coaches had adopted a democratic and humane approach to the players, but facing extinction, Starostin hired the harsh and dictatorial former Dinamo player and coach, Konstantin Beskov who took the team back to the top of the Soviet game. Finally, when *perestroika* arrived with its emphasis on profitability, Nikolai was well prepared to revive the business methods of the NEP and earn many a ruble.

Unlike so many elements of Soviet history that were imposed from above, Spartak emerged from the society below. The club's roots in the Presnia gave it an independence that many deemed attractive, but others thought dangerous. Throughout its history, much of the drama that surrounded the team centered on the Starostins and their fate. They had risen from a modest background to reach the pinnacle of wealth and fame, only to become victims of the purges. Instead of dying in the gulag, they were rescued by football, coaching in the camps and returning after the death of the tyrant to lead their team back to the top. As an image, this tale of triumph, tragedy, and subsequent victory has been hard to resist, and for most fans that image has always been more important than the truth. In paraphrasing Clifford Geertz's famous line about the "deep play" of the Balinese cockfight, one British sociologist wrote, "The game is the place we tell ourselves stories about ourselves" (King 1998, 16–24; Geertz 1972). The Starostins' epic tale has been far too good for the club's supporters to let go.

Society, Spartak, and Soviet Football in the Age of "Mature Socialism"

Until the late 1950s, Soviet soccer had been dominated by the big Moscow clubs. The Spartak–Dinamo rivalry, with its intense political overtones, had been the league's centerpiece. The political position and cultural role of Spartak changed dramatically in the 1960s as the game expanded its reach throughout the entire Soviet Union. Aided by the growth of television, Spartak developed a national following under Khrushchev, but after 1964 it ceased to be the only favorite of Soviet fans, who now had local suitors for their affections. Instead, Spartak became, as has been globally true for Brazil, everyone's second-favorite team and the biggest gate attraction when it played on the road. The state, which had intervened directly in the game for decades, could no longer micromanage the sport. There were now too many constituencies to please as the number of clubs expanded exponentially. Broad supervision replaced doomed attempts at control.

During the Brezhnev years, while it appeared little had changed at the level of high politics, Soviet society was very much in flux. Change was most clearly manifest in the towns. Old cities grew, and new ones, like the auto center Togliatti, were created from nothing. More and more Soviets were now urban dwellers. In 1959, half the citizens of the USSR lived in towns. By the end of Brezhnev's time in office, between 65 and 75 percent of the population was urban (Thompson 2003, 86; Lewin 1985, 43–56; Kagarlitsky 1990, 285). Perhaps more important, half the population had been born in cities, producing a very different sort of urban scene. The peasant presence in the towns ebbed while the numbers of professionally trained citizens continued to grow. There was also a similar expansion in the ranks of lower-status

white-collar workers who performed both service and administrative tasks (Hosking 1990, 3; Boutenko and Razlogov 1997, 99).

All these groups, workers included, had increasingly complicated demands, tastes, and expectations that were not so easily fulfilled by an unresponsive political structure and an inefficient economic system. They all sought more freedom and higher living standards—better housing, an improved diet, and more consumer goods. Despite progress on all these fronts, demand eventually outstripped the command economy's ability to respond to the population's needs. Despite its fundamental weaknesses, the economy did continue to grow until the mid-1970s. There were more and more factories, mines, and construction sites dotting the landscape of the growing cities. As the industrial network expanded to the far ends of the Soviet Union, and as older regions saw increased population and economic activity, their residents came to require not just work but the amenities of modern urban life, including leisure (Gordon and Klopov 1975, 119–35; Kerblay 1983, 57–62). When they weren't working or drinking, young male members of the workforce came to play and watch soccer. Football, virtually everywhere the sport of the cities, followed the factory (Mason 1981, 69–78; Goldblatt 2006, 85–111; Murray 1994, 21–41).

Not only in the USSR but all around the world soccer had developed in tandem with industry and commerce. Accordingly, the game was one of many markers of an increasing modernity. In Great Britain, the sport was the child of the middle classes, only later being adopted by the country's workers. In the USSR, what we could term "middle-class elements" of society were drawn to soccer only after the game had caught on among the proletariat. As towns became industrial centers with larger populations, both the workers and the various white-collar elements who had joined them required not just housing and feeding, but also a whole range of entertainments. Millions had watched the spectacle of professional football on television. Now the citizens of these cities demanded their own teams, and local authorities, eager to raise the prestige of their regions, were only too happy to oblige.[5]

The growth was enormous. In 1950, there had been only 33 clubs formally enrolled in the football league structure. By 1968, there were 267 teams at all levels.[6] Sport societies organized teams that were then integrated into the national league system. A third division, with teams assigned to numerous geographic zones, stretched the entire length and breadth of the union. Stadiums were constructed. Among many new venues, Republican Stadium, seating 100,000, opened in Kiev during 1965, and Erevan's Razdan Stadium, with 75,000 seats, was completed in 1971. Alma-Ata, Baku, Tashkent, Voroshilovgrad, Minsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and dozens of other cities built slightly smaller venues. Fans from all social groups came to watch, and soon the most successful of these newer clubs were seeking entry to the highest levels of the sport.

This expansion was abetted by improvements in transportation and communication, another product of economic development that had made the spread of sport possible everywhere. For the larger first and second divisions to function, teams had to move great distances in a timely manner. By the mid-1960s a flight from Moscow to Tashkent, to name just one example, was no longer a daunting prospect. The mass media expanded and became more efficient. For lovers of the game who wanted to know the scores, television, radio, and an increasingly effective and nimble sports press provided quick information. With more teams in more cities, there

were more games to be played, watched, and reported on. The entire edifice of Soviet football became bigger and more complicated.

The league structures expanded to accommodate these new teams, making life more challenging for those in the capital. Moscow's domination of the game ended. According to Timothy Colton, there had been a similar drop in Moscow's authority within the party and in the larger society.[7] Now there were more suitors for the best talents, as provincial clubs came to outbid the teams in the center.[8] The state sports committee could adjudicate disputes and discipline rule violators, but with the profusion of clubs it became politically impossible to play favorites as had been done in the past. The regime's earlier support for the teams associated with the secret police or the army was no longer acceptable in the face of newly emergent and powerful regional interests.[9] Powerful local leaders themselves became "patrons" (*metsenaty*) for their regional teams, seeking to use political influence and pressure to advance their cause.

With the improved capacity of television to beam games from all the major Soviet cities, there was greater competition for the comparatively limited airtime devoted to soccer. The same struggle for print space was played out in the press, most notably *Sovetskii sport*. No longer could the most famous Moscow teams control the league's proceedings or even its most public images. Two great veteran stars, Igor Netto (Spartak) and Lev Iashin (Dinamo, Moscow) publicly expressed fears that Moscow's decline would have an adverse impact on the national team's performance.[10] These developments also troubled Nikolai Starostin. Writing in *Izvestiia* in 1966, he expressed discomfort with the consequences of the enormous growth in the number of teams wishing to make it to the top flight of the game by means fair or foul:

> Adherents of tradition see in this an inadmissible violation of the sporting principle. According to the rules regulating the league championship, the way to move into the strongest group is through victories [the sporting principle]. . . . In the interest of satisfying the massive number of requests from the localities and in order to put on activities in stadiums, it was seen as advisable to advance certain cities into groups above their ranking.[11]

His view would be adopted by the state sports committee in a 1970 resolution that concluded the massive expansion had been harmful to the interests of Soviet football.[12]

More teams meant a greater number of matches on millions of televisions. Once a luxury item they had since become widely available. There were four or five televised matches a week. Midweek European Cup nights might involve as many as three matches, several of which took place in foreign stadiums. The possibility of watching in the privacy of one's apartment, either with friends or alone, modified the experience of fanship. The joking, complaining, and cursing that went on in the stands could be even more intense in the greater anonymity of a private space. As I can confirm from extensive "ethnographic" observation (not to mention participation), free-flowing banter and unmonitored drinking created possibilities for male bonding and safe criticism of teams, players, coaches, and the game itself. Announcers like Nikolai Ozerov and Vladimir Maslachenko eschewed political didacticism in their descriptions of domestic matches. Pre- and postgame analysis did not exist, and viewers were free to construct their own meanings from what they had just witnessed (Edelman 1993, 166–69; Roth-Ey 2007, 278–82).

The greater complexity of the soccer world mirrored the greater complexity of society in the last Soviet decades. These trends created a very different, far less clear set of political and cultural meanings. The anthropologist Alexei Yurchak argues that the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a fundamental "cultural shift" that eroded the seemingly clear dualities of the earlier epochs of Soviet history. There was a blurring of the conflict between nonconformist behavior that might once have implied resistance and the "authoritative discourse" of the state and party. "The system," he writes, "was internally mutating toward unpredictable, creative multiple forms of 'normal life' that no one anticipated" (Yurchak 2006, 125).

As a particularly apt case in point, Yurchak describes a Komsomol activist and loyal Soviet citizen who was also a passionate and intelligent fan of Western rock music. Similarly, those who took part in the explosion of urban countercultures in the last Soviet decades did not so much seek to challenge the authority of the regime as to avoid it. The other duality of the official and the dissident, so visible to outsiders, did not exist for legions of young people. When the Western popular culture so many of them embraced was denounced as politically dangerous by those in authority, young people simply denied any connection between politics and their favorite activities (Yurchak 2006, 125, 208, 254).

While none of the individuals described by Yurchak evinced an interest in sport, neither the players nor their younger fans can have been immune to these trends. Spartak in particular counted a large number of jazz lovers among its team members. Like footballers all over the world, they enjoyed both Western music and soccer. They wore their hair long in the style of their contemporaries, a fact referees noted disapprovingly as a sign of independence. Globally, long hair had become a marker of a new masculinity, and the lads of Spartak were not the only Soviet footballers with long hair.[13] Older men like the Starostins looked on uncomprehendingly as Soviet youth tried to be free of the demands of the state by exhibiting a spirit of independence.

Like so much else, the new behaviors of those who came of age during this time emerged in response to the continuing growth of the towns. The new subcultures, along with domestic and foreign forms of mass culture, were urban phenomena. During the 1960s and especially the 1970s, entertainment became more extensive and multifarious. Football was no longer the people's only spectacle. Attendance eroded with the greater variety of distractions and the decline in the quality of the Soviet domestic game. Pushing 70, Starostin found himself navigating in decidedly uncharted waters, selling a product that had become less attractive to a very different audience.[14]

Soviet Men and Football: Substance and Style

Spartak's fan base has expanded over time, but it has always involved the male workingmen who constituted the core of the football public. A sweaty activity played and watched largely in the company of other men, football provided a field on which different versions of Soviet masculinity could work out and elaborate their differences (Dunning 1994, 163–79; Archetti 1999, 161–89; Hoberman 1984, 11; Gorn and Goldstein 1993). The Spartak–Dinamo rivalry proved central in this process as well because the political and social differences of these two

teams were amplified by the very different body cultures they practiced. Dinamo sought to project a public image of discipline and rectitude, treating sport didactically. Spartak, on the other hand, was much more relaxed. For its players, fans and officials sports were about entertainment. Dinamo sought to control the bodies its organizations presented; Spartak proved more comfortable with the body's spontaneous movements.[15] Since "the body is inescapable in the construction of masculinity," the contradictions between Dinamo and Spartak were deepened by the differing versions of manhood practiced by the teams' fans (Connell 1995; Appadurai 1995, 93).

By the 1970s and 1980s, Spartak's primary opponent was no longer Di-namo Moscow but Dinamo Kiev, coached at its height by the all-controlling Valerii Lobanovskii. Their rivalry dominated Soviet soccer until the collapse of the USSR. With the exception of one year, Spartak, now coached by the equally all-controlling former *Dinamovets*, Beskov, was always among the top three, taking the championship in 1987 and 1989. Dinamo Kiev won the title in 1980, 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1990. Of the two teams, Lobanovskii's was clearly the stronger, but Spartak's role as a constant contender permitted a fractured revival of the earlier cultural and political stereotypes ascribed to the two great national sport societies. By the 1980s, however, Spartak was no longer a victim of Stalinist tyranny, and Dinamo did not use the powers of the secret police to oppress its rivals. Still, Lobanovskii's hyper-rational approach was a perfect foil for the ideologues of what the great sportswriter, Lev Filatov called "Spartak spirit." They scorned the cynicism of Lobanovskii's many arranged matches and scoffed at their rivals' hyper-rational style of play. Dinamo Kiev's controlled approach on the field featured precise and constant movement to guarantee extended periods of possession. These moments would then be punctuated by long passes over a drawn-in defense to swift attackers like the great Oleg Blokhin, holder of the Soviet season scoring record with thirty-five goals. Lobanovskii placed his greatest emphasis on the elimination of mistakes through well-rehearsed combinations. Backed by the financial and political might of the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior, Dinamo Kiev practiced a form of the "total football" then popularized by Holland but without the charm or spontaneity of the Dutch (Goldblatt 2006, 588–89; Prozumenshikov 2004, 371; Wilson 2006, 14).

Beskov may have been a harsh coach, much like Lobanovskii, but his playing style was altogether different. He combined the speed and movement of his old Dinamo teams with the short passing and creativity of the Spartak tradition. If Dinamo Kiev was deemed rational and scientific, Spartak was said to be romantic and artistic. Dinamo might win, but Spartak would entertain. If Lobanovskii sent his men onto the field to execute, Beskov sent his out to create. Unorthodox players like Iuri Gavrilov and Fyodr Cherenkov would never have been able to play for Dinamo Kiev, and when Lobanovskii was in charge of the national team, they were rarely called. This clash of styles fed into the old dual-ity of "us versus them," but now each side felt it was the noble us and its opponent the evil them.[16] Under Brezhnev, it is hard to find either Spartak or Dinamo Kiev occupying the kind of higher moral ground claimed by Starostin during the Stalin period. Each team had its influential adherents and powerful backers. Each drew support from ordinary folk. Perhaps those Muscovites who favored reform had a preference for Spartak, but refusenik Jews from Kiev could just as easily support their home side and claim Spartak was the team of the big shots. At the same time, Dinamo Kiev's

popularity did not extend to the entire Ukraine. Residents of Odessa expressed their independence by adopting Spartak as their "second team" after the Chernomorets club (Rabiner 2006, 5). Even the attendance figures available for the years 1980–1982 do not give a clear picture of which team was more popular.

To paraphrase the great British historian Richard Holt, the history of Soviet soccer is a history of men, and over the course of Soviet history male citizens were offered a wide variety of conceptions of manhood. Before and shortly after the revolution, rural migrants to the cities had to abandon peasant definitions of manhood and forge a new urban approach. Soccer gave these new workers an arena for the display of manly strength and power away from the fields of Russia's villages. After World War II, even newer men, who did not work with their hands at all, sought an acceptable concept of manhood without the sweat of daily labor on an assembly line. Spartak's tradition of fan behavior was rooted in the nineteenth-century proletarian, "street football" tradition; it was often violent and little concerned with the Victorian concept of fair play. Dinamo athletes, on the other hand, were supposed to project the respectability and sportsmanship derived from middle-class ideas about what was called "rational recreation." In either its proletarian or middle-class variants, sport was seen as a dynamic, modern activity offering urban Soviet men of all classes models of strength, responsibility, and vigor.

Spartak and the World

Spartak's contact with football outside the borders of the USSR took three forms—participation on the national team, games in European Cup tournaments, and foreign commercial tours. Of the three, the club's relationship with the national team was the most fraught. As was true throughout the world, the national team was supposed to be a symbol of patriotism and loyalty. In the Soviet Union, it was controlled directly by the state sports committee, whose interests often clashed with those of the clubs just as they did in capitalist countries. In a system as centralized as the USSR, however, the national team's needs were given the highest priority, and the clubs were in no position to resist such demands. There were, of course, complaints when players away on international duty missed league games, but those burdens were shared by many teams.

Starostin had been involved with international select teams as early as the 1920s. When they called, he and his team were always willing participants. There was never any question of a Spartak player's demonstrating independence by refusing a call-up to the nation's first team. Not even the feisty star Evgenii Lovchev ever balked at playing for so dictatorial a figure as Lobanovskii, coach of Dinamo Kiev and the national team. Instead, the arguments were the normal ones surrounding national teams. When Spartak stars were not picked, there was annoyance, but the choices were dictated by the tastes and loyalties of the coach in charge rather than by the array of political power inside the Kremlin. All those who led the Soviet national team were loyal citizens. Even after Khrushchev's folly in dismissing Konstantin Beskov (a Dinamo man) and general manager Andrei Starostin for placing second at the 1964 European championship, the post went to the man most likely to produce results.

Spartak dominated in the international setup during the 1950s, but the team's role

diminished when the stars of the Golden Age began to retire. By the time Khrushchev had left the political stage, only Galimzian Khusainov was a constant on the national team that achieved its best result ever—fourth place at the 1966 World Cup. Lovchev was capped in his first year (1969) and remained a fixture throughout the 1970s, when results were considerably less glorious. Over the course of both decades, Gennadii Logofet was the only other Spartak man to be called up with some frequency.[17]

Starting with Dinamo Kiev's great success in 1975, it was decided that Valerii Lobanovskii's side should be the base of the national team and that he should be coach. In order to maintain the integrity of what had been a successful system, Lobanovskii quite rationally limited his choices from other clubs. His machine had little or no room for artists whose improvisations would disrupt the system, but this seemingly sensible approach ultimately failed. League games, international duty, and European Cup ties exhausted the players. Poor results at the 1976 Olympics and at that year's European championship led to Lobanovskii's dismissal. He was replaced by Nikita Simonian, who failed to get the team into the 1978 World Cup. The job then went to Beskov, coaching Spartak since 1977, after he had won the 1979 league championship. He named a host of Spartak players to the side. Beskov also led the Olympic team in 1980 at the Moscow Games. That squad included Rinat Dasaev, Vagiz Khidiatulin, Oleg Romantsev, Sergei Shavlo, Iuri Gavrilov, and Fyodr Cherenkov—an impressive array of Spartak talent that managed to lose 0–1 to the German Democratic Republic in the semifinal.[18]

Cherenkov was the most popular player on Beskov's Spartak teams. He was the player of the year in 1983 and 1989. The darling of the Moscow public, *nash Fedya* (our Fedya), was a local boy with whom the residents of the capital could identify. His spontaneity and creativity were qualities they admired. He seemed to embody the humanism and democracy that flowered during the last Soviet decades. When he was not given a place on the national team, the fans were reminded of all that the larger system had denied them. Cherenkov's special popularity and thwarted dreams reflected their own frustrations, but this was yet another case of Spartak supporters telling themselves stories about themselves. For Cherenkov truly did not fit in the model of the national team envisioned by Lobanovskii. Here, Spartak fans were not entirely fair in criticizing Lobanovskii's soccer model as the perfect expression of the declining command-administrative economic system with its excessive planning and false rationality.[19]

The European cups were an important source of hard currency, divided among the team, the federation, and the government. Spartak then supplemented this source of *valiuta* (hard currency) with the time-honored practice of commercial tours to capitalist countries. No hole in the league calendar, large or small, went unused when there was money to be made abroad by both the team and its players. Such opportunities were not available to all Soviet clubs. Spartak and the various Dinamo sides were the only Soviet teams with significant name recognition outside the country. Once the Soviet season ended in November, Spartak would begin its journeys. Starting in the late 1960s, Spartak played in Italy, usually against second-tier opposition before small crowds. By the 1970s, August tournaments on the eve of the Spanish season had become an annual event for Spartak. Regular tours of France took place in February. A six-game December trip through Morocco in 1977 must have been a delightful reward for Spartak's promotion back to the top flight (Nisenboim 2002, 86). Over the course

of the last decades of Soviet power, the team played in Japan, Mexico, Zaire, Guinea, the United Kingdom, Brazil, West Germany, Argentina, and the United States.

While the club received sizable fees for these appearances, the players were busy acquiring so-called *defitsitnye* (hard-to-get) items to sell on their return home. During a 1937 tournament in Paris, the Starostins had shopped extensively in the stores of Paris. The practice of Soviet tourists buying and selling foreign goods had long predated that trip and continued right up to 1991. In interviews the Spartak stars Lovchev, Logofet, and the journalist Arkadii Galinskii, all stressed that the purchase and resale of foreign items constituted a significant and vital supplement to the players' salaries. Logofet described one particularly lucrative tour of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The club winked at speculation in order for Spartak to compete with the heavily subsidized provincial sides. Beyond this, the chance to leave the country and see the world proved to be an effective recruiting tool. Like all other Soviet delegations, Spartak surely had its minders on these trips, but Logofet suggested that when abroad, Spartak players were given more freedom than their Dinamo counterparts, who were subject to military discipline. Customs agents at Sheremetyevo Airport, employed by the Ministry of Interior and likely fans of Dinamo, enforced the regulations selectively. Returning Spartak traveling parties usually had no problems, but when it suited the purposes of the authorities or some difficult customs agent, players entering and leaving the country were detained for breaking harsh customs rules. Punishments for these so-called crimes often took the form of disqualifications, and it was common for those caught to lose their right to travel.[20]

These practices were by no means unique to Spartak. Foreign travel was the greatest privilege any Soviet citizen could enjoy, and shopping was always a big part of such journeys. Things could, however, get complicated upon returning home. To realize a benefit from their business dealings, players often had to sell what they had hunted and gathered not to friends or at secondhand stores but on the black market. In the process, they came in contact with organized crime figures whose interest in soccer might have been more than casual. Match fixing was thought to extend beyond agreements among coaches to include illegal gambling—the "black totalizator" run by various groups of gangsters. With the second economy encompassing an ever-increasing range of consumer goods and services, many athletes of all sorts found themselves in touch with criminal and semi-criminal activity. The ensuing corruption, so endemic in the last Soviet decades, corroded respect for what passed for the law and fostered the deep cynicism that pervaded all levels of society. It would be naive to think that Spartak's players and coaches were untouched by this most basic fact of Soviet life.

Spartak, the Ruble, and the "Stadium"

The link between a team and its supporters is given tangible form by that highly organized and often hallowed space called the stadium. The term "ground," often used in Britain, perhaps best expresses the emotive force of this connection. For a football club and its supporters, the place where they play is that piece of land carved out of the surrounding cityscape. It is a site of continuing reunions with friends bonded by shared passions and obsessions, a scene of pleasant and comforting rituals, small and large, sacred and profane. In a ground that belongs to a club, the supporters can feel, quite incorrectly in any legal sense, that they are in a space

that “belongs” to them, but for all the claims of Spartak fans about the club’s special character, the team never had a stadium of its own. Dinamo had its place in Petrovsky Park. Lokomotiv’s ground was in Cherkizovo. Torpedo had a small 20,000-seater on Vostochnaia Street. Even TsSKA, which played nearly all its games at either Dinamo or Luzhniki, had an old 10,000-place ground on Peschanaia Street. After it opened in 1956, Lenin Stadium, the national arena, was the site of most of Spartak’s home games, but every other Moscow side hosted matches there as well. Over the course of the next 36 years, Spartak played in all of Moscow’s venues, forcing its fans to check the game site carefully. The team also played early- and late-season matches in enclosed arenas. These included its own indoor training facility and that of TsSKA, as well as the enclosed 35,000-seat Olimpiiskii Stadium, built in 1980.

Did this nomadic existence weaken loyalty to the club? Certainly the lack of a consistent stadium attenuated the ties of neighborhood and community that had been so important in Spartak’s prehistory (1900–1935), but it had been decades since the club was based in the Krasnopresneskii region. Moscow had developed in ways that weakened the distinctions among neighborhoods. It therefore cannot be said that Dinamo “represented” north Moscow in the same way that Tottenham Hotspur and Arsenal authentically still represent north London. In this sense, Spartak probably did not lose that much by not having a ground of its own. If anything, the fact of having no permanent site may have allowed it to be seen as the team of all Moscow. In 2004, a group of architects and urban planners from Germany’s famed Bauhaus School studied the siting of Moscow’s arenas and proposed for Spartak the fictional slogan, “The city is our stadium” (Eggers and Kneifl 2006, 111–42).

Stadium or no stadium, Starostin, along with many others at Spartak, always stressed the exceptional loyalty of their followers regardless of the results on the field. The club’s leadership was also fond of pointing out its popularity in comparison with the other Moscow clubs, most notably Dinamo. The boasting could well be seen as yet another example of Spartak ideology, but one can ver-ify or refute the claims by examining attendance figures. A sampling of average gates for the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (choosing successful as well as unsuccessful seasons) reveals that the claims were not entirely arrogant bragging.

During the last three Soviet decades, overall soccer attendance steadily declined.[21] This fall-off was not restricted to the USSR but was a worldwide phenomenon. Spartak was not immune to the game’s general malaise. If the drop in attendance during the 1970s and 1980s was not precipitous in Spartak’s case, it was still unmistakable. Furthermore, as we have seen, Spartak was not failure-proof. Bad play on the field was indeed punished at the turnstile. The fans may have been loyal, but they were not blind. While much has been made of the strong attendance at Spartak’s games during 1977 when the team was in the second division, the fact is that it drew fewer people than it had in 1975 when it finished tenth in the top flight. The numbers also show that while Dinamo was clearly less popular than Spartak, its following was still substantial, and it remained so until the 1980s, when the team fell into crisis. The record, then, does not contradict the broad claims of Spartak loyalists about the solidity of their support, but it does indicate some basis for tempering their enthusiasm. Spartak did not defy gravity. While losers may continue to draw good audiences in provincial markets where the team is one of few entertainments, this is rarely the case in large cities with several teams, not to mention concert halls, movie theaters, and nightclubs. The Moscow soccer market, as well

as the entertainment market, proved to be highly elastic and inconsistent.

Ticket sales provided much—but not all—of Spartak's revenue. The prices of those tickets (one to three rubles) were by no means high. Sponsorship provided the support that the gate did not or could not. By the mid-1960s, the Moscow trade union sports system had taken over responsibility for the team. A broad range of workers, many of them in white-collar positions and service industries, then came under the wing of the Spartak Sport Society, but union funding proved less generous than that of the Moscow city party committee, not to mention the army or police. When attendance declined in the early 1970s, Spartak had to scramble to fill the gap. In 1973, Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, came to the club's aid. By the 1977 season, Viktor Grishin, head of the Moscow party, became sufficiently concerned about the great club's fate to increase the party's involvement with Spartak. Starostin had to scramble for support from a variety of sources. Thus Spartak was once again associated with no clear and dominant patron, a situation that reinforced its enduring but deceptive image of independence.

In order to grow revenues, Starostin greatly expanded the practices of touring and midweek friendlies that went back to the 1920s. The primary purpose of these games was to increase the money available to the players. Provincial clubs were offering much higher salaries than the Moscow teams, and touring was one way Starostin could compete. Here he was trading on the somewhat withered Spartak brand. The Red and White might have known better days, but to folks in a small town who had seen the players only on television, their presence was a grand holiday (*prazdnik*). Once Spartak got back to the top, these events became even bigger and more lucrative attractions. The number of these matches varied from year to year, ranging from as few as five to as many as 20, and did not include pre-season games, which were more clearly justified in terms of preparing the team.

It must be noted that those who filled the stadiums and purchased the tickets did not consume the spectacles in an orderly and healthy manner. Especially during the 1970s, Soviet soccer fans, in the best tradition of internationalism, adopted many of the pathologies then common throughout the world. Violence had always been part of Soviet football but never in epidemic proportions. While Spartak supporters had been involved in such acts, it was not clear they were any more rowdy than the fans of other teams. That changed during the 1970s. When hooliganism began to appear inside and outside Soviet stadiums, many of Spartak's younger supporters appear to have been at the cutting edge, transforming themselves into a new type of fan called *fanaty*, perhaps best translated in contemporary football parlance as "ultras." Their emergence was one sign of the problems that had enveloped the entire world of soccer. Those problems were, in turn, part of the global revolution among youth. As early as the 1969 season, young men with long hair, dressed in jeans and accompanied by girlfriends, were showing up at Spartak matches, chanting and singing their own original contributions to Spartak spirit (Hosking 1990, 335; Wolfe 2005, 108).

Hooliganism, drunkenness, and disorder became even more common, eroding attendance every bit as much as colorless play and endless arranged matches. It was not until 1970, however, that accounts of violence inside and outside the stadium became common in the press. Disorderly "lovers of football" were surely a part of the Soviet sporting crowd from the 1920s on, but the problem apparently did not trouble the authorities until decades later. Large numbers of loud and drunken fans at a jam-packed Lenin Stadium were said to have been

ejected from the Spartak–Dinamo Kiev match on April 18, 1970. The police displayed a mountain of vodka bottles taken from fans when both Torpedo Moscow and Torpedo Kutaisi played Spartak. *Sovetskii sport* did not mention many episodes of this sort involving fans of other clubs, but this alone should not be taken as proof that Spartak fans were drunker than others (Hosking 1990, 335; Wolfe 2005, 108).

By 1972, fan rowdiness took a new form among the teenagers and young men who rooted for Spartak and stood together at the ends of Lenin Stadium. They had grown frustrated by the team's poor performance and sought to find a way to contribute to an improvement in Spartak's fortunes. These young supporters also knew that the participation of Soviet teams in the European club tournaments had revealed the clear superiority of foreign football. They had been especially impressed by the televised final of that year's Cup Winners' Cup involving Glasgow Rangers and Dinamo Moscow. With Rangers ahead by two goals, Dinamo produced a storm of energy toward the end of the match that brought it back to within one, whereupon the Scottish supporters invaded the field, causing the match to be temporarily suspended for several minutes. When play resumed, Dinamo had lost its momentum, and the Rangers went on to triumph 3–2. This was truly a way, thought the *fanaty,* to influence the outcome on the field of play.

The next spring, about 40 young men gathered at one end of Lenin Stadium. They had joined 20,000 others for the first game of the Moscow season as Spartak took on Ararat. They were wearing red and white scarves and waving Spartak banners. These items had not been purchased in the Spartak team store, which did not exist at the time, nor were they sold anyplace else in the city. These new ultras had produced their gear on their own. In time, this practice spread. As the USSR opened up to the rest of the world, Soviet hooligans were able to study the "English model" (Taubman 2003, 307; Zubkova 1998, 171, 193; Medvedev and Medvedev 1978, 73). Forty grew to hundreds and then thousands, who stood in one or another unpopulated section, chanting, singing, and cheering. They do not appear to have been especially drunk or violent at this point, but their sheer exuberance and spontaneity attracted the attention of both the police and volunteer militias (*druzhiny*) who were charged with maintaining calm in the stands. The sometimes brutal treatment from overzealous guardians of order pushed these exuberant fans into less benign activities. Over the next 20 years, the first groups of *fanaty* were joined by masses of disaffected youths who traveled in packs to away matches, engaged in fights, threatened bystanders, and destroyed property.[22]

Such behavior had the potential to end in tragedy and did so for Spartak supporters. On October 20, 1982, the team was playing Haarlem of the Netherlands in the first leg of an early-round UEFA Cup match on a frigid fall evening that brought the season's first snow. Only 10,000 of the faithful showed up, many of them teenagers and young men. The hardy group was confined to a few sideline sections that fed into one narrow exit tunnel leading to an ice-covered stairway. Despite dominating the contest, Spartak had managed to push through only one goal, an unconvincing margin before the return leg in Holland. With a few minutes to go, a group of fans headed for the exits, moving slowly through the only open tunnel. This restriction on crowd flow was a deliberate policy designed to slow the rush of fans into the metro. With 20 seconds left in the match, Sergei Shvetsov scored a vital second goal. Those leaving heard the roar of the crowd, immediately reversed direction and headed back to the stands. Within

seconds they ran into the stream of other fans leaving the arena. The result was carnage. Many slipped on the icy stairway and were trampled. Others were crushed between the two masses of humanity. Police and soldiers began to carry the bodies of the dead out onto the small Lenin Stadium parking lot. It would be a half hour until the first ambulance appeared.

The next day *Vechernaia Moskva* was the only newspaper to hint at the enormity of what had occurred. “Yesterday, at Luzhniki, after the end of the football match, an unfortunate event occurred. There were casualties among the spectators” (Furst 2006, 137). In the aftermath, the police were quick to blame the dead for their own fate. The fanatic behavior of the young men and boys who died was said to explain the chaos. The link to hooliganism was all too clear. It was an argument that sought to deflect the blame from the stadium administration whose sloth and disregard for safety had created the conditions for the disaster. Ultimately, the police official in charge that night was sentenced to a year and a half in jail. At the time, the death toll was given as 66. Seven years later in the full light of *glasnost*, *Sovetskii sport* ran an exposé on the tragedy. According to a group of parents of the dead, the actual loss of life numbered 340 (Reid 2006, 160). If the figure is close to being correct, the toll dwarfed the two great European stadium disasters of the 1980s—the Heysel tragedy of 1985 that took 39 lives and the Hillsborough crush in 1989 that killed 96.[23] Ultimately, Hillsborough produced reforms on a global scale that changed the spectator experience forever. The standing terraces, which were never part of Soviet stadiums, were replaced in much of the world by seats. Police methods were changed. By contrast, no reforms of any sort took place in the USSR in the aftermath of the tragedy at Luzhniki. Instead, the matter was systematically covered up, and Spartak *fanaty* continued to provoke trouble especially at away matches.

On September 24, 1990, I sat in a car with the veteran Soviet sportswriter Gennadi Larchikov as he drove me to see Spartak play Rotor Volgograd at Lenin Stadium. “Spartak,” he told me, “is the team of intellectuals and hooligans.” Iuri Shaliapin, the club’s president, told the weekly *Futbol-Khokkei* much the same thing. The team, he said, had “two categories of fans.” First, there were the young *fanaty* who were “noisy and aggressive” but did not really know either football or the club’s history. The second category was composed of “people from various professions who had been supporters for decades and were genuinely knowledgeable about the game” (Oleshchuk 2000, 102–105). His bifur-cated fan base raises an interesting question. Did the working class and professional supporters of Spartak share anything else beyond their love of the team? Before the war, a significant portion of the largely proletarian soccer audience had used Spartak to establish distance from the state and the elites who ran it. After the war, members of elite social groups joined the football public and supported Spartak. Workers and intellectuals appear to have been drawn to the people’s team for similar reasons, but it is not clear how much they shared once the game was over.

Conclusion

In a famous Soviet-era joke, Brezhnev is sitting in a broken down train with Stalin and Khrushchev. Stalin says to shoot the train’s engineer. Khrushchev says to raise his wages. Brezhnev says to pull down the shades and pretend the train is moving. Yet, it was not the train that was or was not moving. It was the outside world in which the train sat that was in rapid

motion. The era of stagnation only applied to a few segments of the state-party structures. The rest of society was experiencing swift and profound change largely induced by the growth of towns. This was a time of vast unintended consequences induced by the modernizing project Stalin had unleashed. By the Brezhnev period, the old dualities of "state and society"; "official and dissident," which may not have explained much even in their own time, had now collapsed. Here, Yurchak's deconstruction of these withered categories is particularly helpful. During the last Soviet decades, youth and others who did not accept the state's authority did not so much seek to oppose Soviet power as avoid it.

Similarly, development had changed the world of Soviet soccer. The once relatively small league structure had been reasonably controlled by meddling authorities in the center. By the 1970s, football had grown into a huge industry of its own. The state sport committee could only hope to manage the many competing claims of hundreds of regional and industrial interest groups. This was a hard-edged and highly corrupt world to which Spartak adjusted uncomfortably. In the middle of the 1970s it looked as if Nikolai Starostin, the patriarch and founder of the club, had outlived his usefulness. He was shoved aside to return only when those who had pushed him out wound up shoving the entire team under the train. Starostin was granted a second act. In the bare-knuckle word of late Soviet football, he had to take harsh measures himself, hiring the dictatorial Beskov, with whom he feuded for 12 years. Eventually he would dismiss a man described by others as "impossible," returning to the more humane, perhaps paternalistic practices of earlier years. When Soviet power ended, Spartak was well poised to prosper in the post-Soviet space. When Starostin died in 1996 at the age of 98, his creation had won five of the first six titles in the new Russian league. At the beginning of this century the club experienced a crisis. Distraught fans began to display large banners with the great patriarch's portrait. On them, they had written, "He sees all."

By the beginning of the new millennium, the old role of Spartak as a site of careful resistance had ended. Instead, the club attracted nationalist and racist groups of often-violent fans. They clashed with those who remembered the old days when Spartak had stood for something quite different. Today these conflicting discourses swirl around the team that has returned to its elite status as one of Russia's best teams. Sport has been a site on which conflicting versions of historical memory are played out. The result of this struggle for the great old club's soul is yet to be decided.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the role of Soviet subjectivity in the construction of the self, see Hellbeck (2006, 1–14, 347–64). On the public and private, see Siegelbaum (2006, 1–21).

2. Kuper (1994, 46). The anthropologist in question is the Armenian scholar Levon Abramian, whose work has centered on festival in antiquity. See Abramian (1983, 11–14).

3. On the question of resistance and its discontents, see David-Fox, et al. (2003). On violent protest, see Kozlov (2002, 3–21, 311–14).

4. Kuper (1994, 40). The "Soviet scholar" in question is quoted by Kuper but is not named.

5. Leonid Trakhtenberg, interview with the author, Moscow, October 11, 1990.

6. *Soviet Sport* (September 5, 1970).

7. Colton (1995, 388, 453).
8. Goranskii and Lovchev (2002, 32).
9. *Soviet Sport* (January 29, 1966).
10. *Izvestiia* (February 19, 1974).
11. *Izvestiia* (April 4, 1966).
12. *Soviet Sport* (September 5, 1970).
13. www.sport-exprehss.ru/art.shtml?146949. Accessed September 29, 2007.
14. Arbatov (1992, 86). The USSR's leading expert on the United States, Arbatov worked at the Central Committee during the 1960s in a section that housed numerous reformers. He mentioned that in addition to politics, soccer was one of the subjects of their informal conversations.
15. On body culture, see Laqueur and Gallagher (1987); Eichberg (1998); Featherstone and Turner (1991).
16. Nazarov, interview; Vartanian, interview, 1999.
17. *Sto let*, (133–41, 159).
18. *Soviet Sport* (July 30, 1980).
19. Lovchev, Nazarov, Simonian, and Vartanian, interviews.
20. Goranskii (2002, 28); Lovchev, Logofet, and Galinskii, interviews.
21. For more specific figures on attendance of Spartak and Dinamo games in the 1960s–1980s, see Edelman (2009, 291).
22. Klub Bolel'shchikov Spartaka (1990).
23. On the complexities of the Soviet apartment see Reid (2006, 154–70) and Harris (2006, 171–90).

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Chapter 7
Beyond the Genres of Stagnation: Reading the Allure of I. Grekova's *The Hotel Manager*

Benjamin M. Sutcliffe

It is easy to disparage *The Hotel Manager* (*Khoziaika gostinitsy*), a novella composed in 1976 by the outstanding Soviet mathematician Elena Venttsel' (1907–2002), who wrote under the pen name I. Grekova. At first glance the plot is far from original: Vera Butova, a smiling, blonde provincial beauty, marries the rigid commander Aleksandr Larichev in 1930. She discovers that life with the egotistical and overbearing officer is far from the vague idyll she had envisioned. After her husband's death in 1957, she finds work at a local hotel on the Black Sea, and, by the end of the narrative, has become an undisputable success in the service industry. On her sixtieth birthday she receives two telegrams. The first offers her a promotion in Moscow—complete with residence permit, apartment, and her own hotel to manage. The second is from her lover, Sergei, a sturdy Muscovite who will presumably share her remaining years.

The narrative harbors a host of contradictions. First, it is an atypical work for Grekova, who was one of the first writers to legitimate the place of women in Thaw and Stagnation prose. Along with Natal'ia Baranskaia, she made the quotidian quandaries of female characters a key part of literary culture, using the seemingly innocuous realm of everyday life (*byt*) to critique problems such as male alcoholism, broken families, and the difficult balance between home and career.

The Hotel Manager likewise combines three types of literature that appear mutually exclusive: the production novel of socialist realism, the anti-Stalinist narrative, and women's writing. Incorporating these heterogeneous genres, the *povest'* (novella) claims to describe typical Soviet reality for an era more interested in private life than the pompous grandeur of the public sphere. At the same time, *The Hotel Manager* offers an ending that is simply too good to be true: Vera finds real love late in life, quietly rejecting the traditional image of the worn-out, sexless widow. This paradoxical appeal to the realistic/improbable is a key part of the cultural mythology of Stagnation, i.e., those beliefs created by ordinary Soviets and the state to guide perceptions of reality.[1]

Grekova was, for the most part, misread by those Western critics discussing the few but influential women writers before *perestroika*. Some scholars assumed these authors to be feminists, presumably because of their gender and the fact that feminism became prominent in the West during this period (Barker 1988). Another critic slighted Grekova for exactly the opposite reasons, wondering why female readers devoured the works of an author who was not advancing women's equality but instead continuing the legacy of socialist realism (Thompson 1995).

Neither approach accounts for the popularity of *The Hotel Manager*; copies of *Zvezda*, the journal containing the novella, were pilfered from library reading rooms and in the USSR the *povest'* garnered substantial critical interest. The appeal of this work has little to do with

feminism, a concept that was essentially absent from Soviet culture until *perestroika*. Likewise, dismissing all the works of Soviet literature influenced by socialist realism would leave a small group of authors who were unknown, inaccessible, or alien to the average reader.[2]

In examining Grekova's novella, we must consider its appeal to the implied audience. Wolfgang Iser (1978, x) describes how combining reader attitudes and the narrative creates something new, "a reformulation of an already formulated reality." Reader and work interact, which would be impossible without the literary tradition that both rely on. *The Hotel Manager* combined several pre-existing Soviet genres while also advancing risky, if not heretical, ideas about women and the past. This unexpected combination accompanies the novella's use of the typical and the anomalous, two categories that would later shape Vladimir Men'shov's blockbuster 1980 film *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* (*Moskva slezam ne verit*).

Grekova was known for nuanced works illustrating the lives of older, unmarried female scientists. Vera's narrative, however, is an often stylized depiction of an irrepressible optimist whose life, according to the author, is "difficult, working-class, but happy all the same" (*trudnaia, trudovaia a vse zhe veselaia*). This triumvirate of adjectives, which seems paradoxical today, was at the time the presumed foundation of a Soviet culture enthusiastically working to build Communism.[3]

Given the novella's ideological subtexts and Western Slavists' proclivity for linking narrative and politics, it is tempting to read *The Hotel Manager* as a social document demonstrating how hard work and strong moral character bring rewards. However, overemphasizing this portion of the narrative ignores the work's strange place in Grekova's prose and its subtle critiques of Soviet history and gendered inequality. All of these components combine in the three types of Stagnation literature shaping *The Hotel Manager*: (1) the production novel (a genre of socialist realism), (2) the anti-Stalinist narrative, and (3) the nebulous category of "women's writing." As I will discuss, each of these generated different and often conflicting reader expectations. It is a testament to Grekova's skill that she managed to create a unified narrative out of these different genres and their varied agendas (Friedberg 1983, xiv; Sutcliffe 2009).

Socialism with a Woman's Touch: Vera and the Service Industry

Genres are notoriously difficult to define—they escape precise denotation and confound those critics who attempt to make their analysis into an exact science. However, as Katerina Clark and numerous others have shown, from the 1920s onward, readers and scholars developed clear expectations for the production novel, a socialist realist narrative highlighting heroic efforts to advance Soviet metallurgy, agriculture, and even the service industry. Vera herself is aware that this part of the economy has its challenges—from her viewpoint as a hotel administrator, it is a source of continued problems and less a sphere than "all corners and sharp points."[4]

Socialist realism and its production novels provided one of the enduring master plots of

Soviet culture, lingering long after 1953 to assure readers that their lives were good but would soon be even better. As Clark demonstrates, this type of narrative relies on the positive hero, a person such as Vera who overcomes a series of obstacles (including recalcitrant coworkers) to make the workplace a model for the nation and the world (1981, 15–16).

The production novel shapes the third and final portion of *The Hotel Manager.* After Larichev's death, Vera begins work as a floor manager (*dezhurnaia*) at the Hotel Salute on the Black Sea coast. She is 45 when she joins the staff, and by age 60 she has become its manager. This fairly rapid progress occurs despite denunciations by the jealous Alla Tarasovna (the meddlesome senior administrator of the hotel) and an anonymous letter that attacks Vera for having an affair with Sergei, a merchant seaman and inventor, and besmirching the collective's morality. Following the happy ending of the production novel formula, at the end of *The Hotel Manager* Vera will move from the periphery (her provincial city) to the center (Moscow). Katia, the hardworking single mother of *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, follows a similarly radiant path: from a temporary employee in a Moscow factory, she becomes the head of a plant, earning a spacious apartment, contacts with various government ministers, and even a car. In her 40s at the end of the film, she meets the worker Gosha, who makes her life complete. This type of success story, an evolution of the production novel, was in demand during the 1970s and early 1980s in great part because of its optimistic subtext.[5]

Conscientious work changes lives. The production novel shows how involvement in a socially useful task transforms the protagonist. For Vera this shift is precipitated by her escape from the suffocating private realm (housework) to the public sphere, bringing her out from under the long shadow of her domineering husband. This move triggers the positive change that underlies the production novel and its image of a constantly improving reality. One critic observed that Larichev's major shortcoming is to keep Vera from society and for himself; as someone who becomes a model for the service industry, her place is at work, not home. By implication, Vera's significance stems not only from her status as a likeable character, but as an individual who gains meaning from guiding others. In order to fulfill her promise, she must gain her independence.[6]

It is Larichev who first jokingly refers to Vera as a "hotel manager." She impeccably serves his many guests, never losing the smile that he demands on her face. Later, when working as a floor manager, she takes pride in walking home with her meager pay—being both an independent individual and part of the collective gladdens her. In the tradition of socialist realism's positive heroes, Vera herself is transformed as she improves her workplace (remodeling the hotel with a woman's eye), garnering recognition at the local and national level as her hotel becomes famous throughout the USSR.[7]

Vera, Grekova notes, is a working-class woman. To better emphasize this part of her character, the author created her sister, Zhenia. Physically weak since childhood and averse to work, she opposes Vera's sturdy physical and moral nature. Admitting that Zhenia is a poorly developed personage, Grekova explains that she is necessary in order to better highlight Vera's positive attributes. This artificial and rather unsuccessful effort demonstrates that *The Hotel Manager* continues a major concern of the production novel and socialist realism as a whole: literature must clearly portray the positive and negative aspects of real-ity, with reality itself

secondary to persuading the reader.[8]

The *povest'* also uses a series of timely coincidences to deliver its themes. These events, testing the reader's credibility, accompany heavy-handed symbolism incongruous for Grekova. These moments begin well before the production novel takes over the narrative. When Larichev and Vera are in line to register their marriage, the woman in front of them is getting a divorce. She cannot remember her maiden name because her failed marriage has erased the memory of her previous identity. For Vera's part, 27 years as wife firmly subordinate her to Larichev. She experiences only one interval of freedom. After being evacuated during World War II, Vera works in a hospital where her closest friend, Masha Smolina, happens to be stationed—this fortuitous happenstance leads Vera to act as a surrogate mother for Masha's two children. Larichev, upon his return from the front, quickly destroys this makeshift family by driving away Vera's "son" and "daughter" (Grekova 1980b, 244, 274, 287).

These contrived moments clash with the realism Grekova shares with Iurii Trifonov and other mainstream 1970s authors. However, such coincidences also resonate with the pre-modern types of literature that Clark identifies as influencing socialist realism. The manipulation of chance is crucial to both the folktale (*skazka*) and hagiography (*zhitie*), two genres where even the most minor of events must reflect the positive or negative nature of those involved. In these kinds of literature characters do not act independently; instead, their lives are a part of fate or the will of God. In the portion of Grekova's *povest'* resembling a production novel, Vera's destiny is to use her feminine charm, exemplary work ethic, and positive outlook to advance the Soviet hotel industry. This successful goal all but negates the bitter recollections of her marriage to Larichev. It is no surprise that Masha, who first finds Vera a position at the hotel, never liked Larichev. Everything is interconnected in this narrative (Clark 1981, 47; Grekova 1980b, 268, 270, 310, 255–56).

Despite such plot machinations, *The Hotel Manager* is too heterogeneous to be an ideological work. It does not fall under Susan Suleiman's classic definition of "novels that seek, through the vehicle of fiction, to persuade their readers of the 'correctness' of a particular way of interpreting the world" (1983, 1). Grekova's narrative does attempt to convince the reader that the late Soviet experience is ultimately a positive one. However, the conflicting nature of its various genres makes a truly unified worldview impossible. As I note below, each of the three kinds of literature in the *povest'* comes with ideas that contradict those of the others (Suleiman 1983, 1).[9]

Grekova provides one major reason for creating such a narrative. She wrote *The Hotel Manager* after completing what many consider to be her best work—the novella *Ship of Widows* (*Vdovii parokhod*, published in 1979). By her admission, Grekova needed to dispel the gloom this *povest'* had brought on—likewise, she probably wanted to write something more easily published. These two works are strikingly different: *The Ship of Widows* depicts Ol'ga Ivanovna, an intellectual who loses her husband at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (Larichev dies well after Stalin's death). Ol'ga Ivanovna and her communal apartment neighbors—all widows—cannot escape a past defined by national and personal tragedy. Their future is unknown and ultimately unimportant: the novella fo-cuses on a daily routine of arguments and scandals that comprise an interminable present tense and irritated many critics. The *kommunalka* neighbors are a world removed from Vera, the erstwhile working-class girl

who has risen to the top. The final image of *The Ship of Widows* shows no great escape, no yearning toward personal and career aspirations—there is only a listless drifting that one critic likens to the Ship of Fools in medieval thought (Levitan and Tsilevich 1998, 270; Grekova 1986b, 401; Räisälä 2008, 172).

The work Grekova wrote after *The Hotel Manager* is likewise dissimilar. *The Faculty* (*Kafedra*, 1978) details the personal and academic turmoil of professors and students in a cybernetics department. The seemingly cold and monolithic Fliagin, who is poised to become the department chair, at the end of the novella renounces his bid and apologizes for the conflict he has caused. This non-event, the work's many subplots, and a focus on intellectual labor reflect Grekova's usual structure and themes, few of which appear in *The Hotel Manager*. Both *The Faculty* and *The Ship of Widows* are narratives about commu-nity—the individual means little outside this human environment. On her sixtieth birthday Vera is feted by colleagues and her adopted family, yet this togetherness honors Vera's success as an individual, moving from impoverished girl and cowed housewife to successful businesswoman. The triumph of the exemplary worker against a background of general social progress evoked the production novel and helped ensure the publication of *The Hotel Manager* (Grekova 1980a, 220; 1980b, 383–86).

The Dark Figure: Stalinism and Married Life

The final third of Vera's narrative resembles the production novel and contains the transparency that one critic prized in the *povest'* as a whole. The second kind of literature shaping *The Hotel Manager* is the anti-Stalinist narrative, which is more subtle opaque and less easily defined. Between the end of the Thaw and the advent of *perestroika*, critiques of the 1930s–early 1950s appeared only sporadically in published fiction, reflecting what Margaret Ziolkowski terms a "marked ambivalence" in assessing the recent totalitarian past. The anti-Stalinist rhetoric of works such as Evgenii Evtushenko's "The Heirs of Stalin" ("Nasledniki Stalina," 1962) and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (*Odin den' Ivana Denisovicha*, 1962) was no longer acceptable. Iurii Trifonov's more cautious exploration in *The House on the Embankment* (*Dom na naberezhnoi*, 1976) appeared the same year as *The Hotel Manager* and carefully limited the scope of depiction and critique as it described Stalinist interference in post-war academia.[10]

The second portion of Vera's narrative, which focuses on her marriage to Larichev, is a hesitant questioning of Stalinism. Grekova no doubt realized that an explicit attack would make the novel unprintable—her earlier novella *On Maneuvers* (*Na ispytaniiakh*, 1968) was lambasted in part for its unflattering image of denunciations in the army in 1952. In light of this past experience and her recent difficulties with *The Ship of Widows*, she presumably wished to avoid such a negative reception. Grekova was not the only author to make this decision—the few Stagnation-era critiques of the Stalin era that did appear were tentative and fragmentary, as if using their form to challenge Stalinism's false certainty and bloated form.[11]

Larichev first appears as a dark figure on the beach, and only after meeting him does Vera realize that this somber appearance comes from his military uniform. The first glimpse of her

future husband occurs in 1930, the advent of Stalinism in the Soviet popular imagination. Larichev is an unwavering supporter of the leader: in the pre-war years he comments on his fear of spies. This attitude acts as a coded signal for the paranoia and unjustified suspicions Evtushenko and others in the Thaw had ascribed to Stalinism. Later Larichev is captured by the Germans and eventually escapes; he defends the Soviet security officials who interrogated him to ascertain that he had not been converted to the fascist cause (Grekova 1980b, 224, 270, 286).[12]

The present-tense narrative of *The Hotel Manager* describes Vera after her husband's death. The first image we see is Larichev's body in the coffin, dressed in his military uniform. According to his wishes, he is buried with the watch given in gratitude by a Commissar. Its monotonous ticking, the narrator notes, makes it seem that Larichev is still alive, recalling Evtushenko describing Stalinism as a living corpse threatening the Thaw. This detail also suggests both Stalinism's mechanization of the human form and its disregard for those the ruler famously described as "cogs in the machine."[13]

Early in their marriage, Larichev instructs Vera on the roles and duties of husband and wife. During this speech, as the narrator notes, he seems artificial: "There was something familiar in his tones. This is how actors, playing the 'kind father,' change their voice." Such simulation, antithetical to Vera's open nature, evokes Thaw images of the totalitarian era as deathlike, artificial, and hindering normal life.[14]

Larichev firmly supports the Father of the Peoples, yet this does not prevent him from later exploiting the Thaw's liberalization and increased economic opportunities. Scheming to gather materials needed to build a home, he has his wife feed and serve various shady but well-connected characters. Vera is uneasy with this but does not protest, just as she is silently annoyed when he refers to the couple as "landowners" (*pomeshchiki*). The narrator specifically comments on the "Tsarist" nature of this word, which compromises Larichev's status as a high-ranking defender of the Soviet Union by connecting him to the pre-1917 elite. In Vera's world—a world shaped by her poor but happy childhood—her husband has become alien in both a personal and political sense (Grekova 1980b, 298, 300, 223).

The hypocrisy of Stalinism was a well-established feature of Thaw and Stagnation literature. Grekova's discussion is groundbreaking because the resulting critique centers on the female body. Evtushenkos "The Heirs of Stalin" fixated on the undead form of the (male) ruler, while *The House on the Embankment* examined the effect on academic culture and personality. For Vera and her friend Masha, the epoch's dark side is evident specifically through corporeality (*telesnost'*). Masha, pregnant after having an affair while working as a surgeon, cannot terminate the fetus because of wartime restrictions (the narrative does not clarify that these restrictions began in 1936). A similar scenario appears in Grekova's early story "Summer in the City" (*Letom v gorode*), where protagonist Valentina Stepanovna links the late 1930s to oppression, the cloying smell of lime trees, and her near arrest after trying to have an illegal abortion (Grekova 1980b, 278; 1990b, 491–92).

Vera, interestingly enough, has the opposite experience. In the first years of her marriage Larichev forces her to end her pregnancy, citing the flimsy pretexts that military life leaves no room for a child and that the international situation is tense. As she subsequently discovers, there is another reason: Larichev fears the possibility of paying child support, which he

already does because of his first marriage. Vera agrees to the abortion, not recognizing that such control fundamentally negates her rights as an individual. After consenting to his wishes, Vera and her husband have some of the best sex in their marriage, further evidence of the link between the Stalinist Larichev, subordination of other's opinions, and male control over the female body under totalitarianism. True to Grekova's focus as an author, this disturbing sequence of events is presented as part of *byt*, that seemingly banal realm that hints at a disturbing imbalance of power between husband and wife (1980b, 252).

In the context of Soviet culture, Grekova's cautious link between Stalinism and women's corporeality was nothing less than heretical. Thaw- and Stagnation-era works had focused on the male experience and shunned depicting *telesnost'*. Not until the post-Soviet era, with the appearance of Liudmila Ulitskaia's *The Case of Kukotskii* (*Kazus Kukotskogo*, 2001), would a prominent author address this epoch through its distortion of the female body. Grekova, to appropriate a key term from Beth Holmgren, makes the perceptive reader realize that Stalinist control over the female "body politic" was first and foremost manifest in how it manipulated the body itself. In this sense, *The Hotel Manager* was well ahead of its time.[15]

Motherhood Lost: *The Hotel Manager* and Women's Writing

Vera's dizzying success in the service industry and her gloomy Stalinist marriage both rely on her attitudes and expectations as a woman. In the 1960s and 1970s, Grekova and Baranskaia legitimated the place of women in mainstream literature, using the quotidian to focus on women's lives as markedly different from men's. Their efforts were, to a great extent, an outgrowth of the times. Thaw and Stagnation privileged private life over the public sphere, lauding verisimilitude and sincerity in place of the perceived falseness and corruption of Stalinism. In this context, works such as Grekova's *Ladies' Hairdresser* (*Damskii master*, 1963) and Baranskaia's *A Week Like Any Other* (*Nedelia kak nedelia*, 1969) made the female quotidian a worthy topic for literature.[16]

Many critics dismissed such humdrum concerns, as *The Hotel Manager* illustrates. While living in the grim Urals military town where Larichev is stationed, Vera pens an article on the humorous crises of daily life. Local editors, liking the piece and its lighthearted approach, nonetheless reject it because of its petty subject matter. Grekova and Baranskaia attempted to reverse such prejudices, in the process making explicit Russian literature's tacit link between *byt*, private life, and women's problems.[17]

The first year and a half of Vera's marriage, the narrator succinctly summarizes, consists of love, *byt*, and subordination. This triumvirate, none too subtly conveyed to the reader, links Vera's new status as housewife to Larichev eclipsing her personality. Larichev makes this explicit to both Vera and the reader as he explains their respective roles.

> You and I are husband and wife. Each of us has rights and responsibilities. My responsibility is to serve [the state], bring home money. Your responsibility is to keep house. And not just any old way, but with some thought, initiative. Is something missing? Think about where to get it! And don't turn to me with these little problems [*pustiakami*]. I, as a man, am above that. Is that clear?

The trifles of *byt* are the responsibilities of the wife, not the husband. Larichev continues, laying out the rights of each spouse. Vera has only one—"to be loved." This, in Larichev's thinking, is the right from which all others come. Here we can see the imprint of Stalinism: it is the husband/surrogate of the state who grants, interprets, and protects this right, as he is the source of the love. As with the portions of *The Hotel Manager* that resemble the production novel, Larichev's status as overbearing spouse is not open for interpretation. The narrative's clear rejection of him is also aided by Vera's own failure to see the imbalance in her marriage—the reader must do this for her, thus implicitly agreeing with the novel's negative assessment.[18]

Larichev is a controlling figure. Leaving Vera's childhood home, he and his new bride walk together and the husband controls Vera "like a master controls his dog." This comparison recalls the masculine political/personal control that shapes the anti-Stalinist narrative. Once again Vera is not privy to the narrator's comments or their implications as the novella uses overwrought and absolutist language to depict her life with Larichev. *The Hotel Manager* inherits this totalizing diction from the production novel. Apparently, however, some readers still misinterpreted the narrator's attitude toward the marriage—Grekova notes that she received a letter from a retired military officer praising Vera and wishing that more wives were like her (Grekova 1980b, 246; Levitan and Tsilevich 1998, 275).

Larichev's unflattering characterization is not innovative in Soviet women's writing. Grekova's previous prose is littered with husbands who are unfaithful, irresponsible, or simply absent—in *The Ship of Widows,* drunken war veteran Fedor beats his wife, while Valentina Stepanovna in "Summer in the City" drove her husband out because of his philandering. *The Hotel Manager,* how-ever, contributes a new dimension, illustrating how Larichev controls Vera at the level of sexuality as well as everyday life (Grekova 1986b, 325, 331; 1990b, 487).

The narrative wastes no time in making this connection. First seeing his future wife as she emerges from swimming in the Black Sea, the next time Larichev encounters her he hides and watches while she is half-dressed after a swim: "Hesitating, herself not understanding what she was doing, she went out of the water onto the sand. He embraced her—she was wet, embarrassed, and he pressed her to him and said one word: 'Mine'."

Larichev claims her as his own, marking this conquest in terms that are preeminently sexual. In the role of experienced male, the officer looks over the woman he has chosen—her assent is presumed. Again, as with overbearing language shaped by the production novel, there is nothing subtle about this moment. Vera then poses the question that Larichev has, unspoken, brought into her mind: "Is this love?" Her naïve worldview readily supplies the expected response; within this narrative her physical and philosophical virginity allows no other answer.[19]

Larichev does not have sex with Vera on their wedding night, correctly perceiving that she is frightened of him and that this is the natural order of things. Grekova does not describe Vera losing her virginity, which presumably occurs the next evening. Such a scene would have violated the muted Victorianism of women's writing during Stagnation and irked critics, one of whom nonetheless decried the description of Vera's beauty as "naturalistic." However, the narrator unabashedly notes that the early years of their lives together are marked by "love"

(meaning sexual activity) that is persistently described as overwhelming Vera. This clichéd image of tumultuous masculine sexuality is an ideal in women's writing during the 1970s, when the potent, sober, and present husband is a rare find. We are not asked to speculate whether Vera is satisfied by Larichev—satisfaction is presumed by the reader, narrator, and Larichev himself, just as sex reaffirms the roles of (active) husband and (passive) wife (Bukhantsov 1977, 10; Grekova 1980b, 245, 257).

Several reasons underlie *The Hotel* Manager's staid depiction of physical intimacy in marriage. Stagnation literature provides no depictions of a woman's sexuality as evolving independent of a guiding (or deforming) male influence: female characters in *The Ship of Widows* and *The Faculty*, for example, have no erotic voice of their own. For them coitus is connected to being a single mother or widow. Grekova and her generation (most notably Baranskaia) subordinate sexuality to responsibility: in Stagnation prose a wife is less a lover than a mother (if not a father as well). In *The Ship of Widows* Ol'ga Ivanovna notes how maternal duties become a disease; self-sacrifice and guilt plague mothers, causing an illness male doctors cannot understand. What results is the rhetoric of suffering, which was a sociological fact in a nation whose male population had been decimated by wars, famine, and repression. Against this bleak background Vera shines because of her stylized (and patently unrealistic) optimism, which survives her narrow-minded husband (Grekova 1986b, 369).

For the narrator Larichev's sexual control over Vera is a problematic but immutable fact of human nature. His duplicity, however, is openly attacked. As the anti-Stalinist narrative observes, Larichev is clearly a hypocrite in the political sense. He also breaks an early (symbolic) promise to always carry Vera in his arms, which his wife only recalls decades later when he curses her during his long illness, the words falling on her like a blow. As with the role of coincidence, this juxtaposition between promise and fulfillment compels the reader to condemn Larichev (Grekova 1980b, 242, 249–50).

Demanding absolute fidelity from Vera, Larichev himself admits to having had an affair during the war. The trope of the duplicitous husband, not new for Russian culture, in the context of post-Stalinist women's writing signals a betrayal of responsibility and sincerity. The absence of this second value, which Svetlana Boym sees as key to the intelligentsia, denotes a gap between appearance and essence. Ultimately, a wife such as Vera can have little faith in a husband who is not the person he claims to be.[20]

Larichev's past is also far from reassuring, appropriate for a work that alludes to Stalinism and its errors. One day he makes a sudden announcement, saying that Iura, the son from his first marriage, must come to live with him and Vera. Iura's mother is now in a psychiatric hospital. Her illness was presumably triggered by Larichev divorcing her and leaving his son when he married Vera. Male abandonment and its consequences are a main theme for women authors and Grekova's prose in particular. Such behavior is inconceivable for female characters, with the possible exception of masculinized Masha (Grekova 1980b, 262–63).

The narrative indicts Larichev as politically and morally unreliable, linking him to Stalinism's callous brutality and suppression of the individual. Once again we see how those portions of *The Hotel Manager* recalling the anti-Stalinist narrative and women's writing rely on representational strategies similar to those of the totalitarian culture the novella repudiates: characterizations privilege caricature and minimize psychological development. Larichev,

whom Grekova wanted to portray in a more positive light, is the least convincing of any negative character in her works (Levitan and Tsilevich 1998, 275).

Although she never identified it as a central focus, Grekova was greatly concerned with women's status in a male-dominated world. Usually this is the very specific realm of mathematics and the natural sciences, where, for example, the women professors in *The Faculty* are overseen by a series of male department chairs. The strongly autobiographical story "No Smiles" (*Bez ulybok*, 1975), written the same year as *The Hotel Manger,* recounts how its female protagonist must make amends for serious but unspecified errors in the workplace. The narrative is a fictionalized account of Grekova's own problems caused by her colleagues' reactions to her prose. Protagonist "MM" notes that her fellow scholars, who are men, do not realize how vulnerable a woman can feel in academe (Grekova 1990a, 447).

During her career as one of the USSR's foremost experts in applied mathematics, Grekova/Venttsel' tried to be as good a professional as her male colleagues. At the same time, she continues, she was a widowed mother of three children (her husband died in 1955). Western and Russian scholars have examined the problems resulting from women coping with the double burden of work and family, yet Vera easily solves this problem in her own, characteristic way. Used to hard work since childhood and endowed with the optimism of the positive hero(ine), she is a success with the hotel guests because of her efficiency and captivating femininity. These guests, who are occasionally drunk and capricious, are visiting on business and are exclusively men (except for their dubious female visitors). The narrator recounts how Vera regularly receives flowers and even compliments in verse from her semi-smitten guests. In the context of *The Hotel Manager* these gifts are almost believable. All of Grekova's other female protagonists, however, resemble the main character in the story "Under the Streetlight" (*Pod fonarem*, 1967), who confesses to not speaking the language of femininity.[21]

The gender politics of the Hotel Salute, however, do not escape Vera's notice. While cheerfully ignoring the attentions of her male guests, she does remark on the complexities of being in charge of women: her subordinates—the floor managers, maids, and so forth—are middle-aged, underpaid, and easily riled. This banal complaint about the vagaries of the female collective hints at de facto wage discrimination, where Soviet women filled lower-paying positions, such as those in the service industry. This situation, as with Larichev shaping Vera's sexuality, is presented as an immutable fact of existence: it is problem-atic but ultimately unchangeable and even natural. However, in the context of the USSR's rhetoric of gender equality, such comments are as subversive as the critique of Stalinism, implying that the state countenanced or even encouraged women to enter less profitable parts of the economy.[22]

Vera rises to the top of the service industry largely with the help of two female mentors, a character type inherited from socialist realism. The more important of these figures is Masha, who influences the plot if only for securing Vera the humble job of hotel floor manager. (The second mentor, Margarita Antonova, helps when Vera is denounced for having an affair with the inventor Sergei.)[23]

Vera sees Masha for the first time in an abortion ward—a symbolic locus that returns readers to how Larichev controls his wife's body and mind. The hospital as a place for chance meetings and exchanging personal history is also linked to women's writing, less in the prose

of Grekova and Baranskaia than in the *perestroika*-era works of Svetlana Vasilenko and Liudmila Petrushevskaia (Goscilo 1989).

Following the schematic tendency *The Hotel Manager* relies on, Masha is what Vera is not: masculine (during the war she works as a surgeon, not a nurse), swarthy, independent, and the mother of two children. Masha and Larichev dislike each other from the first glance; it is her friend who first tells Vera that all is not right in the marriage. Vera's mother and Masha die a few days apart—what at first appears to be yet another contrived coincidence changes when one considers that Grekova lost her mother and beloved husband at approximately the same time. This biographical link shows the important role Masha plays as mentor and implies a matrilineal line of influence countering Larichev's.[24]

The simplistic dichotomy of these two characters contains one odd element: Masha's children. Their presence qualifies her mannish nature, but this anomaly, like most elements of *The Hotel Manager,* fits into a general pattern. Always independent, Masha has both children out of wedlock and, when her daughter Vika appears, it is Vera who wakes up during the night to take care of her. Soon the two friends decide that Masha will be the "father" and Vera the "mother" in this unorthodox family (Grekova 1980b, 279, 281).

The maternal role is not new to Vera, despite her having no children of her own. In the 1920s her mother adopted the orphan Uzhik, whom Masha's son resembles. Likewise, she treated Larichev's Iura as if he were her own child. Her care for him was the first and only secret she kept from her husband, who instructs her to not spoil the boy and eventually dispatches him to an orphanage. In the context of the USSR's numerous single mothers and widows, Vera's situation is both remarkable and ironic: prevented from bearing her own children, she becomes a surrogate mother to the children of other women. Her warm, maternal nature and marked femininity contrast with the cold Stalinism of Larichev—this opposition fits nicely into the dichotomies structuring the narrative. Motherhood was a fraught topic for Grekova and her characters: both worry about neglecting sons and daughters while pursuing a career in science. Children are also part of the cultural mythology of Stagnation—every woman has the right to a family. Having her own son or daughter is the one gift Vera is denied, despite the lover, promotion, and Moscow apartment she accrues by the end of the *povest'*. For women readers, most of whom were presumably mothers (or would be soon), this enduring lack afforded them some consolation: not even Vera can have everything (Grekova 1980b, 236, 265–66).

The Hotel Manager has a vexed relationship with the reality it purportedly depicts. Those features of the novella that resemble women's writing appeal to verisimilitude: the narrative's attempt to persuade readers that it describes a world closely resembling their own. The final portion of the work, however, deviates from this strategy, and not only because of the production novel's influence. Before the appearance of the manly inventor Sergei, Vera's life is contrived yet believable. The first two-thirds of *The Hotel Manager* chart the lifecycle of the average Soviet woman: early marriage, widowhood, problems with men. With the appearance of her final love interest, however, the narrative becomes less an appeal to verisimilitude than a wish-fulfillment scenario.[25]

The first change is subtle: the strange feeling of freedom she has at Larichev's funeral. The reader shares this sense of relief, which nonetheless "categorically violates the chaste

mourning expected of the Russian widow. However, Vera's sense that life is just beginning was in tune with the times. Vera, 45 when Larichev dies, subsequently illustrates that life only begins at 40, as Katia in *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* informed viewers. Indeed, within a year Vera meets Talia, a male suitor who takes her to a beach that has overtones of her brief courtship with Larichev. Talia later reveals himself to be not a Stalinist but a run-of-the-mill male alcoholic of the type found throughout Grekova's prose (Goscilo 1995, 28–32; Grekova 1980b, 294).

Vera, now wiser in the ways of men, eventually rids herself of Talia, paying his airfare and accompanying him to the airport to make sure he does not sell the ticket for vodka. Her next romance is quite different. Significantly enough, she meets Sergei at work, which is the collective-oriented replacement for her egotistical husband. This turn of events is also an integral part of Stagnation mythology, as El'dar Riazanov depicts in his film *Office Romance* (*Sluzhebnyi roman*, 1977). Sergei is the stuff of dreams: sober, honest, clever with his hands, and independent. Sergei is still married (as he immediately tells Vera), but this is a technicality: his wife has been paralyzed for 10 years, and he has promised not to remarry. (The substantial ethical ramifications of this scenario apparently bother neither Vera nor the implied reader.)[26]

Vera realizes that she is in love for the first time. While both Larichev and Talia saw love as subordination to one's partner, her relationship with Sergei is based on equality. She has replaced innocence and dependence with consciousness and freedom, a transformation in the best tradition of the socialist realist production novel (Grekova 1980b, 365).

This is a love devoid of the tempestuous eroticism she recalls from the first years of marriage. The narrator implies that she and Sergei do have sex, yet such physicality is not the point of being together. In this relationship Grekova provides a mature variant of the youthful romance traditionally concluding the socialist realist narratives. Even more striking is the presumption—seen as completely natural within the wish-fulfillment scenario—that a woman at 60 could find love and that this relationship might be partially erotic. Critics had varying reactions: for one, Vera's love was improper, while another countered that it was no less serious than love at a younger age. Given the expectations that romance ended with marriage (not to mention widowhood), Vera's affair with Sergei is another quietly revolutionary moment in *The Hotel Manager.*[27]

Playing with Anomaly: The Allure of *The Hotel Manager*

The three types of literature influencing Grekova's novella each come with their own reader expectations. The production novel instills optimism and the need for straightforward characters reflecting supposed social progress. The hesitant anti-Stalinist narrative evokes just the opposite: past injustices and personages reveal their hidden meaning only to the perceptive reader. Women's writing relies on verisimilitude, implying that the gendered problems in *The Hotel Manager* are those readers know all too well. However, this third genre also contains a wish-fulfillment scenario that, together with the work's appeal to reality, makes Vera

simultaneously typical and miraculously fortunate.

It is improbable that a woman from a provincial working-class background will receive an apartment and important position in Moscow, and it is even less likely that she will find the love of her life at 60. In many ways such an ending replicates the foolish dreams of young Vera who, the narrator tells us, wants it all. And yet it is precisely this brash enthusiasm that acts as a structuring principle, producing a plot that is farfetched but resonated with readers (Grekova 1980b, 223).

The novella's patently unrealistic resolution was a key part of Stagnation cultural mythology. As *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears* so memorably depicted, those who work hard, are ethical, and contribute to the collective will be rewarded with a life unattainable for other, less worthy mortals. Similarly, those who deserve censure are punished by society or life itself in varying ways: in *The Hotel Manager*, Larichev dies (conveniently liberating Vera), alcoholic Talia is hustled out of the plot, and the jealous Alla Tarasovna, who sabotages Vera, retires in defeat. These positive and negative outcomes constitute a moralizing representation that resembles verisimilitude less than socialist realism, where reality is not what actually exists, but what should exist and will no doubt soon appear.

Readers, however, did not steal *The Hotel Manager* from libraries to support the lingering esthetic of socialist realism. Instead, to return to Iser's analysis, they formed their own relationship with the novella's contradictory elements. Readers interacted with the *povest'* by combining Grekova's narrative with their own expectations and desires. Some may have marveled at Vera's skill as a manager, while others mined the work for hints of the anti-Stalinism found in the author's earlier works or pondered the thought of love after 60. In all likelihood, the same reader responded to all three types of literature imbedded in the work. More importantly, they hastened to believe that Grekova describes a world like our own, yet where even the most unlikely dreams can come true.

Notes

The author thanks Neringa Klumbytė and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova (Miami University) for their comments on an early draft of this chapter.

1. My discussion of the cultural mythologies of Stagnation stems from Svetlana Boym (1994, 23) and her focus on those enduring ideas that are less a function of reality than how Russians perceive it.

2. Levitan and Tsilevich (1998) excerpt the lengthy correspondence between Grekova and the critics Levitan and Tsilevich. See also a volume dedicated to the author: R. Venttsel' and G. Epshtein, comps. 2007. *E.S. Venttsel'—I. Grekova. K stoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia.* Moscow: Iunost'. For a sense of pre-*perestroika* feminism, which was limited to a small number of elite dissidents, see Mamonova (1984, xiii–xxiii).

3. Friedberg (1983, xiv). This volume contains the only English translation of *The Hotel Manager.* On Grekova's characterization of Vera, see Levitan and Tsilevich (1998, 273). The idea of an essentially positive working-class identity also underlies the popular television series *The Long Recess* (*Bol'shaia peremena*, 1973), directed by Aleksei Korenev.

4. On the problems of defining genres, see Fowler (1982). Clark discusses the production novel (1976, 359–75). Grekova (1980b, 353). All translations are mine unless noted.

5. Grekova 1980b, 310, 329, 348, 349. Iuliia Govorukhina, who has written the only dissertation devoted entirely to I. Grekova, observes that the production novel is only evident at the end of *The Hotel Manager* (2000, 13).

6. Levitan and Tsilevich (1998, 274); Orekhova (1977, 192).

7. Grekova 1980b, 309, 320, 352.

8. Levitan and Tsilevich 1998, 271. Baranskaia employs a similar strategy in *A Week Like Any Other* (*Nedelia kak nedelia*, 1969). In this widely read novella, a passel of negative masculine characters highlight sober and loyal Dima, the protagonist's husband (Baranskaia 1981, 10, 16).

9. The ideological work in Suleiman's sense is not a synonym for socialist realism. Denis Fonvizin's literary apologies for Catherine II's enlightened despotism, for instance, better fit her description. Russian literature is no stranger to didacticism—socialist realism was simply a particularly striking manifestation of this tendency. *The Hotel Manager* continues some of the genre's tendencies: the positive hero, an ending that resembles the production novel, and the subordination of plot to thematic concerns.

10. On the clear and concrete nature of *Khoziaika gostinitsy,* see Levitan and Tsilevich (1998, 272); Ziolkowski (1997, 4). During the Thaw Grekova had discovered the limits of depicting Stalinism. Her masterful novel *In Recent Memory* (*Svezho predanie*, written 1962) was denied publication by *Novyi mir* the year Aleksandr Tvardovskii published *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. Grekova's mistake was to link Stalinism to everyday life and an anti-Semitism that the work characterizes as inseparable from Russian culture. In *The Hotel Manager* her attack is much more vague and subtle.

11. For a discussion of critical responses to *On Maneuvers,* see Barker (1989). *The House on the Embankment* (Trifonov 1983), Stagnation's best-known anti-Stalinist narrative, places the era depicted firmly in the past, carefully limiting its descriptions to academic intrigues and not the fate of those arrested.

12. The reader of *One Day in the Day of Ivan Denisovich* recognizes this trope of the anti-Stalinist narrative: Shukhov, not as fortunate as Larichev, was sent to the gulag because of false accusations that his escape from the Germans was due to being a Nazi spy (Solzhenitsyn 1962).

13. Grekova (1980b, 246). For one of the numerous discussions of Stalin's famous comment, see Zubkova (1998, 29).

14. Grekova (1980b, 259); Yevtushenko (1966, 109–14). According to Evtu-shenko, Stalinism continues the deceased ruler's atrocities through the former minions who secretly still support him. For a well-written investigation of how Stalinism equated machines and the human form, see Hellebust (2003).

15. Ulitskaia (2002). See, however, Marina Karpova's link between sexual abuse, rape, and the gulag in her overlooked *perestroika*-era story "Catching May Bugs" ("Lovlia maiskikh zhukov," 1990). On the body politic, see Holmgren (2002). Discussion of Stalinism and the female body begins with Lidiia Chukovskaia's chilling *Sof'ia Petrovna* (written 1940). However, this work was not published in the USSR before *perestroika* and thus could not enter public discourse the way that *The Hotel Manager* did.

16. For an insightful overview of Grekova's place in women's writing from Stagnation to perestroika, see Goscilo (1992).

17. Grekova (1980b, 270). Russian culture has long connected women and *byt*, see Sutcliffe (2009, 3–23).

18. Grekova (1980b, 254, 258–59). The male tyrant is a centuries-old literary villain. Fonvizin provides the first example in his brutally witty play *The Minor* (*Nedorosl'*, 1782). Both Fonvizin's Skotinin and Grekova's Larichev use gendered inequality to oppress a younger and more noble female character. In this sense Elisabeth Menke (1988, 128), in the only monograph on Grekova, is correct when she notes that Larichev's character unmasks and critiques traditional masculinity and its excesses—Stalinism is not the only target. For an intriguing analysis of Stalinism and masculinity, see Kaganovsky (2008).

19. Grekova (1980b, 241, 242). The director Stanislav Govorukhin, who clumsily adapted *The Hotel Manager* for his 2003 film *Bless the Woman* (*Blagoslovite zhenshchinu*), chose this voyeuristic scene for the cover of the DVD case.

20. Grekova (1980b, 292). On sincerity, see Boym (1994, 96–97).

21. Zverkina and Epshtein (2008, 5). For an interesting collection of Soviet women's letters discussing the double burden and other issues of *byt*, see Strelianyi (1981); Grekova (1980b, 326; 1990d, 539).

22. Grekova (1980b, 350). For a discussion of wage discrimination in the context of conservative gender roles, see Liljeström (1993).

23. Grekova (1980b, 250). On the mentor in socialist realist and much older types of literature, see Clark (1981, 168–74).

24. Grekova (1980b, 253, 347). On the death of Grekova's mother and husband, see the interesting and unabashedly subjective biographical article by Zverkina and Epshtein (2008).

25. My discussion of verisimilitude comes from Tzevetan Todorov's analysis of this trait in the mystery novel (1977, 82). On Vera's narrative as lifecycle of the Soviet woman, see Menke (1989, 229).

26. El'dar Riazanov, *Sluzhebnyi roman* (Mosfil'm, 1977); Grekova (1980b, 363–64). Sergei's attributes resemble those of Gosha in *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, suggesting that late-Soviet culture liked its men solid and closer to the working class.

27. Grekova (1980b, 371); Bukhantsov (1977, 10). For a positive view, see Oskotskii (1977, 264).

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Chapter 8
Raped with *Politburon*: Bawdy Humor and Disempowerment in Yuz Aleshkovsky's Prose

Olga Livshin

Numerous prose works by Yuz Aleshkovsky, a well-known Soviet nonconformist writer who was most active in the 1970s and 1980s, revolve around comically thwarted expressions of sexual desire.[1] The protagonist of the short novel *Nikolai Nikolaevich* works as a sperm donor in a secret scientific lab. He practices celibacy, donates sperm once a day, and believes he works hard for the benefit of the Soviet people. The hero of the novel *The Kangaroo* (*Kenguru*) is less lucky. He is accused of "criminal thoughts"; specifically, the intention to rape a kangaroo at the Moscow Zoo. After a grand show trial, he is condemned by representatives of numerous Soviet republics and sent to a labor camp for having these "criminal thoughts." In the novel *Camouflage* (*Maskirovka*), the protagonist's job is to drink himself to delirium in order to imitate Soviet people's moral decay for U.S. spy satellites. He believes that he serves the state proudly—until his wife, who is tired of his drunkenness and absences from home, rapes him with a dildo made out of a secret substance called *politburon*.

Scholars have argued that the language and imagery of sexuality are deployed by Aleshkovsky as an affront to Soviet literary norms and state rhetoric (Lipovetskii 2001, 37–41; Meyer 1984). This has been seen as an effort to break away from the literary norms of "official," publishable literature, as well as state ideology. In addition, Olga Matich envisions this use of sexuality in many other late-Soviet non-conformist authors' work as part of de-Stalinization, part of the revelation of the Soviet system's recent history. According to Matich, sexual language gives an appropriately shocking form to the terrifying "revelation of the truth" (1986, 415). The argument is based on the assumption that Aleshkovsky's works are fundamentally critical of the Soviet state and the Soviet official culture.

While this is an insightful interpretation, several interrelated questions remain provocatively open. Why is sexuality mixed with disempowerment in all three works? Why are male characters humiliated or otherwise abused, and what does the gendering of this dynamic —the emasculation that goes on—imply for the characterization of the protagonists? Finally, why does Aleshkovsky deploy bawdy humor at the male characters who are exploited or abused by the Soviet system, eliciting an uncomfortable mixture of ridicule and compassion?

The following analysis reframes the treatment of sexuality in Aleshkovsky's works with an emphasis on the choices made by the protagonist, rather than solely on criticism of the system. While what Mark Lipovetsky calls Aleshkovsky's "ferocious anti-regime pathos" (2001, 38) and the consequent humiliation and emasculation of the protagonists by the regime, are certainly a part of Aleshkovsky's work, the writer's use of the imagery of sexual power play indicates something besides this important point. Erotic power play—unlike rape or other kinds of non-consensual physical violation—is consensual. By the same logic, Aleshkovsky's protagonists play an important role in their subjugation. Given their willing, sometimes even enthusiastic, loss of agency, and the conventions of folk, bawdy humor based on traditional

gender roles, they are seen as laughable or even contemptible. Specifically, Aleshkovsky views service to the state as sordidly offensive service, subjugation, or prostitution, deeply and intimately humiliating.

Furthermore, while the writer invokes heretical, carnivalesque humorous imagery of the Bakhtinian "lower, material sphere" (Lipovetskii 2001, 36), as well as obscene language (Meyer 1984), he does not merely take the reader *outside* Soviet "official" literary norms: he also fuses together several strains of tradition. Aleshkovsky uses bawdy imagery derived from a few motley sources originating from various folk traditions. Humorous images of sexual domination of men frequently appear in *lubki*, Russian popular prints (Farrell 1999). As Dianne Ecklund Farrell argues, *lubki* are part of a pre-modern tradition that has survived well into the 18th century and countered modern Russian culture and aristocratic ways of life successfully (Farrell 1991). Similarly, by using bawdy humor, Aleshkovsky counters older, pre-modern traditions to the modern im-agery of sexual virility, technology, and progress—with which the protagonists of his works try to frame themselves as Soviet men (all while subjected and humiliated). Other folk sources for his humor include the late Soviet *anekdot*, or joke, and a Soviet proverb.

Aleshkovsky does not draw only on folk culture. The defining qualities of his protagonists, and, in particular, the masculinity-turned-emasculation predicament in which they are involved, are a reworking of another tradition. Nikolai (*Nikolai Nikolaevich*), Fan Fanych (*The Kangaroo*), and Fiodor Milashkin (*Camouflage*) are all reminiscent of the protagonists of rogue novels by Nikolai Gogol (Chichikov, of the novel *Dead Souls*) and Ilia Il'f and Evgenii Petrov (Ostap Bender, of the novels *The Twelve Chairs* and *The Golden Calf)*. Both Chichikov and Bender survive difficult situations through imposture with the use of authoritative language. Aleshkovsky reworks and inverts this tradition: all three protagonists discussed here speak in the "official" language about their sexual activities in order to envision these activities as noble (comically, unsuccessfully). Moreover, in both *The Kangaroo* and *Camouflage*, authoritative language is used by the protagonist not in order to escape a predicament, but in order to frame his subjugated, humiliated condition, and even his loss of dignity, as beautiful and ennobling.

Sexuality as Servility: Aleshkovsky's Use of Power Play and Its Probable Sources

Before turning to close readings of the novels, it is useful to sketch out both prior discussion and Aleshkovsky's biography and beliefs. Sexual imagery is common in late Soviet non-conformist literature. At least two strains of tradition can be identified. First, "camp prose" by authors such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Elena Glinka, sometimes describes rape of the prisoners of the GULAG system (for example, see Solzhenitsyn 1973 and Glinka 1991). "Camp prose" authors, who draw on the Russian realist tradition, describe the acts in detail in order to delineate the full extent of the physical and moral suffering of GULAG inmates.

A second strain of writing, with a hefty dose of sexual and lexical candor, does not aim to enumerate harm done by the Soviet system so much as to shock. Edward Brown described this

genre as an assault on literary norms, both Soviet and Russian: authors such as Aleshkovsky, Brown argues, explode the literary Russian language "into shreds by a massive scatological detonation" (1986, 386). Meyer also envisions Aleshkovsky as part of this endeavor, a chopping away of tradition, Soviet and Russian, in order to obtain a new truth. Specifi-cally, in Meyer's reading, Aleshkovsky opens up certain truths about the body, desire, and spirituality (the body as indicator of the soul's innermost thoughts), which was never permissible in either the Russian or Soviet "publishable" milieu (1984, 458–61).

Aleshkovsky contributes a great deal to the second strain of writing identified here. However, it is essential to note that his writing—while spiced with occasional *mat*, or obscene diction—is not at all sexually explicit. Instead, it is metaphorical. His protagonists are servile, prostitute-like, not actually doing sexual favors or raped; the acts are never described in detail, and are to be understood as something so sordid and despicable as to be laughed at, not savored.

What is the source of this treatment of the theme? While authors such as Eduard Limonov attempted to create a newly candid and extremely emotionally intense literature of eroticism and love, a revelation of self and the body, Aleshkovsky writes not about sexuality per se, but about the psychology of the Soviet man. In doing so, he places priority on subservience as the ultimate harm to self and others—a harm that is no less than that inflicted by the state on the individual. In an interview, Aleshkovsky explains his view of servility as follows:

> The powers-that-be want to set things in order, but then again, that's always been their desire. That's normal. They never wanted anything but order, and there's nothing wrong with that. On the other hand, groveling (*kholuistvo*) is unnatural. Normal people, who don't always want to keep to the boundaries, should oppose this ambition of the authorities. [Yet] I see that a lot of this kind of groveling. . . . Self-censorship among Russians is more terrifying than censorship. Many people passionately long to kiss ass (*strastno dzhadzhdut lizat' zhonu*). (Bykov 2006, 55)[2]

To rephrase, Aleshkovsky goes so far as to consider servile subjects as more baneful than the Soviet or post-Soviet state. The author does not merely imply obsequiousness: the disdainful Russian word "*kholuistvo*" encompasses a broader array of meanings than the English "groveling." A scornful word, it comes from the idea of "*kholui*," or a person who sees himself as a servant to others in order to get material or moral benefits. This kind of behavior is usually so servile as to destroy his or her sense of dignity.[3] In Aleshkovsky's literary universe, this kind of groveling results in the loss of self-respect. Sexuality provides a productive context in which to explore this groveling before the state. This view encompasses both, generally, the Soviet state's claim to define people's thoughts and desires, and, specifically, its claim to perpetuate the Soviet models for gender (thus defining men's gender roles). This latter aspect of Aleshkovsky's work can enrich our view of the literary resistance to Soviet treatments of gender. While scholars such as Helena Goscilo have illuminated the debunking of Soviet models of gender by woman authors, including Liudmila Petrushevsaia and Tatiana Tolstaia (see Goscilo 1993, 1996), Aleshkovsky adds a different facet of the problem.

Aleshkovsky's emphasis on loathing people who prioritize their service to the state over his "anti-regime pathos" is surprising, given the writer's own traumatic encounters with the Soviet judicial system. Born in 1929, Aleshkovsky experienced his first encounter with Soviet law as a young man. During his service in the navy, he hijacked a car belonging to the secretary

of the regional party committee, evidently out of fear that he would not make it in time for a train. Aleshkovsky was sentenced to four years in the labor camps (Bykov 2006, 55). His camp experience informs not only his songs, several of which are currently considered classics of the Russian prison song genre,[4] but also his prose: many of his works are imbued by a sense of a disproportionately cruel punishment by the state. For example, in *The Kangaroo*, the protagonist repeatedly refers to the Soviet Union as an enormous zoo in which people are imprisoned.[5] Nevertheless, Aleshkovsky avoids a narrowly "anti-regime" reading of his works. Servility infuriates him a great deal more than the "regime's" claim to subject everyone to its goals.

Why, then, does Aleshkovsky use gendered terms for his portrayal of self-humiliation? The social and historical context for his emphasis on emasculation echoes a crisis of gender roles, which was widely proclaimed during the late Soviet period. In the late 1960s, Soviet demographers realized with alarm that there had been no significant or steady rise in fertility since the end of World War II. Many of those concerned took the view that since women had joined the workforce and attained equal rights, they have become "masculinized" and men, "feminized." Their appeals to public policy eventually resulted in changes such as new sex-role socialization courses in schools, extended maternity leaves, and the highlighting of women as mothers and nurturers in the popular press throughout the 1970s (Rivkin-Fish 2006, 155–57).[6] As Michele Rivkin-Fish argues, these representations of gender "often consciously remarked on the need to replace the Bolshevik-era representation of women as the physically and mentally strong equals of men . . . with a renewed feminine image of maternity and domesticity" (2006, 157).

That said, it is important that Aleshkovsky's use of sexuality is metaphorical and political, rather than an outcry against an actual "dying off" of "real Soviet men." He does not call the reader to traditional gender roles. Nevertheless, the parallel with the gender crisis of the late Soviet period brings forth an important point. It confirms the view advanced by Vladimir Kozlov in a study of Soviet dissent. Kozlov argues that much resistance to authoritative ideas and practices in the late Soviet Union came from the very ideas and language widely available to the dissenters—remarkably, including, and primarily so, Leninist Marxism. This contradicts the popular view that Soviet dissent was shaped by extra-Soviet ideas (such as Western notions of democracy picked up by listening to Radio Liberty or the BBC) (Kozlov and Mironenko 2005, 5–64). Similarly sexuality is, generally, a topic that one readily sees in one's life, and one that occurs in many Soviet jokes. Thus, Aleshkovsky, like his contemporaries, draws on Russian traditions and a contemporary Soviet trend, even while he critiques Soviet ideas of masculinity and the general trend to be subjected by the state's rhetoric.

Giving the Best Substance in Yourself to the People: Nikolai Nikolaevich

Soviet ideas of masculinity, internalized by the protagonist of *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, are one of the specific targets of Aleshkovsky's criticism in this novel. Specifically, he interrogates the Soviet idea of masculinity as service to the people, as well as imagery of technology, science,

and progress, with which masculinity is generally associated.

The eponymous protagonist of *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, whose work consists of donating sperm once a day for scientific projects, proudly sees his purpose in life as a (sexual) benefactor of the Soviet people. He develops this grandiose role in response to hearing scientists make two statements about him: that his work is crucial "for the good of the entire humanity" and that his sperm is unusually "potent" (although it is never stated why) (Aleshkovsky 1996, 22). It also matters that Nikolai maintains celibacy in order to be a consistent donor, and thus considers himself to be a selfless individual.

Nikolai's sperm is used in correspondingly grand, utopian research projects: the first instance of artificial insemination (of a female colleague, and, subsequently, of the wife of a foreign dignitary) in the USSR, as well as the Cold-War-era attempt to make his sperm resistant to high levels of radiation so that a new race may start its life on a different planet if humanity perishes in a nuclear explosion. "'You, my dear, shall be the progenitor of a newly conceived human race on another planet!'" a professor who works with Nikolai exclaims. "'Every one of your dapper little men [that is, sperm] will be put to good use! Just think: in one thermos, there is a people! In two—a nation! Or maybe it's the other way around. The devil knows these Stalinist formulations'" (Aleshkovsky 1996, 31). At another point, the scientists propose erecting a monument to Nikolai's penis for all the consistent work that it has done (Aleshkovsky 1996, 28).

The idea of masculinity here is characteristically Bolshevik. In her analysis of gender in the Soviet Union, Sarah Ashwin argues that the Bolsheviks did not maintain a genuine commitment to gender equality, but defined masculinity as service to the state, attempting to delineate a form of masculine-identity-based self-realization through work or military service. As for the private sphere, it was identified as women's domain (Ashwin 2000, 12–13).[7] However, Aleshkovsky deflates Nikolai's self-aggrandizement in a number of ways. Nikolai's striving to contribute also has undertones of a bawdy joke: his claim to "give the best in himself to the people" puts him in the role of the promiscuous partner of the entire country, although he does not seem to realize it. Nikolai's daily work is also too pleasurable and too easy to be considered a valiant achievement. Nikolai's occupation is also an ill fit for the grand context of selfless production of a valuable substance, a sort of Lyotardian meta-narrative that purports to explain all aspects of his existence. When Nikolai begins work, his supervisor Kimza tries very hard to define his test subject's sperm donorship in the language of industrial production:

"Go ahead and get settled. You will begin as soon as I give the command: 'Attention: orgasm!' After the orgasm, close the test tube with a stopper."

"So that [the sperm] wouldn't run around?

"You must work quickly and without losses! Did you read the sign?" (Aleshkovsky 1996, 24)

The passage makes a parodic nod to effective, timed production, an important value in the Stalinist conception of production (*Nikolai Nikolaevich* is set in the late 1940s and early 1950s), as well as the Taylorist notion that the human body can have the same precision and coordination as a machine to achieve efficiency, a belief that Lenin upheld and incorporated into the Soviet idea of social engineering (Stites 1989, 154).[8] However, sexuality is glaringly

unfit for this role. Spontaneous and difficult to control (Nikolai's faithful penis fails him several times throughout the novel), it juts out of the notion of industrial production.

More importantly yet, the dirty joke at the core of the novel's plot conflicts with the language of science and technology. Science and technology are traditionally associated with masculinity, and they were important cultural themes for Soviet masculinity. A line from the lyrics to a Stalinism-era song is "Instead of a heart, he has a flaming motor." These words echo the qualities that Helena Goscilo and Andrea Lanoux argue to be defining features of Stalinist masculin-ity: steel-like military power, images of progress, industry, and technology (Goscilo and Lanoux 2006, 11–13). Science and technology were also important notions for the Soviet state: Leninist Marxism was deemed to be "scientific" and correct; the Bolsheviks considered modernity and technology to be essential to the Soviet project ("Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the entire country," Lenin's famous slogan read). *Nikolai Nikolaevich* is permeated with scientific language that the researchers use and that the uneducated Nikolai also attempts to use, with comical lapses. However, as the novel progresses, Nikolai begins to see himself as an inspired scientist in his own way—and this clashes a great deal with the sexual nature of his work. For example, when he attempts to create theories about the past and future of humanity, placing the penis as a foundation of the universe:

> You see, pal, if you think about it, you'll see that the penis is the most important part of all. It's even more important than the brain. You know, a million years ago, we didn't use our brains, only our penises. Our brains were still developing. Oh, and if it wasn't for the penis, then spaceships wouldn't look like dicks . . . and they wouldn't even fly to the moon. Anyway, enough talk. Mark my word, you'll see. When the brain won't be able to develop anymore, that's when the world will be fundamentally fucked up. (Aleshkovsky 1996, 28)

Aleshkovsky thus presents us with a sort of carnivalized version of science, in which images of a virile masculinity set the order of things. His masculinity is supported by the notions of progress, and, he feels, he supports progress as well. However, Aleshkovsky's use of pre-modern, folk diction ("dicks," "the world will be fundamentally fucked up") casts the whole enterprise in a preposterous light. Nikolai's grandiose ambitions meet his own older, honest, folk-like diction, and fail. Later on, Nikolai realizes that he is not, in fact, a scientist or even someone in control of the experiment; instead, he is a sort of bull whose sperm is used to inseminate cows. The woman who will carry his test-tube baby, the wife of a political leader of an unnamed country, is anonymous, "the one inseminated by the Soviet Union"; he does not even know where she and the child live (Aleshkovsky 1996, 62).

To summarize, in *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, sexuality serves as a sort of litmus test for the foundational ideas and images of Soviet official culture. It represents many aspects that elude this culture. Yet while the falsity of Nikolai's role becomes obvious to the reader, Nikolai maintains his opinion that his penis is a crucial "means of production" for much of the novel (Aleshkovsky 1996, 26). Although he sees himself as a sexual superman, he is but a puppet, a man whose thinking is limited by the Marxist-Leninist terms of discussion.

However, Nikolai is also a complex enough character to enable Aleshkovsky to interrogate the boundaries of the Soviet man's psychology. To what extent is the protagonist manipulated by the system to think that he is a glorious and masculine contributor to society, and to what extent does he manipulate these beliefs produced by the state? According to Ashwin, the

Stalinist model of masculinity as a service model began to fall apart after Stalin's death, when gender roles became complicated by the absence of a clear model from above. Women's increased control of the private sphere also made it difficult for men to return to these spheres as patriarchs (Ashwin 2000, 14). In Aleshkovsky's literary universe, however, the process begins already during Stalinism. To an extent, Nikolai exploits the language of selfless contribution to get material benefits. He demands an ever-growing salary for his work, as well as many protein-rich foods, supposedly to boost his sperm count (the novel begins in the famished post-war years, and these foods are extremely hard to get). One day, Nikolai goes so far as to ask for a large amount of rubbing alcohol, supposedly to sterilize his penis. He needs three times as much alcohol as the scientists propose, he argues, because he must sterilize his penis while erect—and his penis is three times as long when fully erect. (Of course, in reality, Nikolai wishes to drink the alcohol). This scheme is justified in rhetoric of love for the people: "I give the most valuable fucking thing I have to the people! In the U.S.," he boasts, "I would have already had a dacha at the 'Lincoln' resort, as well as other real estate. And it's not like I am buying up fucking dead souls that belong to the state, like Chichikov: I give my own fresh sperm." (Aleshkovsky 1996, 27)

The reference to lavish benefits that Nikolai would have surely had in the United States casts him as a sort of comical, highly paid prostitute. Yet disdain for Nikolai's materialism is not the only reaction elicited from the reader: Nikolai is also subversive because he manipulates the system by using communist rhetoric to his own ends. A literary predecessor for the rogue hero who uses Bolshevik language to this effect is Ostap Bender, the hero of the highly popular novels *The Twelve Chairs* (*Dvenadtsat' stul'ev*) and *The Golden Calf* (*Zolotoi melenok*) by Ilia Il'f and Evgeny Petrov. Sheila Fitzpatrick (2001) argues that the con man Bender follows the archetype of a trickster (*plut*, the Russian word that also means "rogue"), a figure whose skillful (and not really dangerous) schemes are described with humor and sympathy in folklores of various cultures. Elsewhere, Fitzpatrick contends that Bender is a subversive character, given his ability to overturn accepted hierarchies and mock official discourses (Fitzpatrick 2005, 280–81).

Nikolai's use of official idiom has similar effects, and we watch gleefully as he navigates the system from chapter to chapter (most rogue novels are structured episodically)—eventually earning half a house on the Volga and a boat through his glorious masturbating. Nikolai's general strategy evokes the nonsensical yet psychologically persuasive work of Chichikov, the protagonist of Nikolai Gogol's novel *Dead Souls* (the denial of association in his reference to Chichikov is parodically double-voiced). Like Chichikov, Nikolai successfully attaches a value to something that has no determined price. Chichikov's scam is to buy serfs who died a long time ago.[9] The USSR had neither sperm banks, nor—in the Stalinist era—laboratories devoted to the research on human sexuality.[10] And as Gogol's character sometimes does, Nikolai negotiates his deal by inventing a favorable, if fabled, point of reference, the United States.

At the end of the novel, Aleshkovsky underscores his faith in the individual's ability to place himself outside the system, even without considerable his-toric impetus for this to happen. According to Goscilo and Lanoux, these images of steely masculinity "melted" during the Thaw, when values such as "small-scale endeavors, emotion, and human bonds" were re-

introduced (2006, 16–17). However, Nikolai does not need an historical impulse to change his ideas of gender: something as personal and particular as falling in love changes his values. When he has sex with his beloved, Vlada Iur'evna, both of them faint during orgasms. The characters are thus catapulted from the industrial novel into a different genre—the romance novel. Nikolai also realizes that the grand projects of Soviet science are not aimed at healing or helping individuals: instead, they are *sukhdrochka*, or masturbation without an orgasm. In the end, he walks out of his job, dropping out of the system—or, at least, out of his former system of metaphors. If his work in the lab was comparable to industrial production, Nikolai's dream job is one in which nothing radically new or utopian is produced; he wants to repair shoes.

Aleshkovsky's questioning of whether one is held captive by the system's worldview (including a set of beliefs about gender) or finds himself outside this worldview has important implications. Behind this question is another: does the Soviet individual even know the difference anymore? This question is explored in further detail in Aleshkovsky's novel *The Kangaroo*, in which the protagonist, Fan Fanych, finds himself captured by the Soviet judicial system and willingly participates in the fabrication of evidence against him. Fan Fanych is an anti-Ostap Bender who is willing to dig his grave deeper with authoritative language, used against himself.

Self-Incrimination as Masculine Work: The Protagonist of The Kangaroo Inside the System

In *The Kangaroo*, Aleshkovsky's second novel, the nature of sexual imagery changes. In *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, cultural themes of technology, progress, and steely masculinity are turned into a sordid joke. When the protagonist understands the reality of his condition, he simply walks away from it. In *The Kangaroo*, one cannot walk away from the dirty joke of one's existence, and it has real consequences. *The Kangaroo* also presents us with a far more oppressive and more convoluted sexual metaphor: the victim of the Soviet law is incriminated with the notion of sexually abusing a vulnerable being, creating a double injustice, and the crime is raping a kangaroo—certainly not the most popular fantasy. Nevertheless, the preposterous nature of the crime does not seem to bother anyone (in *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, the scientists agree with Nikolai that their work is *sukhodrochka*); far from that, the protagonist is forced to co-create the ridiculous and sinister story of his own crime. All of this is precariously weighed against valiant Soviet masculinity: the protagonist attempts to find meaning and creative potential in this situation. The narrative of active masculinity is, for a while, enough for him to feel well—and, remarkably, to collaborate with the system on humiliating and emasculating himself.

During the NEP era, Fan Fanych, a thief, is caught for a crime, but not prosecuted. Instead, he is informed by his prosecutor that his case will be a show trial, in which he will be "useful" as an artistic person and a talented actor (Aleshkovsky 1996, 78–80). In 1949, Fan Fanych is called into the prosecutor's office and informed that a computer has generated a variety of possible intentions to commit a crime for his case. The investigator is proud of his use of

technology to produce the criminal intention, stating that with this feature, they have put the "objectively reactionary science of cybernetics to use for the cause of peace," and that the computerized process of generating criminal intention allows one to realize what the criminal's intentions may be without the actual cruel crime (84–85).

Aleshkovsky thus offers a farcical version of a common practice during the "Great Terror" (though not in the late 1940s, when *The Kangaroo* takes place). As has been well documented with the opening of Soviet archives, many people were prosecuted for crimes that they never committed. They were arrested because of family ties or an improper class background and were forced to confess to masterminding fantastical feats of espionage, subversion, or murder on behalf of foreign governments and the bourgeoisie (see Gregory 2009; Khlevniuk 2009). Confession (usually under threat) is the principle on which this practice hinged. The substantial difference between the practice and *The Kangaroo* is that Fan Fanych need not be coerced into confession. Instead, he enthusiastically chooses his "intention" among several equally implausible scenarios:

> Well, I threw out all sorts of cases on the assassination of Iosif Vissarionovich [Stalin] like a wild mustang kicks up dirt. I didn't care for Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov and that whole crowd either.[11] . . . I looked through many cases. I almost chose the printing of currency with the portraits of Peter the Great on the 100-ruble bills, the soccer player Bobrov on the 50-ruble bills, and Ilya Ehrenburg on the 30-ruble bills, but I changed my mind. I couldn't care less for the theft of a kidney from the body of Marshal Choibalsan during his surgery.[12] An attempt to stage *The Brothers Karamazov* at the Central Red Army Theatre didn't excite me either.[13]
>
> And then . . . Dear Kolia, guess what I notice? I notice "The Case of the Brutal Rape and Murder of the Oldest Kangaroo of the Moscow Zoo on the Night of July 14, 1789, Continuing into the Morning of January 9, 1905."
>
> Something about this appealed to me. I wondered: who could have fathomed screwing the poor animal and then killing it? I thought about it and saw it, clear as day: I did it! I did! I, the most immoral monster of all times and nations, spent long winter nights watching the oldest kangaroo from a high rise on Vosstanie Square! In my confusion about the sex question, I planned a crime that chills the blood of progressive elements! I committed it, and I will answer for it before our judicial system, which is the most democratic in the world! (Aleshkovsky 1996, 82–83)

Fan Fanych immediately takes to the role set up by him by his prosecutor. He looks for a crime that would match the desires and thoughts of the "most immoral monster of all times and nations." Having found his "intention," he extends and elaborates on it, not only with highly specific details, but also with the Soviet official language that his prosecutors would use, like a strangely self-accusatory trickster.

What is the reason for this inversion of agency? The idiosyncrasies of the system create an illusion of freedom of choice for Fan Fanych. For decades, Fan Fanych had expected to be accused of a political crime (Aleshkovsky 1996, 84). In contrast with the narrowly conceived options of Article 58, the smorgasbord of options before him, as well as his ability to choose, seem to make Fan Fanych an imaginative co-creator of his own destiny. Captive to the system, he still believes that he has agency, even one with possibilities of choice. Moreover, Fan Fanych seems to realize some qualities associated with traditional ideas of masculinity: he actively constructs his own fate, and does not give up on his freedom. He is asked to elaborate on his "plans" by writing a script for a film that would be shown at his trial. At his request, Fan Fanych is provided with a cell in which he is supposed to do research on kangaroos and consults with a professor of biology. He is also given hard-to-get foreign films and literature.

Sexy female KGB trainees visit him and the professor, and he helps the professor—an erstwhile virgin—have his first sexual encounter. He feels terrific.

However, Fan Fanych's holiday of commanding others and realizing his and others' virility ends. He finds himself bound, nude, and humiliated by another female KGB officer. The officer forces him to act like a kangaroo, conditioned so that he eats carrots out of the officer's hand, offered and denied sexual contact with the officer, and making odd animal sounds, purportedly so that Fan Fanych experiences compassion for the kangaroo (Aleshkovsky 1996, 100–102). At his trial, he watches a film for which he did not write the script, and in which he does not remember playing (evidently, he had been drugged). Fan Fanych is subsequently condemned and sent to a labor camp.

Fan Fanych is humiliated and emasculated in a number of ways. He helps to fabricate an ideologically based narrative that has nothing to do with his actual desires. Aleshkovsky places emphasis on the way in which the Stalinist state replaces the reality of people's desires, thoughts, and motivations with whatever is expedient for its ideological project. Fan Fanych's crime, for the show trial, must sound both morally repugnant enough to satisfy the most sensationalist observer and somewhat realistic (therefore using the film medium). His male, heterosexual desires have been taken from him and replaced with expressions of bestiality—and instead of denying it, he collaborates on developing this narrative. Fan Fanych's loss of agency is underscored by the irony of the situation. He is accused of violating a vulnerable creature while he is himself a vulnerable victim of his prosecutor—and still does nothing to defend himself. Fan Fanych's seemingly comfortable and masculine existence in his cell is the key to his own emasculation.

To summarize, in contrast to the protagonist of *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, Fan Fanych does not notice the boundary between masculinity and emasculation and conflates some fanciful options presented by the system for his crime with free choice. Subsequent prose by Aleshkovsky presents an even more somber view of the matter. In *Camouflage*, the protagonist Milashkin is emasculated in more real and physical ways than Fan Fanych. Not only is he raped by his wife, but before this, he also lacks control over his life because of alcoholism and, like his fellow citizens, suffers from the lack of adequate nutrition.

Rape Camouflaged as the March to a Good Life: Camouflage

The likely source for bawdy humor in *Camouflage* is a well-known late-Soviet joke about a tired and addled man who is told by his doctor that he is pregnant. Nothing can surprise this man: as he states, he is exploited (or "sexually used") at work, at home, during his commute on crowded public transportation—how can he not be pregnant? As early as the first page of the novel, Milashkin states the premise for his tale: "So be quiet and listen to the story of how your own brother was fucked in the ass" (Aleshkovsky 1996, 227). Milashkin means himself: he is convinced that he is speaking to his brother throughout the narrative, although later we find out that his interlocutor is his doctor in a psychiatric hospital. This premise, which bears strong resemblance to a dirty joke, frames the subsequent episodes in which Milashkin describes the misery of his life. The rape is not mentioned until the midpoint of the novella. Thus, it is Milashkin's life, rather than one specific incident of sexual violence, that resembles a

violation.

Milashkin's specific problems are ingrained in his last name. First, it resembles *milashka*, a Russian word that means "baby" or "darling" and is always applied to women; thus, he is emasculated. Second, "Milashkin" is somewhat similar to "Bashmachkin," the name of the protagonist of Gogol's programmatic short story "The Overcoat." Bashmachkin, a low-level clerk in St. Petersburg and a figure that came to be known as the archetypical "small man" of Russian literature, derives the very value of his life from what little skill he has—the ability to copy documents by hand meticulously. Similarly, Milashkin feels like a small man, albeit with an important job. The city where he lives, Staroporokhov, contains a vast, technologically advanced underground military complex. However, on the surface, Staroporokhov is made to appear as a place of drunkenness and debauchery, the weakest and most immoral city in the USSR. This scheme is designed to distract the U.S. satellites that fly over the city and take photos for espionage. Milashkin's job is to get drunk on a daily basis and fall asleep in his inebriation near the Lenin monument. His male friends have the same job description. There is very little food in the stores, and the general quality of life is dismal. However, Milashkin dismisses all the problems he sees as "camouflage."

It becomes clear that Milashkin is an unreliable narrator—probably the patient of psychiatric hospital who has drunken delirium. In this view, Milashkin's narrative is productively read in two ways, both of which are meant to comfort the protagonist. His story seeks to explain gendered problems such as drinking (an overwhelmingly male problem in the late-Soviet period) in a way that obviates responsibility from them. It also attempts to explain Soviet social problems such as the deficit of food and consumer goods as "camouflage." The gendered and the political are thus intertwined. Milashkin tells himself that his and his friends' drinking is work (a statement that recalls the "work" in *Nikolai Nikolaevich*) and that his life is ennobled by his contribution to the development of Soviet military strength. In the following tirade, he addresses the imagined Cold War enemy:

> Yes, we produce shitty shoes. Yes, we drink! But this is all above ground, amongst us, so to speak, while underneath, in spacious workshops, labs, of-fices, explodariums (*vzryvarivaemakh*) and Party committees, all covered with artificial fucking sunlight, the best of the Soviet people in their white robes forge the atom-and-hydrogen shield of our motherland, or else our sword, if we are the first to fuck you up, dear sirs, esteemed Boa Constrictors! (Aleshkovsky 1996, 230)

The connection between gender and military politics is a close one for Milashkin. Military strength imparts to him a modicum of personal strength and an underscoring of his power despite his drinking problem. In fact, his drinking is oddly transformed into a crucial military strategy.[14] His defense of Staroporokhov's purpose echoes the old, close connections that exist between masculinity and nationalism. Joane Nagel contends that most men are eager to defend nationalist ideology and valorize masculine, heterosexual institutions such as military academies both because the state is a masculine institution and because the culture of nationalism emphasizes cultural values such as honor and patriotism (1998).

However, under the surface of comfort, a layer of parody appears:

> So some days I'll freshen up after my work, catch up on sleep, and have a bowl of cabbage soup with some crushed garlic and sour cream. And then I'll go walking on our Frunzenskaia embankment above the river Pushka, and I'll take a good look around at all the humps in our pavement, and the ratty gray buildings, and the general shabbiness of life and at the scruffiness of my fellow townspeople and their miserable kids, and I feel it: pride is stirring in my soul. Won't you fucking look at how much we've

accomplished throughout these years! Look how many camouflage facilities (*ob'ektov maskirovochnykh*) we've built! The hospitals, the schools, the daycare centers and kindergartens, the movie theaters where they show such shit that you just want to run away and turn the TV on instead, but then you do that and there's nothing but camouflage on TV too. (Aleshkovsky 1996, 229)[15]

In this double-voiced passage, Milashkin insists that everything around him was built by "our" (note the participatory quality) hands and is excellent, while the author engages in parody, undercutting all his statements. Aleshkovsky parodies the statement frequently made in Soviet newspapers that all of Soviet "particular shortcomings" (*otdel'nye nedostatki*) were merely small obstacles on the road toward the bright Communist future. The joke inside Milashkin's speech is, of course, that all that he sees as camouflage is an unfortunate reality. At the end of the passage, even Milashkin himself begins to call everything rotten "camouflage."

To an extent, Milashkin's rape by his wife, Dusia, is an extension of the same quagmire of the loss of control and inability to take responsibility for his own life. It is plausible that a man who envisions himself as helpless, disempowered, and malnourished, would view rape—and rape by a woman, traditionally the weaker and less active of the two sexes–as an ultimate emasculation. However, Dusia also introduces another theme in the novel: the differences between women's and men's perception of the Soviet social reality. Dusia is angry at Milashkin because he is never home, does not make love to her, and does not do his part to raise their son; the rape is conducted as revenge. She commits rape, and her female friends, whose husbands have similar flaws, follow her example. Unlike the men in *Camouflage*, Dusia and her female friends, the wives of "camouflage" employees, see their problems as real and pressing. In this regard, Aleshkovsky prefigures the statement made by the writer and essayist Viktor Erofeev concerning women and men in the late-Soviet period. Late-Soviet men, Erofeev contends, helped bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike men, they lived in the present: "Statistically, the Russian woman lied considerably less at work and drank at home considerably less" (Erofeev 1997, 8). Men, on the other hand, dwelled either in the revolutionary past, in the Communist future, or in a drunken haze. Similarly, the emasculation in *Camouflage* serves as a type of wake-up call by women. After the men find out who raped them, they become sober and realize how miserable their lives are.

Aleshkovsky treats Dusia not only as a dissenter (later in the novel, she is compared to Vladimir Bukovskii, a dissident author and distributor of samizdat), but also as part of a succession of women who attempt—often successfully—to preserve everyday life in the face of wars and men's destructive behavior. The heroine of *Camouflage*, who does not wish to see her husband drunk and upholding war and weapons, appears as a modern, tragi-comical version of the eponymous heroine of *Lysistrata.* In Aristophanes' play, women conspire to withhold sex from their husbands to impress upon them that the Peloponnesian War is doing a great deal of damage to their society and can only end in ruin for all. Like the women of *Lysistrata*, Dusia and her female friends insolently assume a position of power to fight for a serene life. Aleshkovsky also alludes to the archetype of a "strong Russian woman," initiated by Nikolai Nekrasov in his narrative poem "Frost, Red Nose" (*Moroz—Krasnyi Nos*). Milashkin has a prophetic—if comical—dream, in which a troika of horse—named Marx, Engels, and Lenin and driven by Stalin—run wildly. Then, suddenly, they are stopped by the powerful Dusia, who, like Nekrasov's village woman, knows how to stop a running horse or

enter a burning house if needed (Aleshkovsky 1996, 247). In the same image, he also alludes to the metaphor of Russia as a troika rushing in an uncertain direction as used in Gogol's *Dead Souls*—here, the troika is driven by the iconic Communist leaders. Once again, Aleshkovsky draws a parallel between state leaders and men, the loyal subjects and defenders of the state. Dusia is able to stop Marx, Engels, and Lenin; she is also able to awaken her husband, if violently, from his sleep.

However, while Dusia is able to stop the "wild horses," her effort ultimately has limited success. Aleshkovsky does not represent women as somehow exempt from the poor conditions of life in Staroporokhov or from the symbols of Soviet existence. Dusia is still embroiled in the Soviet "camouflage": when she and other wives of "camouflage" husbands bring revenge upon their men, they do so with a dildo made out of *politburon*, a polymer invented in a secret lab of the military complex. The women of Staroporokhov must mask themselves (that is, take on camouflage) as male rapists in order to violate their men. Finally, the rape does not result in lasting change: Milashkin's narrative collapses into incoherent, crazed discourse; the women's rebellion turns out to be only a dream. Aleshkovsky makes a statement concerning the tradition of strong women who defend "normal life": in the past, women have been able to guard their homes and rescue men from their own destructive behavior; in Soviet times, they are unable to do so.

Conclusion: Consent to Humiliation Masking as Masculinity

Milashkin is the third in a series of the protagonists of works that demonstrate an ever-worsening tendency for Soviet men to inscribe themselves intimately into the system. In Aleshkovsky's literary universe, men continue to hold on to the gender models either generated by Soviet authorities or enabled by them (in the case of Fan Fanych). Men hold on to these symbols even when they are symbolically emasculated or even physically harmed, for masculinity and Soviet symbols of military and technological progress are mutually supportive and intertwined.

Reading *Nikolai Nikolaevich*, *The Kangaroo*, and *Camouflage* in succession leaves one with the sense of a stronger and stronger tendency toward the feeling of entrapment in the system and its gender models, a "no exit" situation. The reason for this is not because a totalitarian state controls every aspect of their existence, but because they trust in the notion of loyal service, placing it at the core of their masculinity. Subjugation worsens and begins to have an immediate effect on one's chances to survive, yet masculinity provides a comforting narrative that lulls one into submission.

With his desperate, ever more urgent escalation of tension, Aleshkovsky leaves us with the following observation. While many among the late Soviet intelligentsia saw themselves as autonomous and authentic in certain social contexts (Zdravomyslova and Voronkov 2002), Aleshkovsky demonstrates that a powerful intersection between state rhetoric and gender existed, and entrapped Soviet men in ideas of service to the state and attractive images of science and progress (led by men). If gender and state rhetoric are mutually supportive, was

the Soviet man able to define himself outside this nexus? The downward spiral of submission and helplessness in Aleshkovsky's works seems to indicate that the answer is no. However, the bawdy humor in his works presupposes a reader who is able to see the dirty, sordid reality behind the rhetoric, and who can be actively jolted out of preconceived ideas about both masculinity and the state.

Notes

I am grateful to Neringa Klumbytė and Benjamin M. Sutcliffe for their helpful critical remarks on this chapter.

1. Yuz Aleshkovsky's prose was widely read in Moscow and several large cities of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, but most of his readers did not know the name of the author, as he distributed them anonymously. Likewise, his songs about camp and prison experience were regarded as folklore. After the *Metropol'* almanac published the lyrics to one of Aleshkovsky's most famous songs, "Comrade Stalin, You Are A Great Scholar" (*Tovarish Stalin, vy bol'shoi uchenyi*) in 1979, he was exiled and moved to the United States, where he has lived since then. His works have been published abroad, and, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in Russia. For biographical accounts of Aleshkovsky by numerous Russian cultural figures, most of whom read Aleshkovsky first in samizdat, see Maier and Sviridova (2005). See also Brodskii (1996).

2. All translations from the Russian in this chapter are mine.

3. For a discussion of the idea of *kholuistvo* in Russia, see Levkin (2007).

4. According to Aleshkovsky, the popularity of his songs extended even to some members of the Central Committee, demonstrating the extent of the complications of state–society interaction in the late Soviet period. See Bykov (2006, 56). "Comrade Stalin, You Are a Great Scholar" was especially well-known because Vladimir Vysotsky performed the song. For a reading of Aleshkovsky's songs in the context of the Russian and Soviet prison song traditions, see Glotov and Guliaigorodskaia (2007).

5. This sense of disproportionate cruelty as part of the Soviet experience is already felt in Aleshkovsky's songs. Along with it, one finds the frequent use of bawdy, sexual terms that gives the experience a tragi-comical quality. For example, the "Soviet Lesbian Song" (*Sovetskaya lesbiiskaya*) describes a self-conducted wedding between two female camp prisoners who are in love. One of the "brides" dresses in drag; the other smears red lipstick onto a piece of bread instead of caviar as a sad mockery of a lavish wedding; and a tacit assumption that female homosexuality is a forced, sad situation for prisoners of all-female camps.

6. For a detailed account of debates in the medical, pedagogical, and popular literature, see Attwood (1990, 163–64, 175 and *passim*).

7. In a diverging interpretation of the Stalinist ambition to define gender, Sergei Kukhterin argues that these roles for men existed more as an ideal than as a reality throughout the Soviet era. Many men were closely involved in their children's lives; patriarchal gender roles were recaptured by others at home; grandparents often enjoyed close relationships with their

grandchildren and passed traditional values on to new generations. See Kukhterin (2000, 80–83).

8. In Soviet literature, Stites points out, the image of the machine-like man with "muscles of steel" takes shape in Alexei Gastev's poetry, among other works. See Stites (1989, 150–54).

9. On Chichikov's strategies for putting a value on valueless serfs, see Morson (1992).

10. The discipline of sexology did not take shape in the USSR until the early 1960s. See Kon (1995, 86–97).

11. The reference to Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Molotov seems to imply an anachronism. While Fan Fanych's trial takes place in 1949, it was not until May 1957 that three members of Stalin's ruling circle, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov attempted to remove Khrushchev from power. In June, an emergency Central Committee meeting upheld Khrushchev's position as First Secretary and members of the "anti-Party Group" were expelled or demoted.

12. Khorloogiin Choibalsan (1895–1952) was the leader of the Communist Party of the Mongolian People's Republic from the 1930s to his death.

13. Given its unfavorable commentary on socialists and related political groups, Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* was not published in the Soviet Union during Stalin's time. The reference to the staging of this work is all the more preposterous because it is a novel and not a play.

14. Here Aleshkovsky echoes the argument on masculinity and dissent made by Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina. According to Zdravomyslova and Temkina, the late Soviet liberal, critical discourse decried the limitations placed by the Soviet social order on their ability to travel or realize themselves professionally. As a result, many men took to drink and described alcoholism in terms of attaining a certain degree of freedom. See Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2002).

15. Aleshkovsky generalizes Milashkin's vision to include not only the city of Staroporokhov, but a broader context of Soviet culture: the Frunzenskaia embankment is a Moscow site, while the river Pushka is loosely based on the last name of the Russian classic poet Aleksandr Pushkin.

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Afterword Postcard from Berlin: Rethinking the Juncture of Late Socialism and Late Liberalism in Europe

Dominic Boyer

A few years ago, a friend's father, I'll call him Christian, picked me up from Berlin's Tegel airport. "Where else in the world," he said, arms outstretched, "can you pick someone up by car five meters from the gate?" This was the first time I'd met Christian, and it took me about 30 minutes to discern that he had what in Germany is called *eine DDR-Vergangenheit* (an East German past). The signals were nothing if not ambivalent. He and his wife had lived for many years near Tegel in West Berlin, and he talked at some length about his work as a doctor in West Berlin and Stuttgart. He complained about the incompetence of the city government of Berlin, but that only meant he breathed oxygen; every *Berliner* does that. Christian's was a tricky case of diagnosis, but still, I had a little feeling. Perhaps it was his working class manner, which otherwise would have seemed out of sync with the habitus of a city doctor. Maybe it was his certain hesitance and over-articulated formality with the second-person formal *Sie*. Maybe it was just the trunk full of dirty blankets. What West German of his age would leave his car in such a state? But none of these things, to my mind, were decisive. My good friend Alfred, a superb ethnographer of German unification, says that the most unexpected people can reveal themselves to be from the West or the East if you don't blind yourself with stereotypes. Back at my apartment, Christian and I pored over a pile of tourist brochures he had kindly brought for me, and, like any proper anthropologist, I feigned ignorance of places I had already been in order to have the goings on in the city explained to me through his eyes. And that's when I was sure. He said *Alex* meaning *Alexanderplatz*. He recommended that I visit the *Weltzeituhr*, a beautiful if kitschy symbol of socialist internationalism. No West Berliner would have sent me there first, if at all. At the bottom of the pile was a brochure Christian had evidently saved for last because he treated it with more gravity than the others. It was for a twentieth anniversary, open-air exhibit about the events of 1989–1990, events that in Germany are often condensed into a single term, *die Wende* (the turn), meaning both the collapse of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) regime in the GDR and the opening of the border between East and West Germany. Handing me the brochure, he said, "This exhibition on the *Wende*, it's very moving, you should see it. But you should also know that I don't like the term *Wende*, it doesn't describe adequately what happened, as though it was just some minor change in direction. No, believe me, it was no little turn, I lived through it. I know what I am talking about. My wife and I both spent a year in the Stasi-jail in Bautzen as political prisoners. For us, the year 1978 didn't happen." Christian shook his head and looked at me, "No, 1989 was no *Wende*, it was the *Umbruch* (collapse) of an entire system."

1989, Then and Now, in Germany

I think it's fair to say that wherever else 1989 lives in memory and whatever else it means to individuals and communities across the world, it is globally associ-ated with Germany, specifically with Berlin, specifically with the fall of the Berlin Wall, that metonym of all

metonyms of the geopolitics that polarized Europe and much of the rest of the world from 1945 to 1989. What was the significance of 1989? As someone who has spent a good part of the past two decades studying and writing about the aftermath of 1989 in Berlin and the former East Germany, I can't pretend to be able to answer that question in a pithy way. For me, the compass of meaning points in too many directions at once; toward a multiplicity of personalities, conversations, remembrances, emotions, and arguments. I have asked about "the meaning of 1989" hundreds of times in my field research in the mid-1990s and received, of course, hundreds of responses, the vast majority of which were anchored not by geopolitics but rather by personal life experiences, by emotional where-I-was-then stories, by memories of the opportunities and tragedies that followed in the wake of 1989 and by often ironic observations about the similarities between the social *Systeme* (systems) cultivated by the East and West German states. Out of habit, I suppose, I've continued to pose the question occasionally over the years that followed and have been comforted to receive much the same range of responses.

For example, I asked a close friend, Jürgen, a few weeks ago whether 1989 was still meaningful for him twenty years later, and he nodded vigorously yes. His response was structurally and thematically very similar to so many that I have heard. He said,

> The Fall of the Wall itself wasn't that important to me. What I found much more important was that phase of *Aufbruch* (upheaval) that preceded it. Where people were suddenly able to do the unthinkable, to challenge the entire political system of the GDR. That's an experience that no one in the West has had, and it limits how they can think about the future. The Fall of the Wall itself, well, that was much more about finding security. As if people suddenly realized they had been doing something that people aren't supposed to do. You know, thinking for themselves, imagining a better way of life, challenging authority. The Fall of the Wall was just about running for the cover of the West German system. About going from being protected by the cover (*Deckel*) of the GDR state to being protected by the cover of the West German state. And what we then discovered is that there is enormous *Anpassungsdruck* (pressure to adapt) in both systems. Every system demands that people conform with its principles.

Thus 1989, the *Wende*, is nothing if not singular in public memory in Germany.

As I've written at length elsewhere it was a complex event, both emancipatory and traumatic for the citizens of the two Germanys. In the East, 1989 massively disrupted the lifeworld of the former GDR, but in ways that many do consider retrospectively as if not positive then at least necessary. Which is not to say that the subsequent colonial politics of unification have been either forgotten or forgiven or that the stitches of the union do not continue to scratch. But as Jürgen's response suggests, eastern Germans often remember 1989 as a moment of tremendous personal and social transcendence, a time that somehow remains unsullied by all that came before and after it, an experience that will forever distinguish them from western Germans. Indeed, for some, 1989 is a secret sanctuary in the heart of the neo-liberal world order, a place where one remembers that history has not ended, that radical transformations are still possible.

In the West, meanwhile, life continued after 1989 much as it had beforehand. It always surprises me now twenty years later how few West Germans have thought it worth their time to visit, much less explore, the five new federal states of eastern Germany. The East remains a non-place for a majority of western Germans—a sinister space of radical politics, social intolerance, and provincial small-mindedness, to be sure—but otherwise unremarkable. Conquering powers rarely have to endure the experiential traumas of the conquered, yet I have argued that 1989 had its traumatic aspect for western Germans as well. The occupation and

division of Germany in 1945 deferred and deflected the problem of national accountability for the Holocaust in complex and subtle ways. Even though both post-war German states made an effort to come to terms with the widespread public tolerance and enthusiasm for the Nazi state, the fact of the existence of two Germanys created a situation in which the worst national qualities and legacies of German-ness could easily be deflected West or East. With the existence of two Germanys, one could always easily anchor one's own cultural decency in contrast to ethnotypes like the ultra-competitive, soulless *Wessi* and the crypto-authoritarian clueless *Ossi*. Especially for the many western Germans who saw and continue to see a relatively uninterrupted legacy of authoritarianism stretching from 1933 to 1989 in eastern Germany, the Fall of the Wall meant an uncomfortable co-location with those worst qualities and legacies of German-ness that they believed resided in the East. In the years after 1989, western Germans expressed a great deal of public and personal anxiety about the contamination, poisoning even, of West German democracy with East German authoritarianism. They feared especially being tainted by association with former East German communists, those eastern carriers of the worst traits of German-ness, the ones with a world-class secret police with world-class paranoia, the ones who built Berlin Walls and political prisons like Bautzen to discipline and torment decent people like Christian and Jürgen.

All this is to say again that in Germany, perhaps especially in Berlin, 1989 remains a fabulously, abundantly meaningful event twenty years on. Seemingly fixed and timeless, 1989 anchors myriad memories and generates innumerable new meanings.

But one must also recognize that 1989's diversity of meanings is also centered. Its referentiality has, in other words, a semantic core. Let me return to Christian's and Jürgen's sense of the *Wende* of 1989. It wasn't just a little turn, just a little adjustment, it was an unthinkable *Aufbruch,* upheaval, followed by absolute *Umbruch,* collapse. This is the core of what 1989 means in Germany, whether East or West. It means the end of a *System,* specifically, the end of state socialism. There should be something quite familiar to us about this core meaning of 1989 in Germany because, after all, is this not precisely how 1989 is usually conceived outside of Germany as well?

Clash of the Titans

Since storytelling is an important part of anthropology, let me tell you a fable. It is one you have probably heard many times before, about the struggle among three Greek Titans. The three Titans were named Fascism, Socialism, and Liberalism, and once upon a time they all desired dominion over the world. Although they were siblings, all children of the deity Europa, none of the titans had any love for the other two. And, each titan also possessed a fatal flaw: Fascism was a tyrant, Socialism a dreamer, and Liberalism selfish to the core. After a period of uneasy coexistence, there came a time when Fascism and Socialism thought Liberalism had grown so corrupt, weak, and self-indulgent as to be easily conquered. They thus joined forces in a war on their sibling, which proved to be the most terrible war the world had ever seen. But the alliance was short-lived, faltering on mutual distrust. Fascism, the tyrant, soon betrayed Socialism, deceiving itself that it could master both its siblings at once. Yet their combined strength overcame Fascism's brutality, and after a long and bloody conflict it was vanquished.

With the death of Fascism, Liberalism and Socialism now each controlled half the world. And a wall was built to divide their respective empires. But half a world satisfied neither of them and they each sulked jealously about what lay on the other side of the wall. Still each knew that their weapons had meanwhile grown so powerful that it would be impossible to battle further without destroying the whole world in the process. So Liberalism cleverly conceived to play to Socialism the dreamer's imagination and vanity, that its clever mind could outdo Liberalism's magnificent wealth of arms and goods. Goaded on by Liberalism's taunts, Socialism spent all its strength to out-think and outdo its sibling, harming its citizens, alienating its children, poisoning itself in the process. In the end, aged, unloved, and exhausted, Socialism slumped into clever Liberalism's arms at the foot of the wall that divided the world. Socialism was dead; and Liberalism never had to strike a blow.

The reason this fable is familiar is that it is the myth of twentieth century history seen through the twenty-first century eyes of a victorious Liberalism. Like all myths, it tells a good story, providing the grammar for countless histories, countless plot and character variations, and countless creative twists. But also, like all true mythology, certain key operators connect all the variations. For example, if we ask what the image of 1945 is in this parable, it is always Liberalism and Socialism standing together among the smoke and ruins of war over the body of Fascism. And 1989? It is always the wretched corpse of Socialism cradled in the arms of Liberalism, as Liberalism gazes on the mortals of the world celebrating the end of history and the dawn of a new order. Although the two great victories of Liberalism may be narrated quite differently, let us be very clear that both 1945 and 1989 are equivalently mythologized as "extinction events"; moments when an alternative political and social modernity dies. After 1945, Fascism is no longer treated as a serious political form, but rather as a kind of bogeyman, a carelessly dished out epithet or a strategic scare tactic aimed at disciplining voters or children, still perfect today for the thousand Hollywood films needing a tidy symbol of absolute modern evil. After 1989, Socialism sometimes finds itself folded into Fascism's absolute evil but sometimes, as in wonderful farces like the film "Goodbye Lenin!" and less wonderful dramas like "The Lives of Others," it finds itself treated more as a kind of technocratic authoritarianism, moderately evil yes, but more to the point, riddled with absurd internal contradictions and despair and incapable of providing a viable political alternative to Liberalism.

Whether in public culture, in politics, or in much academic research, the dominant historical narrative of 1989 is that it was the moment when socialism died, its experiments to improve human sociality absolutely defunct and defrauded. For those of us curiously interested in the project of post-socialist studies, part of our job is to argue that socialism retains a significant presence in memory, habits, and institutions. But let's be honest, do we nevertheless not normally treat socialism as a remainder, as a carcass of traditions weighing down the living, rather than as something one might ever expect (or want) to return to life? In this era of the great triumph of neo-liberalism who, for example, dares to speak or write of neo-socialism? Some of the crucial discourse-forming and agenda-setting texts of early post-socialist studies like Janos Kornai's *The Socialist System* and Katherine Verdery's *What Was Socialism and What Comes Next*, were quite unapologetic about burying Socialism the Dreamer. And also quite happy, one might add, to celebrate the political and intellectual

legacies of Liberalism the Victor. With this intellectual history, it is unsurprising that post-socialist studies often feel like a funeral, waiting for the body to finally disappear into the ground. Or like a séance, where we try to elicit from the dead some insight into the living. Post-socialist studies today seems a lot like ghost-hunting; it chases elusive specters, those communist remnants still weirdly at large in the world. This situation is partly but not entirely our fault as scholars. For, in the world at large today, Socialism is already a ghost story, often amounting to not much more than a morality tale about what happens when fools deny that the philosophical premises of Liberalism amount to human nature.

Given the theme of this project, I feel compelled to ask the question: Was 1989 really an extinction event? I offer a pithy response: No. But that response only makes sense if we are willing to rethink what socialism was, and what it is and why anyone should care about it today. Let me be clear that I reject the model of socialism as a defunct, dead *System* not for reasons of professional expediency, in other words, just because I think it's good or necessary for post-socialist studies to do so (although I do think that as well). I reject this model because it misunderstands the relationship of socialism to liberalism both historically and philosophically.

I now want to suggest another way to understand the relationship of socialism and liberalism. I want to look at how socialism and liberalism emerged as the twin children of Enlightenment social philosophy, and I argue that, as in any twinning, socialism and liberalism have always carried within themselves part of the genetic code of the other. When one understands what they are as phenom-ena in knowledge and political culture, neither socialism nor liberalism makes any sense without the other, neither exists without the other and, more to the point, neither dies without the other. With neo-liberalism there would therefore necessarily have to be neo-socialism and the question is only to understand what in the world neo-socialism might be. Moreover, a fascinating aspect of the genetic entanglement of liberalism and socialism is that we can use either one of them to expose the internal principles and paradoxes of the other. With Kornai, Verdery, and many others we have seen, for example, how critical liberalism can be put to work analytically to expose the paradoxes of socialism. I close by sharing a few insights from an ongoing collaborative project with Alexei Yurchak from Berkeley in which we show that the opposite mode of revelation is also possible, that one can work through the analytic lens of late socialism to expose paradoxes and tensions in the political and cultural forms of contemporary late liberal societies as well.

Vanishing Twins

The first thing I need to clarify is that I am speaking here of "liberalism" and "socialism" principally in a philosophical sense and not in the sense of economic structures and institutional formations. I will just beg the patience of the comparativists and institutionalists among you not to misunderstand my line of argument here as a denial of the importance of mediating institutional forms and processes for understanding either socialism or liberalism. What I am trying to do is to grasp the philosophical principles that have guided and justified the evolution of the particular institutional arrangements characteristic of the empirical late socialist and late liberal societies with which we are familiar.

My second caveat is that both liberalism and socialism have generated such large and detailed philosophical canons and discourse universes that I can't pretend to address them in their totality. Still, it helps enormously to recognize that, despite the tremendous intellectual virtuosity that has been poured into them over the past two centuries, in essence, liberalism and socialism each articulate a much more limited set of reflections upon—and ethical postulates for—modern sociality.

Everything else eventually boils down to the following: Liberalism, since at least Rousseau's Second Discourse, posits individuality as the natural state and positive disposition of humanity. Social relations exist, of course, how could Liberalism deny them, but it holds that meaningful, positive social relations are familial and at most communitarian. Like Margaret Thatcher, Liberalism is ultimately skeptical that something like "Society" actually exists as a meaningful reference for politics. Once beyond families and communities, liberalism offers us zones of exchange (in other words, markets), a discourse on rights, and political institutions for the remediation of incommensurable interests and differences (in other words, pluralism). Above all, individual rights are sacrosanct, including the rights of the individual to freely express himself, to pursue freedom even to the point of dominating other lesser individuals, as well as to own and to amass individual property and dispose of that property as he sees fit.

Socialism, by contrast, posits society as the natural state and positive disposition of humanity. Human life is determined ultimately not by the will of the self but by the necessity of social interdependence. By the facts that human beings are not born alone, that selves do not nourish and educate themselves, that all of the great achievements and terrors of humankind have been generated through assemblages of social action. Socialism thus judges politics and interests naturally as societal in character and it is for this reason that when socialism has become institutionalized it has indeed been prone, much as liberalism ac-cuses it, of looking to states and bureaucracies as the best political means available of guaranteeing certain basic social standards of human life, whether in terms of health and nourishment, wages and work, education, justice, housing, or any of the other modern biopolitical spheres. Of course individuality exists, how could Socialism deny it? But individuality is never held to be sovereign; rather it is, let's say like Durkheim's famous proposition "man is double," treated as the biological medium of a set of social forces or relations. Moreover, individualism is often overtly or covertly moralized as a negative force of self-interest that undermines communitarian interest.

Perhaps you can see already the entangled relationship of socialism and liberalism that I alluded to earlier. Taking a page from the phenomenological sociology of knowledge, I would say that liberalism and socialism reflect the crystallization of political ontologies around two experiential poles of modern sociality: for simplicity's sake, let's call these two poles autonomy and relatedness. In a very basic way, liberalism sacralizes the experience of individual autonomy, the recognition that to some extent we can always believe ourselves to be unrelated beings, experiencing the world through individualized senses, ideas, and bodies that are to a significant degree self-sovereign. In a similar way, socialism sacralizes the phenomenological experience of inter-individual relatedness, the recognition that no matter how much we experience human life as an island of selfhood, experience constantly reminds us not just of the archipelago of other selves but that our selfhood is in every way constituted

through and contingent upon interaction with other selves and with trans-individual societal institutions.

To put this more plainly: Liberalism acknowledges relatedness but valorizes autonomy; socialism valorizes relatedness but acknowledges autonomy. For this reason, it is not surprising to find that both liberalism and socialism contain within their philosophical and political arguments an embryonic version of the other, a kind of philosophical vanishing twin. A greatly suppressed secret of European social philosophy is that socialism contains a good deal of repressed liberalist thinking and liberalism its fair share of repressed socialist thinking. What does this mean? For example, Hegel, a great liberal thinker, wrestled throughout his philosophy with dialectics of inter-individuality and inter-culturality even if, in the end, they were woven into an historical narrative promising the teleological advancement of individual freedom. Adam Smith, another great liberal thinker, found it necessary to develop a theory of sympathy and moral sentiment adjacent to his dominant model of the human propensity to "truck, barter, and exchange" as individuals. But Karl Marx is an even more poignant example, given our topic. Marx, perhaps the greatest philosopher of socialism and surely the most influential, argued in his early writings that the entire point of the communist movement and the negation of bourgeois relations of capital and alienation was to unlock the full potential of human individuality. Indeed, the model of Marx as the apologist for Stalinist authoritarianism with which some of us grew up is shattered by reading his early philosophical works in which it becomes clear just how deeply Marx's socialism was informed by Hegel's dialectical liberalism. The ultimate object of Marx's critique of capital was not the creation of any kind of state, authoritarian or otherwise, but rather the transcendence of human alienation. And he promised that leaving alienation behind would unlock the creative, productive capacities of the self. What could be more liberal?

One could, of course, attribute such moments to the confusion or imperfection of individual philosophical projects. But I would rather see them as evidence of the philosophical limits of how far liberalism and socialism can move without acknowledging their entanglement in the interests of the other. After all, without autonomy, what is relatedness? And without relatedness, what is autonomy? Autonomial thinking and relationalist thinking—for that is a more precise way to describe what liberalism and socialism are doing—autonomial and relationalist thinking cannot exist without the other, as much as both of them try to deny it.

From Post-socialist to Neo-socialist Studies

This brings us again to the curious paradox of neo-liberalism and neo-socialism today. The fact that neo-liberalism is diagnosed everywhere and neo-socialism nowhere in our contemporary world. I would be the first to admit that autonomial thinking has exercised massive political and social effects since 1989. But it would be massively mistaken not to see the parallel presence and influence of political modes of relationalist thinking as well. Communitarianism seems to me alive and well across the world, for example, and at all scales of governance and political action. Social democracy, European and otherwise, although perhaps not well, is certainly alive and offers a solid foil to neo-liberal modalities of governance. A great many non-governmental political and social movements—the international anti-free-trade, clean

energy, and digital commons movements are good examples—are similarly informed by relationalist thinking; that is, by a prioritization of some understanding of collective interest and sociality over private interest and individuality. And then of course we have a new generation of modes of populist socialism, the best known of which is perhaps Latin American neo-Bolivarianism, which are challenging, at least discursively, neo-liberal politics of globalization. And these are just a few examples. That neo-socialist politics and movements often seem to exist in a reactive and marginal position to dominant neo-liberalist policies, politics, and institutions is, of course, to be expected. Perhaps the greatest geopolitical legacies of 1989 were its dramatic extension of international markets in labor and capital and its intensification of transnational flows of persons, things, and social forms. The truth claims of sovereign individuals and sovereign markets have offered refuges, ways of finding security, in an era of the acceleration of all manners of social mediation. The last twenty years have thus been a good generation for liberalism, and it is understandable that, on that basis, neo-liberalism is usually understood to have an absolute hegemony and endless horizon. But we should remind ourselves that back in 1988 many of us felt that the polarity of socialism and liberalism was eternal as well.

My point is that socialism is only irrelevant to the world today if we accept the idea that there is no relationalist political thinking and activity today that is not simply repeating the historical legacy of the particular technocratic and authoritarian mode of European state socialism that became known as "communism." This is, of course, an absurd proposition, no more or less absurd that saying that all liberalist thinking today is doing no more than rearticulating and refining the Thatcherism and Reaganism of the 1980s. The ecoliberalism present in green movements across the Western world, for example, is not the same thing as Milton Friedman's pursuit of free markets, I think you would agree. Of course, it would certainly make life easier if socialism and liberalism only amounted to one set of ideas and institutions—there is something comforting about dealing with a unitary System of political principles and forms on a global scale, not least because there is not a thing anyone of us could do to challenge such a System. But this is, once again, 1988 thinking. Neo-socialism need not be one set of discourses, practices, and institutions any more than neo-liberalism need be. It is better to conceive of neo-socialism and neo-liberalism as the work of political ontology to constantly adapt autonomial and relationalist thinking to the exigencies of contemporary experience. For us as social analysts, what is really interesting and important to understand about socialism and liberalism is not their core principles of relatedness and autonomy; those are rather straightforward. Rather, what is interesting is the diversity of political discourses, practices, and institutions that these principles have inspired in their various adaptations to the contemporary world.

So, for those of us who believe socialism remains an important political phenomenon and orientation in the present, I would make a strong case for a transition from post-socialist to neo-socialist studies; that is, from the study of the disappearing legacies of one historical institutionalization of socialism to a broader and deeper investigation of the plurality of relationalist political forms in the world and toward a better understanding of the way in which relationalist and autonomial modes of political thought and action are always entangled with and co-creating of one another. This last point is key because we can't open the analytical

space for a diversity of neo-socialisms unless we also acknowledge the plurality of neo-liberalisms and dispel the illusion that we are facing a unified, conspiratorial system of marketization and exploitation. This is a hopeless a point of departure analytically just as it is politically.

What Late Socialism Teaches Us About Late Liberalism

So there is one programmatic idea for the future: let's move from post-socialist to neo-socialist studies. My second proposal is, I hope, more modest, concrete, and useful. Alexei Yurchak and I have recently been experimenting on how we can use the study of late socialism as a way of uncovering contemporary trends and paradoxes in late liberal discourse, politics, and society. Let me tell you a bit about the first phase of this project, a study of what late socialist parody can teach us about Western political culture today.

Our point of departure is *Stiob*, which is a Russian slang term for a particular late-Soviet style of parody, the method of which was to inhabit the form of authoritative political discourse (e.g., party–state language) so perfectly that it was impossible to tell whether the imitative performance was ironic or sincere. We argue that *Stiob* appeared in late-Soviet socialism in the 1970s and 1980s because of the party-state's obsessive emphasis on the formal orthodoxy of its discourse. As I've discussed elsewhere with respect to censorship in East Germany, late-socialist states typically invested considerable energy into the negotiation of perfected languages of political communication as a means of constituting perfected socialist citizens. Yet, rather than actually achieving this desired effect, late-socialist authoritative discourse most often resulted in expert over-crafting of every aspect of language. For example, if one read front-page articles in *Pravda* or *Neues Deutschland* or any other central party organ in the 1970s, one encountered an exceedingly technical, cumbersome, and often absurd language filled with long sentences, proliferating nominal structures, perplexing passive constructions, and repetitive formulations. If one listened, meanwhile, to speeches of local communist youth leaders one heard texts that sounded uncannily like quotations of previous texts written by their predecessors (which is, in fact, precisely how they were produced). The pressure was always to adhere to the precise norms and forms of already-existing authoritative discourse, and to minimize subjective interpretation or voice. Yurchak terms the result of this pressure "hypernormalization," a snowball effect of the layering of the normalized structures of authoritative discourse upon themselves.

Under such conditions, *Stiob* aesthetics made sense. Faced with political discourse that was already recursively overformalizing itself to the point of caricature, *Stiob's* parodic technique of overidentification sent a more potent critical signal (one articulated in the language of form itself) than any revelatory exposé or gesture of ironic diminishment could have. Moreover, while the state easily identified and isolated any overt form of oppositional discourse as a threat, recognizing and disciplining the critical potential of overidentification was more difficult because of its formal resemblance to the state's own language. Overidentification even offered the possibility of ethical refuge: unlike more overt forms of dissidence and critique, overidentification with state rhetoric did not require one to wholly distance oneself from communist idealism. For this reason, *Stiob* rarely occupied or promoted

recognizable political positions—it existed to some extent outside the familiar axes of political tension between party and opposition, between socialism and liberalism, aware of these axes but uninvested in them.

The hypernormalization of discourse in the late-socialist party–state can thus be interpreted as enabling the performativity of *Stiob*. Now, what we've done in our project is to harness this analysis of late-socialist *Stiob* in order to highlight and explore overformalization and overidentification in late-liberal political discourse as well. Using *Stiob* as a kind of conceptual compass, we have been working through a variety of recent instances of overidentifying parody in Western popular and political culture (for example, "fake" news television shows like *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report*, the activist hoax group, The Yes Men, the parody newspaper *The Onion*, and so on), all of which we gather under the rubric of what we call "American *Stiob*."

I won't try your patience by reconstructing our entire analysis in detail, but in essence we argue that the concept of *Stiob* helps us to reveal how the changing institutional and communicational organization of political culture in the United States (and elsewhere) has consolidated discursive conditions analogous in certain respects to late-socialist hypernormalization. For example, we discuss how the monopolization of broadcast media production and circulation via corporate consolidation and the adaptation of news journalism to digital media have actually made political and economic news content significantly more homogeneous and experientially repetitive. We look at the cementing of liberal-entrepreneurial consensus in political news analysis (paralleled by huge growth in business journalism and the rapid thinning out of investigative reporting); we examine, in keeping with the general professionalization of political life and the central importance of 24/7 news cycles for political communication, how political performances in the United States are increasingly calculated and formalized, concerned more with efficient and precise political messaging than with riskier forms of political debate and communicational improvisation.

For the sake of narrative simplicity, I'm overstating our sense of the kinship between late-Soviet *Stiob* and American *Stiob* (and we explore their differential nuances as well). Clearly, American political discourse is not being actively orchestrated by anything like a Politburo Department of Agitprop. Yet, we argue that for the institutional considerations just outlined, discursive hypernormalization is rising within late liberalism as well, producing the very kinds of repetitive messaging, standardized modes of political performance, and estranged political sentiments, especially among late liberal youth, upon which Stiob-esque meta-political parodists like Stephen Colbert and The Yes Men thrive. So, in short, our experiment allows us to compare the conditions and effects of overformalized political discourse in late-socialist and late-liberal societies.

So, now, finally, to conclude: as political ontologies, as philosophies, as modes of knowing individuals and their social worlds, socialism and liberalism will never be rid of each other much as they might want to be. And, if we can train ourselves to tune out liberal myths concerning the death of socialism and to recognize instead the mutual co-constituting entanglement of modes of autonomial and relationalist thinking, then suddenly our corner of the world of social analysis looks like a much more interesting place. Alongside more actively exploring neo-socialist studies, I suggest that we mine historical forms of socialism for

phenomena that anticipate or otherwise critically illuminate contemporary trends in late-liberal politics, society, and culture. Even if post-socialist studies has been pursuing a vanishing object for some time, or more precisely, even if we find that framing our research within post-socialist analytic frameworks has a vanishing payoff, the futures of neo-socialist and socialist studies look much brighter to me.

Perhaps the problem is simply that we in post-socialist studies—and I very much include myself in that "we," by the way—have been thinking for too long about the 1990s and now the 2000s as though it were still 1988. A wonderful way of memorializing of 1989 20 years later would be to return to that East German sanctuary of *die Wende* and allow an upheaval, an *Aufbruch*, in our common sense of things to restore a sense of possibility for the future. Let's recognize and explore the intimate co-dependency of liberalism and socialism alongside their formal opposition.

Note

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